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As Caesar knew, the tripartite cases are always the most difficult, but 
this does not mean they cannot be subdued, given sufficient patience, in-
sight, and brute force. So it is in voidable preference law. 
A transfer of an interest in debtor's property shortly before bank-
ruptcy may be a voidable preference.1 The theory behind voidable pref er-
ences is that unsecured creditors are supposed to be treated equally with 
other creditors of similar rank. If a transfer from the debtor produces 
more for the creditor than the bankruptcy distribution would have, then 
the creditor may be forced to return the property to the bankruptcy estate 
so that it can be divided ratably among the creditors. 
A voidable preference case is tripartite when a transfer to one credi-
tor benefits another creditor. Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code con-
demns transfe,rs of a debtor's property "to" a creditor and, in addition, 
1 See 11 U,S.C. § 547(b) (1988). Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 
2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in various sections of 
11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3114 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 
U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 
102 Stat. 610 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 
U.S.C.); Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat. 2865 (codified as 
amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C.); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 
Stat. 4789 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in various sections of 
11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-509, 104 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended in various sections of 28 U.S.C.); 
Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-121, 107 Stat. 1153 (codified as amended in various sections of 28 U.S.C.); 
and Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 3146 (codified as amended in 
various sections of 11 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code or Code). 
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transfers "for the benefit of a creditor."2 One transfer, then, may result in 
multiple liabilities. Either the transferee or the party who benefited from 
the transfer may be forced to return the property or its value to the bank-
ruptcy estate. 
Tripartite cases are especially complicated by the fact that the period 
during which preferences are voidable is ninety days for ordinary creditors 
while it is one year for "insiders."3 Thus a creditor initially receiving the 
transfer might be subject to the ninety day period, while the creditor who 
benefi~ed by the same transfer might be an insider subject to a one year 
period. 
Quite independently from section 547(b), tripartition arises from sec-
tion SS0(a),4 the general liability provision for trustee avoidance powers. 
According to section SS0(a): 
to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section ... 547 ... the trustee 
may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the 
court so orders, the value of such property, from- (1) the initial transferee 
of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made 
G 
To be sure, section SS0(d) limits the trustee "to only a single satisfaction 
under subsection (a) of this section."6 Hence, although the trustee may 
ultimately recover once, tripartition increases the number of parties from 
whom the trustee might ultimately recover. 
Louring over any discussion of tripartite voidable preferences is the 
landmark case of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp.7 Universally 
referred to as the Deprizio case, in honor of the debtor, V.N. Deprizio 
Construction Co., the opinion used section 550(a)(1) to extend the voida-
ble preference. period against the transferee from ninety days to one year 
whenever a lender obtained an insider guaranty. That is, the insider 
surety received a benefit from a transfer to the assured creditor within the 
• Id. § 547(b)(1). 
3 "Insider" is a statutorily defined term in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (54) (Supp. V 
1993). The definition includes shareholders, subsidiaries, general partners, relatives, and the like. See 
generally David I. Adelman, Comment, Who ls an "Insider" After the 1984 Amendments to Section 
547(bX4XB)?, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 195 (1987). 
• 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988). Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this Article are to 
sections of the Bankruptcy Code. 
• Id. (emphasis added). 
6 Id. § 550(d). 
7 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). See infra Section III. 
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one year period, and the assured creditor, as initial transferee, had to pay 
for it, even though the transfer was more than ninety days old by the time 
of the bankruptcy petition. Section 550(a)(1) did not excuse an initial 
transferee just because the transfer was more than ninety days old. 
This result scandalized the financial community, which saw no rea-
son why a creditor who prudently obtains suretyship rights against an 
insider should be penalized with a longer preference period. Accordingly, 
Congress amended section 550(a)(1) to assure that only insiders are vul-
nerable for transfers made more than ninety days before bankruptcy. This 
amendment re-letters all the subsections of section 550 and adds subsec-
tion (c), which reads: 
If a transfer made between 90 days and one year before the filing of the 
petition-
(1) is avoided under section 547(b) of this title; and 
(2) was made for the benefit of a creditor that at the time of such 
transfer was an insider; the trustee may not recover under subsection (a) 
from a transferee that is not an insider.8 
This amendment ends or at least severely limits the reign of Deprizio, 
which continued to gain adherents amongst appellate courts until the very 
eve of the amendment. 9 
Nevertheless, tripartite voidable preference cases present a great deal 
of complexity in their own right, even if Deprizio is all but dead. Accord-
ingly, Part I of the Article will focus on matters arising solely from the 
text of section 547(b). This provision sets forth the prima facie case which 
a trustee must establish in order to recover a voidable preference. Part II 
will consider defenses to the prima facie case that arise under section 
547(c). Deprizio itself - and the new environment created by the repeal 
of Deprizio - will be the subject of Part III of the Article.10 
8 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 202, 108 Stat. 4106, 4126 (amending 
11 U.S.C. § 550 by adding new subsection (c)). 
• The Eleventh Circuit endorsed Deprizio in the summer of 1994, just as Congress was about to 
reverse it. Galloway v. First Alabama Bank (In re Wesley Indus., Inc.), 30 F.3d 1438 (11th Cir. 
1994). 
10 This Article is one of a series that addresses the law of security interests on personal property 
and their fate in federal bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, I focus here on issues of concern to 
secured creditors only. Nevertheless, virtually everything that will be said is of relevance to unsecured 
creditors who have received the benefit of a transfer to some other creditor. 
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I. THE TRUSTEE'S PRIMA F ACIE CASE 
A. Benefit 
Quickly, a voidable preference is a transfer of property just before 
bankruptcy. The transfer is voidable because it tends to violate the norm 
that unsecured creditors ought to be equal in the bankruptcy.11 Section 
547(b) does not strictly require that a creditor receive a transfer of debtor 
property in order to be liable for its return. Section 547(b)(1) is equally 
offended if a transfer is merely "for the benefit" of a creditor. Section 
550(a)(1) reiterates the point, rendering liable either "the initial trans-
feree" of a voidable preference or "the entity for whose benefit such trans-
fer was made .... "12 
11 For a complete analysis of the basic elements of voidable preferences in simpler bipartite cases, 
see David Gray Carlson, Security Interests as Voidable Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Code, 
1995 ILL. L. REV. -- (forthcoming). Section 547(b) sets forth six familiar elements of the trustee's 
cause of action. They are: (1) The debtor has transferred an interest in its own property. This re-
quirement appears in the preamble of section 547(b); (2) The property was transferred "to or for the 
benefit of a creditor;" (3) The transfer was "for or on account of antecedent debt owed by the debtor 
before such transfer was made ... ;" (4) The transfer was made at a time when the debtor was 
insolvent. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1)-(3) (1988). For purposes of § 547, the debtor is presumed to be 
insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the bankruptcy. Id. § 547(f). Under Fed. 
R. Evid. 301, "a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going 
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of 
proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on 
whom it was originally cast." (5) The transfer was made on or within 90 days of bankruptcy, id. 
§ 547(b)(4)(A), or within one year of bankruptcy, in the case of insiders. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B). 
Insiders are defined in § 101 (31 ). ( 6) The transfer enables such creditor to receive more .than such 
creditor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had not been made; 
and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provi-
sions of this title .... 
Id. § 547(b)(5). This last element is the hypothetical liquidation test, which establishes that a trans-
feree may not receive more than he would have had there been a chapter 7 liquidation. Otherwise, it 
would violate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among similarly situated 
creditors. 
Some courts think there are more than six elements. See, e.g., Lingley v. Stuart Shaines, Inc. (In 
re Acme-Dunhain Inc.), 50 B.R. 734, 737 (D. Me. 1985) ("In addition to the express statutory 
requirements of a preference, many courts ... have held that for a transfer to be preferentiai in the 
forbidden sense, it must 'diminish the fund to which creditors of the same class can legally resort for 
the payment of their debts.'") (quoting Kapela v. Newman, 649 F.2d 887, 892 (1st Cir. 1981) (citing 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 60.20, at 859-60 (14th ed. 1977))). See also Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. 
Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 801 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 
1986). For an attack on this "diminution" requirement, see Thomas M. Ward & Jay A. Shulman, In 
Defense of the Bankruptcy Code's Radical Integration of the Preference Rules Affecting Commercial 
Financing, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 40-41 (1983). 
'" 11 u.s.c. § 550(~)(1) (1988). 
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"Benefit" is a vague word, and it has caused great detriment to juris-
prudence wherever it has reared its ugly head. For our purposes, it can be 
said that "benefit" invokes a welfare analysis-a comparison of the credi-
tor's well-being before the transfer and her well-being after it. Thus, a 
court must make the following implicit calculation in a tripartite· voidable 
preference case: Just prior to the challenged transfer, a creditor assesses 
her wealth and happiness as equal to some quantity. Call this quantity A. 
After some other person receives a transfer, our creditor reassesses her 
total utility at A 1 • If A 1 > A and the transfer "caused" this increase in 
happiness, then the creditor has enjoyed a "benefit," which section 
547(b)(1) is keen to stamp out. 
Notice that even the slightest benefit rains guilt upon a creditor, but, 
once guilt is established, the creditor is not merely liable for the value of 
the benefit, but is liable for the value of the entire transfer.13 Thus, even 
where the benefit is very small and the transfer is very large, the benefited 
creditor is liable for the latter, larger amount.14 
1. Sureties 
Suretyship is the archetypical (but not the only) case in which trans-
fers to one creditor might benefit another. 1 ~ Typically, payments to as-
sured creditors benefit the surety because, to the extent that the debtor 
pays the assured creditor, the surety is relieved of liability. Since, by defi-
nition, the debtor is insolvent in the context of voidable preferences, 16 any 
dollar the assured creditor extracts from the debtor will displace a subro-
gation claim worth less than a dollar.17 Because this displacement benefits 
the surety, the surety may be liable for the value of transfers made to the 
assured creditor. 18 
13 Naturally, for a preference to be voidable, all the other elements of§ 547(b) must be met, and 
the transaction cannot qualify for any defenses under § 547(c). The present discussion concerns only 
the element of "benefit" in § 547(b)(1). 
" But see T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re T.B. Westex Foods, 
lnc.),.950 F.2d 1187, 1195 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Section 547(b)(S) provides that the transfer is avoidable 
only to the extent that the benefit that the insider received from the transfer exceeded the amount that 
the insider would have received under a Chapter 7 distribution."); see also Levit v. Ingersoll Rand 
Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1195 (7th Cir. 1989) (wrongfully assuming that the trustee can only 
recover the value of the "benefit"). " 
'" For example, transfers to a senior secured party might benefit a junior secured party. See 
infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. ' · 
18 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1988). 
17 This will be true unless the surety or the assured creditor is oversecured. On the effect of 
oversecurity, see infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. 
18 In Trollopean contexts, this can be cruel, as in Gosch v. Burns (In re Finn), 111 B.R. 123 
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Not all payments to the assured creditor will benefit a surety. For 
example, if the surety has guaranteed all the creditors, then payment of 
one creditor instead of another does not "benefit" the surety.19 This is 
good news for general partners who are generally liable for partnership 
debts.20 Because general partners are insiders of a bankrupt partnership, 
they are subject to the one year preference period, rather than the ninety 
day period for ordinary creditors. Payments to the ordinary creditors can-
not benefit the general partners unless the partnership has issued nonre-
course debt to other creditors. If nonrecourse debt exists, then favorable 
treatment of a recourse creditor over a nonrecourse creditor can indeed 
radiate a benefit fatal to general partners.21 
It is very possible to argue that insolvent sureties enjoy no benefit 
when the assured creditor receives a transfer. The transfer implies that 
the insolvent surety will have one less creditor chasing the surety's inade-
quate assets, but if the surety is drowning in a sea of debt, it is certainly 
possible to say that removing one cup of water from the surety's ocean of 
despair will not make her any the less a toast for Neptune. 
Yet, in the sore agony of her death, the insolvent surety, in good 
conscience, should maximize her estate for the benefit of the creditors 
before she sinks below · th<; tumbling billows of the main. If a court in-
(E.D. Mich. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 909 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1990), where a brother casually 
signed his sister's consumer loan agreement. The sister made payments to the lender more than 90 
days before bankruptcy. The brother had no influence over the sister, yet he still had to pay because 
he had the benefit of a transfer to another. Fortunately, the appellate court found that an "ordinary 
course" defense in section 547(c)(2) was possibly available to prevent ultimate liability. Id. at 904. 
19 Ryan v. Zinker (In re Sprint Mortgage Bankers Corp.), 164 B.R. 224, 230 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1994). 
•• And under Deprizio, it was good news for creditors of general partners, who are liable as 
initial transferees under Bankruptcy Code § 550(a)(1) as the initial transferees of others' voidable 
preferences. For cases acquitting creditors with claims against partnerships, see Broad Street Assocs. 
v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co. (In re Broad Street Assocs.), 163 B.R. 68, 72-73 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993); 
Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Seasons Properties v. Miller & Martin (In re Seasons Properties), 
141 B.R. 631, 634 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992). For a case denying that removal of creditors generally 
facilitated the possibility that the partnership debtor might have an equity account in the future that 
would "benefit" the general partner, see Marshack v. Wells Fargo Bank (/n re Walters), 163 B.R. 
575 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994). 
21 For example, suppose a partnership debtor has $100 in assets. It owes $100 to A and $100 to 
B. B has waived recourse against the general partners of the debtor. If the debtor pays $100 to A, the 
general partners benefit because they are relieved of $100 of liability, since B has no recourse. If both 
creditors are recourse creditors, payment of A (in lieu of a pro rata division) is a matter of no conse-
quence to the general partners because they still owe B $100. 
Conversely, if the debtor were ·to pay B, the general partners would be harmed, because A loses a 
pro rata share of the debtor's estate and therefore will recover her full $100 from the general 
partners. 
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dulges in the fiction that all insolvent sureties would do what fiduciary 
duty and good character demand, then anything that tends to eliminate a 
potential creditor benefits the estate of the surety, even as the surety her-
self is drowned. Thus, when we presume the surety is a fiduciary to her 
surfeit of creditors, the surety benefits when the assured creditor is paid. 
In Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. United States Na-
tional Bank of Oregon (In re Suffola, Inc.),22 Judge Jerome Farris ruled 
that insolvent sureties always benefit when the assured creditor receives 
transfers from the debtor. "Insolvency is transitory," he cheerfully ob-
served, "or at least not inherently permanent. A decrease in the degree of 
insolvency, like an increase in the degree of solvency, is beneficial."23 
Hence, just as death is merely prologue to resurrection, so insolvency 
might be overcome by some analogous miracle.24 
2. Nonrecourse Sureties 
What constitutes a "benefit" to nonrecourse sureties has proved con-
troversial. Payments to an assured creditor benefit sureties to the extent 
that the assured obligation shrinks, but this shrinkage might not occur if 
the assured creditor is undersecured, and the surety has pledged collateral 
on a nonrecourse basis. This occurred in Travelers Insurance Co. v. 
Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc. (In re Erin Food Services, Inc.).n The 
surety had pledged about $19 million in collateral on a nonrecourse basis, 
but the assured creditors had $61 million in claims against this property. 
The assured creditors received under $3 million in payment from the 
debtor just before bankruptcy. 
Judge _Cyr ruled that the surety received no benefit until the assured 
obligation fell below $19 million in amount. Only thereafter would collat-
eral be disencumbered.26 For this reason, the payments did not "benefit" 
22 2 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1993). 
28 Id. at 986; accord Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Meredith Hoffman Partners), 
12 F.3d 1549, 1555-56 (10th Cir. 1993). See also Lowrey v. Manufacturer's Hanover Leasing Corp. 
(In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 6 F.3d 701 (10th Cir. 1993) (where insider was $96 million in 
debt, payment of $176,000 to assured creditor still constituted a benefit to the insider surety). 
24 See also T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins .. Corp. (In re T.B. Westex Foods, 
Inc.), 950 F.2d 1187, 1192 n.8 (5th Cir. 1992) (fact that alleged surety actually went bankrupt and 
had all debts discharged did not mean that earlier transfers prior to discharge were not for the alleged 
surety's benefit). 
2• 980 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1992). 
•• "If Erin had not made the three interest payments, [the surety] would have held a contingent 
unsecured claim against the debtor estate in the amount of $19.35 million; immediately after the 
challenged transfers, [the surety] held a contingent unsecured claim in the same amount." Id. at 803. 
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the surety, and hence the surety was not liable for a voidable preference. 27 
Ironically, had the surety filed a chapter 11 petition-as commonly 
happens when the surety is an insider-the nonrecourse claim of the as-
sured creditor would have become a recourse claim. According to section 
111 l(b)(l)(A), a nonrecourse creditor must be treated as having recourse, 
unless the debtor plans to sell the collateral. This creation of artificial 
recourse, however, exists only in chapter 11 and nowhere else. Given this 
artificial recourse, the surety's chapter 11 petition would have generated a 
voidable preference liability in the bankruptcy of the principal obligor .. 
Because an insolvent surety has the power to file for bankruptcy in 
chapter 11, where the nonrecourse claim becomes a recourse claim, the 
mere potential of recourse in chapter 11 could prove that the insolvent 
nonrecourse insider has benefited when the undersecured assured creditor 
receives a transfer on the underwater part of the claim. But not every 
insolvent party belongs in chapter 11. Chapter 11 is premised on produc-
ing a dividend for a creditor that equals or exceeds a hypothetical chapter 
7 dividend. 28 This Paretian requirement of net going concern value will 
eliminate chapter 11 as an honest possibility for many debtors. With it 
goes any voidable preference theory in the principal obligor's bankruptcy, 
where the surety must be viewed as nonrecourse.29 
27 In a similar case, Judge Philip G. Reinhard wrote: 
[T]he plain language of section 54 7 (b) refers to benefit. There is nothing in the language of 
section 547(b) to suggest that benefit is equivalent to potential or possible benefit. Second, 
it cannot necessarily be said that with each payment the guarantors were brought one step 
closer to the direct reduction of their guarantee. Each payment may very well have brought 
[ the debtor] closer to bankruptcy and thus increased the likelihood that the guarantors 
would become liable to Sequa. Suffice it to say, the concepts of potentiality and possibility 
carry with them all sorts of unknown or unpredictable consequences which do not readily 
lend themselves to an ascertainable determination of the existence of a benefit. Conse-
quently, this court does not consider the term "benefit in section 547(b) to embrace poten-
tial benefit. 
'cannon Ball Indus., Inc. v. Sequa Corp. (In re Cannon Ball Indus., Inc.), 155 B.R. 177, 180 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1993). 
•• 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988). 
•• The sequence of the bankruptcy petitions may be relevant here. If the original debtor filed 
first, the surety's contingent claim against the debtor is limited to the value of the surety's collateral 
pledged to the assured creditor. The later addition of a recourse liability is a postpetition event, insofar 
as the principal obligor is concerned. It is often held that, in hypothesizing a liquidation for the 
purpose of the test in § 547(b), a court may not imagine any postpetition event. Neuger v. United 
States (/n re Tenna Corp.), 801 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1986); Carlson, supra note 11. On the other 
hand, if the surety filed first, then recourse exists as of the time of the original debtor's bankruptcy. 
Palmer Clay Prods. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227, 229 (1936) (hypothetical liquidation test judged on facts 
that exist as of the bankruptcy petition). When the assured creditors were paid, however, the surety 
was nonrecourse. At this time, "benefit" would have to be based on the mere potential to file for 
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Erin Food Services bears a contradictory relationship with Official 
Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. United States National Bank of Ore-
gon (In re Suffola, Inc.),30 where Judge Jerome Farris held that any 
transfer to the assured creditor benefits the insolvent surety, because insol-
vency is only transitory.31 In both cases, the transfers in question did not 
cause direct harm to the surety's equity interest in its own estate, but each 
represented an incremental step toward that future possibility. Yet Erin 
Food Services held that benefit did not exist, whereas Suffola held the 
opposite. 
3. Assured Creditors 
Transfers to the assured creditor may benefit the surety, but what 
about the converse? Can the surety's security interest benefit the assured 
creditor? If so, the assured creditor assumes potential liability for the ben-
eficial transfer. 
Sometimes, transfers clearly increase the welfare of the assured credi-
tor. For example, suppose the debtor appeases an unpaid creditor with a 
new surety arrangement. As inducement for the extension of this new 
credit, the debtor grants the surety a security interest. Being the sine qua 
non of the suretyship arrangement, the security interest clearly benefits 
the assured creditor on an antecedent debt. In such cases, the assured 
creditor is liable for the value of the security interest granted to the 
surety.32 
A surety's security interest benefits the assured creditor when the 
surety receives it contemporaneously with the surety's extension of credit. 
But where the suretyship comes first with the security interest following 
thereafter,· it is far from clear whether the assured creditor is benefited. 
For example, suppose an assured creditor obtains the guaranty of some 
solvent insider. The insider has no collateral from the debtor. Later, just 
before the debtor's bankruptcy, the insider nervously takes collateral from 
the debtor for any subrogation claim. In this example, the assured creditor 
has not benefited from the grant of this security interest. The unsecured 
guaranty was enough to guarantee repayment; the subsequent security in-
chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
• 0 2 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1993). 
81 This case is discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 22-24. 
•• Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917); American Bank v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air Con-
ditioning, Inc.), 845 F.2d 293 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc. 
v. American Bank, 488 U.S. 993 (1988); Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 
831 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1987), modified on other grounds, 835 F.2d 584 (1988). 
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terest granted to the surety adds nothing to the rights of the assured credi-
tor and is merely for the benefit of the surety who received it directly. 33 
Similarly, if the assured creditor possesses an adequate security interest on 
assets of the surety or the surety has already paid up on her obligation to 
the assured creditor, any subsequently created security interest enriches 
only the surety, not the assured creditor. 
If, however, the surety was insolvent at the time it received the secur-
ity interest from the debtor on antecedent debt, and if the assured creditor 
has no security interest from the surety, it is possible to spy some benefit 
to the assured creditor. The argument, admittedly difficult, may proceed 
as follows: Any payment by the insolvent surety to the assured creditor 
would be a voidable preference in the surety's own bankruptcy. Neverthe-
less, if the surety pays, knowing that the payment can be recovered en-
tirely from collateral pledged by the principal obligor (the debtor), the 
insolvent surety, as fiduciary for her general creditors, has furthered the 
interests of her creditors. The elimination of one unsecured creditor at the 
expense of a third party benefits all the unsecured creditors of the insol-
vent surety who remain. This incentive to pay the assured creditor, arising 
from the insolvent surety's security interest, constitutes the benefit to the 
assured creditor, rendering the assured creditor liable to the principal ob-
ligor's trustee for the surety's security interest. 
Yet the payment by the insolvent surety to the assured creditor is at 
least potentially voidable in the surety's bankruptcy. The voidability of 
this payment complicates the claim that any security interest transferred 
to the insolvent surety (after the suretyship agreement is executed) bene-
1 fits the assured creditor. A paradox exists that may prevent an assured 
creditor from ever obtaining the benefit of a security interest issued di-
rectly to an insolvent surety. 
One idea from state law could radically strengthen the position of the 
principal obligor's bankruptcy trustee. The Restatement of Suretyship, 
like its ancestor, the Restatement of Security,34 declares that the assured 
creditor is always . subrogated to the security interests granted to the 
surety.35 If followed, then security interests issued to the surety always 
88 Security Servs., Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Security Servs., Inc.), 132 B.R. 
411 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991). 
84 RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 140 (1941). 
80 According to § 29 of Restatement of Suretyship: 
When the principal obligor supplies collateral securing its duty of performance or reim-
bursement to the secondary obligor, and the secondary obligor defaults on the secondary 
obligation, the obligee may elect to enforce for its benefit the rights of the secondary obligor 
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benefit the assured creditor and therefore the assured creditor is always 
liable for them when all other elements of section 547(6) are satisfied. 
This is an ironic result, since the Restatement of Suretyship aims to help, 
not harm, the assured creditor. 
Assume that a security interest issued to a surety on antecedent debt 
actually does benefit the assured creditor. In principle, section SSO(a)(1) 
authorizes the trustee to recover the "property transferred" -specifically, 
the security interest granted to the insider-or the value of such property 
"if the court so orders." That is, the trustee may, with court permission, 
let the security interest stand and instead obtain the value of the security 
interest. Furthermore, the value of the security interest may be recovered 
either from the insider ("the initial transferee" of the preference) or the 
"person benefited" by the security interest. This means that the insider 
may keep the security interest in question, but the unpaid assured creditor 
will have to reimburse the bankruptcy trustee for the value of this security 
interest. That is, the assured creditor is out of pocket on the original loan 
and must pay for the security interest issued to the surety. Chapter 11 
exacerbates this discrepancy when the insider is in control of the debtor-
in-possession and hence primarily responsible for setting litigation strat-
egy. The insider is therefore in a position to suggest that the recovery be 
aimed at the assured creditor and not at herself. 
Taunt v. Fidelity Bank (In re Royal Golf Products Corp.)86 raised 
such an issue. There, the insider surety executed an irrevocable letter of 
credit to guarantee a loan taken by Royal Golf. When Royal Golf de-
faulted, the assured creditor was prepared to draw on the letter of credit. 
To avoid losing the shares of Royal Golf pledged as collateral for the line 
of credit, the insider paid the assured creditor out of his own assets. The 
insider, however, also had a prior security agreement with Royal Golf to 
collateralize any subrogation claim arising from a payment made on the 
corporation's behalf. 
Both the bankruptcy and appellate courts found these payments to be 
voidable preferences to the extent they diminished the debtor's estate by 
increasing the insider's security interest.37 Thus, the insider's security in-
terest was allowed to stand while the payment to the assured creditor was 
with respect to the collateral to the extent of the secondary obligor's failure to perform the 
secondary obligation. 
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP § 29 (Tentative Draft No. 2 1993). 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(I) (1988). 
•• 908 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1990). 
•• Id. at 95. 
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avoided. 38 This astonishing result could follow only if the surety's security 
interest, received antecedently to the suretyship agreement, benefited the 
assured creditor. 
To be precise, the security interest in Royal Golf Products was cre-
ated contemporaneously with the suretyship agreement and loan by the 
assured creditor, but the surety forgot to perfect his security interest. The 
Bankruptcy Code defers the timing of such transfers, so that what was 
previously an unpreferential contemporaneous exchange becomes a trans-
fer on antecedent debt. 39 This manipulation of timing illustrates one of the 
principal ways in which the Bankruptcy Code persecutes unperfected se-
curity. interests.4° 
If one focuses on the contemporaneous exchange, the security interest 
"benefited" the assured creditor because it may have been part of the fi-
nancial package that induced the assured creditor to lend. If one focuses 
on the perfection of the security interest and the timing of the transfer, the 
security interest is on antecedent debt, and its beneficial effect on the as-
sured creditor is less clear. 
In any case, by holding the assured creditor liable, Judge Jones in 
Royal Golf Products implied that the security interest benefited the as-
sured creditor. The assured creditor in that case suggested that, given the 
invalidity of the surety's unperfected security interest in bankruptcy, the 
surety should be treated as an unsecured surety, and the assured creditor 
should therefore be excused from all liability for the security interest. In 
other words, the assured creditor argued that it obtained no benefit from a 
security interest that was unperfected, because an unperfected security in-
terest is tantamount to no security interest. 
The assured creditor's argument overlooks the fact that the un-
perf ected security interest is a transfer from the debtor to the surety just 
before bankruptcy, under the timing rule of section 547(e)(2)(C).41 It is 
precisely this unperfected security interest that the trustee was seeking to 
avoid, and the assured creditor, as the "beneficiary" of the security inter-
est, was liable for its value, under section 547(b)(2)42 and section 
550(a)(1).4~ When the dust settled, the surety would be a secured, not 
unsecured, creditor in the debtor's bankruptcy, because, having recovered 
•• Id. 
•• 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(C) (1988). 
•• See Carlson, supra note 11. 
•• 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(C) (1988). 
•• Id. § 547(b)(2). 
•• Id. § 550(a)(l). 
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once from the assured creditor, the trustee could not recover again from 
the insider.44 
4. Nexus 
In all of the above suretyship situations, the trustee's recovery was 
predicated upon benefit to a creditor of the debtor. Either the surety bene-
fited with regard to her contingent claim against the debtor, or, con-
versely, the assured creditor benefited by transfers to the surety. In both 
cases there was a connection (or nexus) between the suretyship contract 
and the benefit received. Many courts assert this nexus as a vital part of 
the trustee's theory of recovery against the beneficiary of a transfer (or 
against the initial transferee, where recovery is predicated on· the presence 
of a beneficiary). 
According to this nexus requirement: 
... [I]t is not enough that an insider be a creditor of the debtor in a general 
sense; the insider must have a "claim" against the debtor attributable to the 
specific debt he or she guaranteed in order to render transfers made by the 
debtor on account of that debt to the non-insider transferee avoidable under 
§ 547(b).43 
The nexus theory requires that the claims against the debtor must enjoy a 
unity, such that payment or collateralization of one implies payment or 
collateralization of the other,46 or, in the alternative, that the debtor must 
have intended that the transfer to the initial transferee benefit some spe-
cific antecedent debt owed to some other creditor.47 If justified, this nexus 
•• 11 U.S.C. § SS0(d) (1988), as amended by Act, supra note 8, § 202, 108 Stat. at 4126. 
•• Hendon v. Associates Commercial Corp. (In re Fastrans, Inc.), 142 B.R. 241, 245 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. 1992). 
•• This branch of the requirement would cover the typical case where the debtor pays the as-
sured creditor, thereby relieving the surety of its suretyship obligation. 
47 This branch of the requirement covers transfers to sureties for the benefit of an assured credi-
tor. E.g., Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1987), 
modified, 835 F.2d 584 (1988) (per curiam). It also covers cases in which a creditor enjoying no 
suretyship protection is simply paid or collateralized by a third party because the debtor transferred 
assets to the third party in exchange for that payment. E.g., Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917). 
In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc. (In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.), 980 
F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1992), Judge Conrad Cyr ruled that the nexus theory absolutely required reduc-
tion of the joint debt. In Erin, the trustee could not show that the surety's claim against the debtor 
was benefited by transfers to the assured creditor, because the surety was a nonrecourse secured party, 
and the assured claim was well under water. The trustee therefore asserted that, because of payments 
to undersecured creditors, bankruptcy was deferred-a benefit to the surety. Judge Cyr disagreed, 
explaining that the deferral of bankruptcy was not reduction of debt because of the nexus 
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requirement makes it difficult for a trustee to export tripartite preference 
theory very far from the context in which the debtor is the principal obli-
gor and one of the creditors is surety for the debtor. For example, no 
tripartite voidable preference case could be brought by the surety's bank-
ruptcy trustee, if the nexus requirement exists. 48 
The second branch of the nexus requirement-founded upon the 
debtor's mental state-can be located in the language of section 547(b) 
itself. According to section 547(b)(2), a transfer or the benefit emanating 
therefrom must be "for or on account of' an antecedent debt. 49 This lan-
guage suggests that the transfer must be laden with purpose-that the 
debtor must intend to connect a transfer to a specific debt. Furthermore, 
the hypothetical liquidation test in section 547(b)(5) refers to a hypotheti-
cal bankruptcy dividend on "such debt" -the debt a transfer was intended 
to benefit:10 That is, the benefit intentionally allocated to a certain, singu-
lar debt must be compared to the hypothetical liquidation dividend that 
the very same debt would generate. Thus, the nexus requirement could be 
grounded in the language of section 547(b). If this analysis holds, an inci-
dental benefit or even a simple intent to benefit a person who happens by 
coincidence to have a claim against the debtor is not good enough. 
Meanwhile, the first branch of the nexus requirement-unity of 
claims of two creditors held independently against the debtor--can be seen 
as a special case of the second branch. If two claims are really one 
claim-as in the case of suretyship-then the natural consequence of pay-
ing or collateralizing one claim is to pay or collateralize the other. Intent 
contemplates not only the direct anticipation of cause and effect, but also 
requirement: 
The equation could not be more clear. Unless the creditor for whose "benefit" the transfer 
was made realized some quantifiable monetary advantage from the debtor's transfer, there 
would be no practicable method for determining whether "such creditor ... receive(d] more 
than such creditor would receive" in the event of a chapter 7 liquidation. Thus, interpret-
ing all its parts harmoniously, as we must, we believe section 54 7 (b) plainly mandates that 
the "benefit" inquiry under section 547(b) be confined ... to transfers of the debtor's 
property which are shown to have resulted in a quantifiable monetary reduction in the 
insider-creditor's contingent claim against the debtor's chapter 7 estate to the detriment of 
other creditors of the same class. 
Id. at 800-01 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). This statement of the nexus requirement goes 
too far. By requiring that the debtor's transfer of property result in a monetary reduction of an 
insider's claim, Cyr has eliminated any case involving security interests, or any case in which the 
surety is the initial transferee and the assured creditor is the beneficiary. 
•• See Southmark Corp. v. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc. (In re Southmark Corp.), 993 F.2d 
117, 119 (5th Cir. 1993). 
•• 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1988). 
•• For a description of the hypothetical liquidation test, see supra note 11. 
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the launching of a cause with knowledge that the effect is certain to fol-
low. 51 The nexus between benefit and debt, then, is forged by the will of 
the debtor and is reduced to a question of the debtor's intent to pay or 
secure a specific antecedent debt. 
A nexus requirement can also be drawn directly from the Deprizio 
holding.52 In Deprizio, Judge Frank Easterbrook ruled that the trustee 
could recover a benefited creditor's voidable preference from an innocent 
"initial transferee," but he could not recover withholding tax paid to the 
Internal Revenue Service based upon the theory that insiders were like-
wise benefited from such payments.53 The insiders did indeed benefit from 
payment of withholding tax. Because those taxes were paid, the insiders 
avoided "responsible person" liability under section 6672(a) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.54 But, as a matter of state law such liability would 
generate no claim over against the debtor. Such indemnity rights are un-
available in the area of intentional torts, Judge Easterbrook predicted.55 
It is quite apparent that these same insiders were "creditors" of the 
debtor. They had, for example, suretyship claims against the debtor aris-
ing from loan transaction claims which were the very basis of Deprizio' s 
famous holding. Yet, even though the insiders were "creditors" who re-
ceived the "benefit" of avoiding control person liability under section 
6672(a), Easterbrook refused to find them liable. Their immunity from 
liability necessarily implies a nexus requirement.56 
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § SA (1965) (intent exists when "the actor desires to 
cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that consequences are substantially certain to result 
from it"). 
•• Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1191-92 (7th Cir. 1989). 
•• Id. 
•• Id. (citing I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1988)). 
•• Id. at 1192. Judge Easterbrook apparently assumed this to be a matter of state law and noted 
that at common law no indemnity claim could exist in favor of the intentional or reckless tortfeasor. 
Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 343 (5th ed. 1984)). This suggests 
that state governments might specifically create indemnity rights in trust fund tax cases, thereby ren-
dering the IRS liable to return any trust fund taxes received with 90 days of bankruptcy and deliver-
ing a severe blow to public tax collection. 
Fortunately for the IRS, the Supreme Court short-circuited this threat. In Begier v. Internal 
Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990), Justice Thurgood Marshall ruled that the entire bankrupt estate 
is held in trust for any withholding taxes which, if they remain unpaid, will give rise to § 6672(a) 
liabilities. Id. As a result of this holding, any payment to the IRS is not a transfer of property of the 
debtor, and payment of such taxes can never be a voidable preference. See generally Wayne Rodney, 
Note, The Non-Traceable 7501 Tax Trust and Bankruptcy Superpriority, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 
449 (1992). 
•• See, e.g., Southmark Corp. v. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc. (In re Southmark Corp.), 993 
F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1993) (reading Deprizio in this fashion); Hendon v. Associates Commercial 
Corp. (In re Fastrans, Inc.), 142 B.R. 241, 244-45 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) (same). 
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At least one case expressly rejects the nexus requirement. In Johnson 
v. NBD Park Ridge Bank (In re Octagon Roofing),r;7 a surety filed for 
bankruptcy. As we have seen, any claim by the surety's bankruptcy trus-
tee based upon a tripartite voidable preference theory violates the nexus 
requirement.r;8 Yet, in Octagon Roofing, the surety's trustee prevailed. 
The debtor in Octagon Roofing was a subsidiary and surety to its 
spendthrift parent. The surety issued a security interest to the assured 
creditor for the antecedent suretyship obligation and also for an antece-
dent debt that the surety happened to owe the assured creditor indepen-
dently. The security interest was more than ninety days but less than a 
year old at the time of the surety's bankruptcy. Therefore, the surety's 
bankruptcy trustee had to show that the transfer to the assured creditor 
"benefited" the parent. If so, then, per Deprizio the assured creditor was 
liable as the "initial transferee" of another's voidable preference. r;9 
,Judge Jack Schmetterer found a benefit to the insider: the grant of 
the security interest caused the principal obligor to forbear from enforcing 
its claim against the insider.80 This benefit bore no "nexus" with the 
cla~m, owned by the insider against the debtor. Insofar as the suretyship 
relation was concerned, the insider had no claim against the debtor. On 
the contrary, the debtor had a claim against the insider. Nevertheless, the 
insider was additionally a creditor for other, unrelated matters. It was a 
"benefited" creditor and hence liable for the surety's grant of a security 
interest to the assured creditor. According to Judge Schmetterer: 
There is nothing in Deprizio, or in any cases which have followed the rea-
soning of the Deprizio court, which suggests that the benefit to the inside 
creditor must be monetary in nature and cannot include forbearance such as 
that exercised by the Bank in favor of [the insider].81 
•• 124 B.R. 522, 531-32 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991). 
•• See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
•• Another feature of Octagon Roofing is that the assured creditor claimed a security interest for 
two different debts-one a claim against the surety of an insider and one on account of its own claim. 
The security interest was voidable as to the former, under the anti-nexus interpretation of Deprizio. 
The other was on antecedent debt, although it was valid because the security interest was more than 
90 days old by the time of the bankruptcy and was not for the benefit of any insider. 
Since every separate advance gives rise to separate security interests, the security interest for the 
suretyship might have been stricken on a Deprizio theory, but the other security interest for the 
antecedent debt should have been upheld. Judge Jack Schmetterer, in considering the secured party's 
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, implied that the entire security 
interest was void, even for the antecedent debt. 
•• 124 B.R. at 532. 
"' Id. 
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Of course, we have seen that Deprizio does indeed imply the nexus re-
quirement's existence62 and is therefore in contradiction with the result in 
Octagon Roofing. 
Octagon Roofing, if correct, opens up new vistas of voidable prefer-
ence liability. Under Octagon Roofing, insiders who are creditors of the 
debtor will be liable for anything paid to other creditors, provided that the 
insider somehow "benefited" by the transfer.63 
5. junior Secured Parties 
Transfers to senior oversecured creditors disencumber collateral for 
the benefit of the junior secured party. Without the reference to the bene-
fited junior secured party, these transfers are not directly recoverable from 
the senior secured creditor under section 547(6),64 because such payments 
supposedly cannot be challenged under the hypothetical liquidation test. 611 
But these same payments benefit the undersecured junior secured party, 
who might therefore be liable for them.66 By way of example, suppose 
that A is senior to B. Both A and B each claim $100, but the total collat-
eral is worth $150. Accordingly, B is undersecured and can expect only 
$50 of collateral. If the debtor pays A $10, and the collateral retains its 
value of $150,67 B has benefited. B's collateral has improved from $50 to 
$60. B's benefit, then, precisely equals the $10 payment.68 
62 It did so in the context of its ruling that the IRS did not have to return all withholding taxes 
paid one year before the bankruptcy. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
63 Two other authors have suggested that transfers to a subsidiary of the lender benefit the ' 
lender and are therefore recoverable from the lender. Craig H. Averch & Michael J. Collins, Avoid-
ance oJForeclosure Sales as Preferential Transfers: Another Serious Threat to Secured Creditors?, 
24 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 985, 1012 (1993). Such a veil-piercing proposition also contradicts the 
nexus requirement. 
For other sources denying a nexus requirement, see Peter A. Akes, Rethinking Professor West-
brook's Two Thoughts About Insider Preferences, 77 MINN. L. REV. 605, 625 (1993); Donald W. 
Baker, Repayments of Loans Guaranteed by Insiders as Avoidable Preferences in Bankruptcy: 
Deprizio and its Aftermath, 23 U.C.C.L.J. 115, 145-46 (1990). 
64 As always, if the junior creditor has received the voidable benefit of transfers to the senior 
secured party, then, under Deprizio, the senior secured party must pay, as initial transferee of these 
preferences. See infra notes 322-33 and accompanying text. 
60 The hypothetical liquidation test protects any transfer to an oversecured party. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 547(6)(5) (1988). For some heretical suggestions to the contrary, see Carlson, supra note 11. 
66 Ward & Shulman, supra note 11, at 37-38. 
67 By implication, the $1Q payment is not cash proceeds of A's security interest. If the $10 is 
already encumbered, its surrender to A does not benefit B, because the payment implies that collateral 
has shrunk from $150 to $140. 
•• In suretyship cases, courts have learned to impose a nexus requirement in tripartite voidable 
preference cases. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text. According to this nexus requirement, 
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Furthermore, A, the oversecured party, will be liable as well, under a 
Deprizio theory. Whereas Congress has repealed Deprizio when the trus-
tee attempts to recover from the initial transferee for transfers more than 
ninety days before bankruptcy, it has left untouched the premise of 
Deprizio in all other cases.69 Hence, where an oversecured creditor has 
received transfers benefiting the junior secured party, the senior over-
secured party is still liable for the voidable preference. 
The leading case holding B liable for transfers to A is In re Pres-
cott, 70 'where A-a bank-was undersecured until it received various 
transfers: After these transfers, A was oversecured. Accordingly, the first 
few increments of transfer, which caused A to improve its position, did not 
benefit B directly. 71 But after A was fully secured, every unencumbered 
dollar transferred to A benefited B pro tanto. 
In Prescott, A received three kinds of transfers: (1) additional collat-
eral that B could not claim; (2) funds deposited in an overdrawn checking 
account; and (3) additional deposits in the checking account beyond the 
overdrawn amount.72 Later, the resulting positive balance was offset by A, 
thereby reducing the amount of the senior secured claim. 
The first of these three transfers-the assignment of additional col-
lateral to A-was clearly for the benefit of B, once A was oversecured. 
the debtor must intend a benefit in connection with a single debt which is owed to one creditor and 
guaranteed by another. Intent, however, contemplates not merely the desire for the result, but also the 
conscious invoca:tion of a cause with the knowledge that the effect must necessarily follow. On this 
latter definition of intent, tripartite cases involving junior and senior creditors meet the nexus require-
ment It is a natural consequence of transfers to the senior secured creditor that the junior under-
secured creditor is rendered more secure. 
•• Once again, new § 550(c) provides: 
If a transfer made between 90 days and one year before the filing of the petition- (1) is 
avoided under section 547(b) of this title; and (2) was made for the benefit of a creditor 
that at the time of such transfer was an insider; the trustee may not recover under subsec-
tion (a) from a transferee that is not an insider. 
Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 8, § 292, 108 Stat. at 4126 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 550(c) 
(1988) by adding new subsection (c)). 
•• 805 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1986). 
11 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc. (In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.), 980 
F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1992); but see Cannon Ball Indus., Inc. v. Sequa Corp. (In re Cannon Ball Indus., 
Inc.), 150 B.R. 929, 932 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1992) (taking the position that such increments move a 
"person benefited" closer to direct benefit and so are themselves benefits). These holdings are dis-
cussed supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. 
The statement in the text assumes that the incrementalist philosophy of the Ninth Circuit will 
not be applied Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon (In re 
Suffola, Inc.), 2 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1992). See supra text and accompanying notes 22-24. 
•• 805 F.2d at 721. 
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Under ordinary principles of marshaling of assets,73 additional collateral 
available to A resulted in additional collateral available to B.74 
The deposits in the checking account, to the extent they covered the 
overdrafts, were also clearly transfers for the benefit of B. Such d~posits 
were not setoffs but payments of a senior debt owed to A. Since these 
deposits were not distinguishable from any other payment of senior debt, 
B received a benefit. 
The most difficult question was whether the setoff of deposits beyond 
the amount of the overdrafts could be recovered from B. Judge Robert 
Martin had ruled that this setoff was a transfer for the benefit of B, 
thereby making the junior party liable for its value. 76 
That setoffs implicate transfers by a debtor may seem surprising at 
first. 76 But, especially after the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Code, the proposition cannot be denied. Even before the first amendment 
to section 500 in 1984, one might have observed that the mere existence of 
a setoff opportunity not yet exercised implies that a creditor has a secured 
claim in bankruptcy.77 This concept tends to support the notion that setoff 
opportunities are in the nature of security interests in property of the 
78 The doctrine of marshaling assets is an equitable rule for the benefit of junior secured parties. 
According to this doctrine, if the senior secured party has two pools of collateral-one encumbered by 
a junior security interest and the other not-the senior secured party should look to the singly encum-
bered collateral before pursuing the doubly encumbered collateral. The doctrine of marshaling applies 
only if it causes no inconvenience to the senior secured party of any·kind. Moses Lachman, Note, 
Marshaling Assets in Bankruptcy: Recent Innovations in the Doctrine, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 671, 
672-73 (1985). 
74 The collateral in question was a certificate of deposit, apparently payable by some other bank. 
See Armstrong v. Marine Bank Dane County (In re Prescott), 51 B.R. 751, 753-54 (Bankr. D. Wis. 
1985) (senior-secured party said to have "cashed the certificate of deposit"), aff d, 805 F.2d 719 (7th 
Cir. 1986). A "certificate of deposit" is simply a bank's unsecured obligation to pay. U.C.C. § 3-
104(j) (1978). If the debtor had "pledged" the senior secured party's own certificate of deposit over 
the senior secured party, the senior secured party would have had a setoff opportunity, not an Article 
9 security interest.· 
70 51 B.R. at 576-77. 
78 Under the former Bankruptcy Act, courts usually denied that setoffs were transfers of debtor 
property. National Bank of Newport v. National Herkimer County Bank, 225 U.S. 178, 185 (1912) 
("The fact then is not ... that 'the bankrupt parted with property ... and the bank received it,' but 
rather that the bankrupt parted with nothing, and the bank received then money of the [affiliate] and 
redelivered to the [affiliate] the paper and collateral."); New York County Nat'! Bank v. Massey, 192 
U.S. 138, 147 (1904) ("A deposit of money ... in a bank does not operate-to diminish the estate of 
the depositor. It is not a transfer as security .... "); but see Katz v. First Nat'! Bank of Glen Head, 
568 F.2d 964, 970 (2d Cir. 1977) (setoffs could be transfers if they were fraudulent attempts to loot 
the debtor's estate). 
77 See 11 U.S.C, § 506(a) (1988) ("An allowed claim of a creditor ... that is subject to setoff 
under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the ... amount subject to setoff .... 
~ . 
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debtor. In 1984, Congress erased doubt by amending section 550(a) to 
~ead: 
to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section ... 553(b) ... the 
trustee may recover ... the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, 
the value of such property, from (1) the initial transferee of such transfer or 
the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made .... 78 
Section 553(b) is a setoff rule that attempts to prevent improvement in 
position by a creditor over the life of the preference period. In section 
550(a), the avoided setoff is specifically labeled a "transfer."79 
The reference in section 550 to setoff s was added in 1984, and, on 
appeal, Judge Richard Cudahy thought he had to apply the pre-1984 
statute to the setoff in question. Nevertheless, Judge Cudahy ruled that 
the 1984 amendment to section 550(a) simply made explicit an earlier 
intent of Congress with regard to setoffs that benefit third parties.80 
But when did the setoff become a transfer? In Prescott, all the sur-
plus deposits in the checking account, plus the setoff itself, occurred 
within the preference period, and so the exact moment of the transfer did 
not have to be identified.81 Under any assumption, B received the benefit 
•• 11 U.S.C. § SS0(a) (1988). 
•• Oddly, setoffs that violate § 553(b) are transfers, but setoffs that violate § 553(a) are not 
likewise labeled in § SS0(a). 
It may also be noted that, after 1984, the trustee could have prevailed against B for A's setoff 
without any reference to voidable preference law. Rather, the trustee could show that the entire setoff 
constituted an improvement of position under § 553(b)(1). Section 553(b)(1) provides, in relevant 
part: 
[I]f a creditor offsets a mutual debt owing to the debtor against a claim against the debtor 
on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition, then the trustee may 
recover from such creditor the amount so offset to the extent that any insufficiency on the 
date of such setoff is less than the insufficiency on the later of- (A) 90 days before the date 
of filing of the petition; and (B) the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the 
date of the filing of the petition on which there is an insufficiency. 
11 U.S.C § 553(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Section 553(b)(2) defines "insufficiency" to be 
"amount, if any, by which a claim against the debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by 
the holder of such claim." Id. 
A was liable for the illegal setoff, although any amount returned because the setoff was illegal 
could be recouped from the valid collateral the senior secured party may have held. But B was like-
wise liable under § 553(b). Section SS0(a) specifically makes an "entity for whose benefit such trans-
fer was made" liable for setoffs by another. Since B was the "entity for whose benefit such transfer 
was made," the trustee could have dunned B under§ 553(b) and § SS0(a)(l) without ever relying on 
§ 547(b). 
•• Prescott, 805 F.2d at 731. 
81 Id. at 722. 
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of a transfer to A within the preference period. On the other hand, sup-
pose the surplus deposits occurred before the beginning of the preference 
period, and the actual setoff occurred within the ninety day period, For 
timing purposes, which event constitutes the transfer? 
The better view is that the creation of the setoff opportunity-not the 
actual setoff-is the moment of the transfer. The creation of mutual debts 
is what makes the creditor a secured creditor in bankruptcy.82 This justi-
fies the conclusion that the key moment is when A obtained the deposits 
(where a countervailing debt already exists) or when A's claim against the 
debtor first arose (where the deposits have already been made). The ac-
tual manifestation of the set off is akin to a foreclosure-not the crea-
tion-of the implicit security interest. Hence, if A took surplus deposits 
before the preference period, the transfers would have been for the benefit 
of B, but these benefits would not have been voidable because they did .not 
occur within ninety days of bankruptcy. 
Thus, A's valid setoff opportunity may constitute B's voidable prefer-
ence, when the debtor's claim against A (the setoff opportunity) arose 
within the preference period. Since she is the initial transferee of this set-
off, A shares liability according to Deprizio because B was benefited. This 
is a surprising result when section 553(a) explicitly blesses A's setoff. 
A final point about Prescott should be made. It was almost certainly 
wrongly decided! The analysis in both court opinions assumes that the 
dollars deposited in the checking account and later set off by A were 
unencumbered dollars, not cash proceeds encumbered by the senior secur-
ity interest. Since the debtor was a grocery store, income probably came 
from the sale of encumbered inventory, and it is likely that all amounts 
deposited in the checking account were indeed cash proceeds. 
When a debtor deposits cash proceeds already belonging to a bank in 
a checking account, the bank does not thereby become obligated for these 
funds to the debtor, as would be the case if unencumbered dollars were 
deposited. Accordingly, when the bank later asserts its prior right to these 
cash proceeds by debiting the checking account, the bank is not exercising 
a setoff right at all.83 For example, the trustee could not claim that an 
improvement in position occurre~ within the meaning of section 553(b), 
for the simple reason that the cancellation of the checking account is not a 
•• See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) ("An allowed claim of a creditor ... that is subject to setoff 
under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the ... amount subject to setoff 
.... "). 
83 Smith v. Mark Twain Nat'! Bank, 805 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1986); see generally David Gray 
Carlson, Commingled Bank Accounts in Bankruptcy, 112 BANKING L.J. (1995) (forthcoming). 
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"setofP' when the account has only cash proceeds in it.84 
Meanwhile, repossession of cash proceeds that A already owns can-
not possibly benefit B. For every encumbered dollar A expropriates to 
extinguish the senior claim, a dollar of collateral disappears.86 B is not 
enriched. Therefore, the trustee should not have been able to claim that 
the "setofP' benefited B at all. To the extent that the deposits were cash 
proceeds that otherwise belonged to A, the Prescott case was wrongly 
decided. 
6. Cost of Maintaining Collateral 
If transfers to senior secured creditors generate liability for benefited 
junior undersecured creditors, then the path is open to a much more sub-
versive idea-that any payment to a supplier or an employee tending to 
maintain or improve the value of collateral is a preferential benefit 
chargeable to a secured creditor. 
Thomas M. Ward and Jay A. Shulman, writing early in the career 
of the Bankruptcy Code, anticipated this radical possibility.86 They 
thought that the word "benefit" might contemplate payments to those who 
helped improve the value of collateral. For example, if a worker improved 
the value of collateral and then received payment of wages, the payment 
"benefited" the secured party, thereby justifying a voidable preference re-
covery.87 Furthermore, the secured party would be liable as a "benefited" 
party even when the payment to the employee or supplier is fully secured 
or a contemporaneous exchange. Such facts relieve the supplier of liability 
under section 547(b), but not the secured party; for whom the benefit is 
on antecedent debt. Meanwhile, even if the suppliers are immune under 
section 547(b), they are vulnerable under Deprizio, thereby giving the 
bankruptcy trustee the option of undoing payment of payrolls, suppliers, 
and the like. 
Assuming no defense applies to aid the secured creditor, this broad 
definition of "benefit" invokes for the prepetition period a principle analo-
84 805 F.2d at 289-90; see also Quinn v. Montrose State Bank (/n re lntermountain Porta 
Storage, Inc.), 74 B.R. 1011 (D. Colo. 1987) (denying that U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) changes such a 
result); Wear v. Buffalo Bank (/n re 4-S Corp.), 69 B.R. 499 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (setoff of 
bank account containing only cash proceeds held to be foreclosure of security interest on these funds). 
See Carlson, supra note 11. 
•• For this reason, a surrender of cash collateral never constitutes a voidable preference because 
the surrender never falls afoul of the hypothetical liquidation test. See Carlson, supra note 11. 
•• Ward & Shulman, supra note 11, at 38-39. 
•• Id. 
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gous to the one that section 506(c) invokes for the postpetition era. Ac-
cording to section 506(c): 
The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim 
the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, 
such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim.88 
By referring to trustee expenses, section 506(c) at least hints that the trus-
tee can recover only the postpetition expenses of collateral maintenance.89 
Under the Ward-Shulman analysis, voidable preference law manages to 
extend the trustee's section 506(c) power to the prepetition period. The 
strength of this theory, however, is much mitigated by the fact that se-
cured creditors can invoke the section 547(c)(2) defense which protects 
ordinary course payments.90 Hence, only unusual activity will generate 
voidable preference liability for benefits bestowed on collateral by employ-
ees and suppliers.91 
7. Collection Prowess 
According to Judge Will Garwood in T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc,),92 the 
collection prowess of a secured party claiming receivables constitutes a 
benefit to the debtor.93 Thus, when the account debtor files for bank-
ruptcy, the account debtor's trustee may recover the value of what is paid 
to the secured party from the debtor to whom the account debtor origi-
nally owed the debt. Although Westex involved judicial liens, if translated 
into the context of accounts receivable financing under Article 9, the case 
progressed as follows. 
Suppose D and SP sign a security interest whereby D assigns his 
receivables to SP. One account debtor (AD) also happens to be a subsidi-
ary of D. D defaults and SP collects directly from AD. AD pays and 
quickly files for bankruptcy. If benefit can be located, SP and D are both 
liable for the voidable preference. 
88 11 U.S.C § 506(c) (1988). 
•• But see Irvi~g A. Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interests as Voidable Preferences: Part II The 
Floating Lien, 4 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 133 n.380 (1982). 
•• 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988). 
81 As to how this theory survives the nexus requirement, see supra note 68. The nexus require-
ment is described supra in the text accompanying notes 45-63. 
•• 950 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir. 1992). 
•• Id. 
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In Westex, Judge Garwood asserted that benefit to the insider ac-
crued because SP collected more from AD than D would have.94 The ex-
tra collection therefore effectively extinguished more of D's obligation to 
SP than would have been the case if D collected and surrendered the pro-
ceeds to SP indirectly.911 Because of this "benefit," the insider was liable 
for a voidable preference. 96 
That D benefited because SP coHected debts owed by AD 97 is sur-
prising98 because, in the Westex case, D was the president of AD, and 
could simply have written himself a check on behalf of AD. But Judge 
Garwood~s conclusion is simply the logical implication of the hypothetical 
liquidation test of section 547(b)(S). According to that provision, a trans-
fer is voidable only if it: 
enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had 
not been made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the 
extent provided by the provisions of this title .... 99 
As applied to Westex, the hypothetical liquidation test requires us to 
imagine that SP has returned the collections to AD's trustee and that D 
has entered the bankruptcy as an unsecured creditor collecting a dividend. 
By definition, whenever AD is insolvent, SP's collection allowed D to "re-
ceive more" than the hypothetical liquidation dividend of section 
547(b)(S)(C).100 
Notice that the hypothetical liquidation test does not allow us to im-
agine that, instead of SP's collection, D used his power as president of AD 
to write himself a check for the amount AD owed. The only thing that 
•• Id at 1192-93. 
•• Id. 
•• This holding would appear to meet the first prong of the nexus requirement: the claims 
against the debtor en joyed a unity, such that payment or collateralization of one claim implies extin-
guishment or collateralization of the other. D as assignor and SP as assignee each had a separate 
claim against the debtor, but AD owed only a single debt. 
97 In fact, SP did not garnish AD but AD's bank, because AD was refusing to pay SP under the 
garnishment. This makes no analytical difference. Whether AD paid voluntarily or whether AD's 
property was levied upon, SP is alleged to have been a superior collector than the company of which 
D was the president. 
•• Without considering these facts too deeply, the reader may wonder how likely it is that D will 
think, "Thank heaven. My property has been garnished." Yet that is precisely what Judge Garwood 
implied in holding that D obtained a benefit when its account debtor suffered a transfer to SP. 
•• 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(S) (1988). 
100 That this is true by definition is established in Carlson, supra note 11. 
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may be compared to SP's collection is the dividend in AD's hypothetical 
chapter 7 liquidation. Therefore, the superior collecting prowess of SP is 
nothing more than the logic of the hypothetical liquidation test playing 
itself out. 
It may also be noted that if AD paid D directly, D would have re-
ceived a clear voidable preference because D was an insider. Any such 
payment to D would be recoverable by AD's bankruptcy trustee,101 and D 
would be reduced to a pro rata dividend. But because SP was paid, and 
because more than ninety days had elapsed, D enjoyed the benefit of hav-
ing his own debt reduced, because SP was immune from voidable prefer-
ence liability. For these reasons, Westex was correctly decided on the 
question of benefit to D.102 
B. Antecedent Debt 
A loan agreement and a suretyship agreement are often executed si-
multaneously. In this context, security interests taken by the surety are 
not voidable preferences, if promptly perfected. Such security interests are 
contemporaneous exchanges, not transfers on antecedent debt.103 
Alternatively, the surety's security interest may be a transfer to the 
surety on antecedent debt. Antecedence of debt could arise in three ways: 
(1) the loan agreement and suretyship agreement are coeval, but thereaf-
ter the debtor grants a security interest to the surety; (2) the assured cred-
itor first extends the loan, and thereafter the suretyship agreement arises, 
1• 1 The cash actually paid by AD, however, would be cash proceeds belonging to SP. SP would 
be a transferee of a transferee within the meaning of § 550(a)(2) and therefore eligible for the defense 
in § 550(6), which provides: 
The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section from- (1) a transferee 
that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in 
good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided .... 
11 U.S.C. § 550(6) (1988). SP's liability as transferee of a transferee would then depend upon SP's 
knowledge about the collection. 
1
•• Later it will be pointed out that, when the trustee proves a benefit has occurred within the 
meaning of§ 547(6)(1), the trustee has automatically proven that the hypothetical liquidation test of 
§ 547(6)(5) has been met with regard to that creditor. See infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text. 
Westex may also be taken as authority for this proposition. 
In Westex, even though AD's trustee had a voidable preference action against SP, D's bankruptcy 
trustee did not. The money AD paid to SP was a transfer of debtor property because this money 
represented proceeds of D's claim against AD. But this same mo~ey also represented cash proceeds of 
SP's security interest. Payment of unencumbered dollars may be a voidable preference, but surrender 
of cash proceeds encumbered by a valid security interest never is because such surrenders cannot meet 
the hypothetical liquidation test under § 547(6)(5). See Carlson, supra note 11. 
1
•• 11 U.S.C. § 547(6)(2) (1988). 
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secured by a simultaneously created security interest granted by the debtor 
to the surety; (3) the loan agreement and suretyship agreement are created 
simultaneously, but the surety does not perfect the security interest in a 
timely manner. 104 Each of these examples poses its own special difficulty. 
First, when the assured obligation and the suretyship are of equal 
age, the debtor may thereafter transfer collateral to the surety .1011 In this 
first case, can it truly be said that the transfer is on antecedent debt so 
long as the surety has paid nothing to the assured creditor, the debtor does 
not yet "owe" the surety anything. A surety's claim against the debtor at 
this point is merely contingent.106 According to section 547(b)(2), a voida-
ble preference must be a transfer "for or on account of an antecedent debt 
owed by the debtor .... " 107 
In an earlier article, I tried to establish that a mere commitment to 
lend was not an antecedent debt-a proposition generally vital for secured 
transactions under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.108 Accord-
ing to section 547(b)(2), the debtor must actually "owe" the debt to the 
lender. If the lender has not advanced any funds, the debtor "owes" noth-
ing, and therefore the commitment to lend is not itself an antecedent 
debt. 109 This is so even though the Uniform Commercial Code defines the 
commitment to lend as "value" - one of the elements of attachment under 
Article 9. 110 
If a commitment to lend is not an antecedent debt because the debtor 
does not owe anything, it must also follow that neither is the contingent 
suretyship claim. Without more, it would appear that no security interest 
granted to a surety while the suretyship claim is still contingent could be a 
voidable preference. This unacceptable result will be rejected in due 
course, but before a solution is offered, let us examine the second way a 
security interest may be a transfer on antecedent debt in a tripartite case: 
when the assured obligation arose first and then the suretyship obligation 
arose later. Contemporaneously with the suretyship agreement, the surety 
10• The first two security interests on antecedent debt will be considered in this section, and the 
third, old-fashioned late perfection of the security interest, will be considered in the next section. 
10
• As discussed earlier, controversy exists as to whether such a security interest "benefits" the 
assured creditor. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. In any case, the surety is clearly 
liable for receiving a security interest on antecedent debt. 
106 Such a contingent claim is not even an allowable claim in the debtor's bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 502(e)(1 )(B) (1988). 
107 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(c) (1988) (emphasis added). 
10
• Carlson, supra note 11. 
100 Id. 
llO u.c:c. §§ 1-201(44), 9-203(1)(6) (1978). 
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receives a security interest. 
Here we clearly have a transfer of debtor property to the surety for 
the benefit of the assured creditor.111 Assuming all the other elements of 
section 547(6) are met, the assured creditor will be liable for the surety's 
security interest. 112 The surety, however, will still be immune from liabil-
ity because she will have a defense under section 547(c)(1).113 
In both these cases, a surety received a security interest at a time 
when the debtor owed nothing to the surety. Yet section 547(6)(2) re-
quires that the security interest be "for or on account of an antecedent 
debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made." How can it be 
said that these security interests are transfers on antecedent debt? In par-
ticular, we wish in the first type of case to hold the surety liable for a 
voidable preference, and in the second case, we wish to hold liable the 
assured creditor, for whose benefit the security interest was granted. 
The following theory should do the job. According to section 
547(6)(2), the debtor must actually owe someone for an antecedent debt, 
but section 547(6)(2) does not specify to whom the debt must be owed. 
Thus, by virtue of its contingent claim, the surety is a "creditor" of the 
debtor under section 547(6)(1), and the antecedent debt is "owed" to 
someone other than the surety under section 547(6)(2).114 These observa-
tions imply that the surety has received a security interest on antecedent 
debt in both the first case, where the suretyship agreement is antecedent to 
the security interest, and in the second case where the suretyship agree-
ment is contemporaneous with the security interest. Thus, a· bank issuing 
a letter of credit to secure an assured creditor's antecedent claim falls to 
the prima facie case under section 547(6). Such a bank, however, is likely 
to have a· valid defense under section 547(c)(1). This matter will be dis-
111 We assume here that the security interest was the sine qua non of the suretyship agreement 
and that the suretyship agreement was a benefit to the assured creditor. See supra note 32 and accom-
panying text. 
112 If the insider also supplies collateral to the assured creditor and ·then files for bankruptcy, the 
assured creditor has received a voidable preference in the surety's bankruptcy. Gill v. Winn (In re 
Perma Pac. Props.), 983 F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1992). 
113 Section 547(c) provides that the trustee may not avoid the transfer: 
(1) to the extent that such transfer was- (A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or 
for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value 
given to the debtor; and (B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange .... 
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(l) (1988). 
11
• Section 547(b) requires both the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship, and, separately, 
the establishment of an antecedent debt. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(l) (1988). Given that creditors can have 
purely contingent claims, the concept of antecedent debt and creditor status are by no means the same. 
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cussed in Part 11.115 For now, the prima facie case under section 547(b) 
affirms that, in the first two types of cases, both the assured creditor and 
the surety have received transfers on antecedent debt. 116 
A security interest in the second type of case-where the assured 
claim is antecedent to the surety's security interest-was illegitimately 
preserved from the prima facie case in Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. 
(In re Compton Corp.). 117 In Compton, the debtor appeased an unpaid 
supplier with a bank's standby letter of credit, which stated that the sup-
plier could obtain payment from a bank on demand. In exchange, the 
bank automatically obtained a security interest pursuant to a future ad-
vance clause in a preexisting security agreement between the bank and the 
debtor. The day after the letter of credit was executed, creditors filed a 
bankruptcy petition against the debtor. A month later, the bank paid the 
supplier under the letter of credit. The bankruptcy trustee sued the sup-
plier, but not the bank, for voidable preference liability.118 · 
The supplier moved for summary judgment on the theory that it had 
never received debtor property_ll9 This fact alone could not defeat the 
trustee because section 547(b) does not require the creditor to receive 
debtor property. Section 547(b) applies if the creditor benefited when 
some other person received debtor property.12° Clearly, the supplier bene-
fited when the bank received a security interest, thereby enabling the let-
ter of credit to be issued. Nevertheless, both the bankruptcy and district 
courts awarded summary judgment in favor of the supplier, on the pre-
mise that liability was impossible if the supplier received no transfers of 
11
• See infra notes 17 4-82 and accompanying text. 
118 Another implication of this definition of antecedent debt is that, when a secured party takes 
an assignment of an unsecured claim from an unsecured creditor and brings it in under the security 
interest as if it were a future advance, the security interest created for the unsecured claim is on 
antecedent debt owed to the unsecured assignor, even though the assignee's claim and the assignee's 
security interest arose at the same time. Although courts have struggled to maintain the U.C.C. itself 
does not permit an assignee to fit the assigned claim under a security agreement without the consent of 
the debtor, Republic Nat'I Bank v. Fitzgerald (In re E.A. Fretz Co.), 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978), a 
different answer is that the security interest is on antecedent debt and hence possibly a voidable 
preference. See F. Stephen Knippenberg, Future Nonadvance Obligations: Preferences Lost in Meta-
phor, 72 WASH. U. L. REV. 1537, 1598 (1994). 
117 831 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g granted, 835 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). 
118 Id. at 589. The supplier also tried to force the bank ·to indemnify it because of the supplier's 
voidable preference liability. Id. at 596 ("We affirm the district court's dismissal of Blue Quail's 
request to proceed against MBank for reimbursement."). 
m 831 F.2d at 589. 
120 See also American Bank v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air Conditioning, Inc.), 845 F.2d 293, 
297 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc. v. American Bank, 488 
U.S. 993 (1988). 
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debtor property.121 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Judge Jerre Williams 
reversed. 
With regard to the bank, Judge Williams noted that the bank's fu-
ture advance clause under a security agreement was executed almost two 
years prior to the filing of bankruptcy. Judge Williams reasoned that the 
security interest was transferred more than a year before bankruptcy,122 
even though the bank issued the letter of credit one day before bank-
ruptcy. According to Judge Williams: 
The transfer to MBank of the increased security interest was a direct trans-
fer which occurred on May 6, 1982, when the bank issued the letter of 
credit. Under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A), however, such a transfer is deemed 
to have taken place ... at the time such transfer "takes effect" between the 
transferor and transferee if such transfer is perfected within 10 days. The 
phrase "takes effect" is undefined in the Bankruptcy Code, but under Uni-
form Commercial Code Article 9 law, a transfer of a security interest "takes 
effect" when the security interest attaches. Because of the future advances 
clause in MBank's 1980 security agreement ... the attachment of the ... 
security interest relates back to ... the date the security agreement went 
into effect.123 
This relation back of the security interest to the time of the security agree-
ment was error, albeit harmless. Because the advance was discretionary on 
the part of the bank, 124 the security interest arose only when the advance 
was made.126 Indeed, Judge Williams' conclusion potentially violated sec-
121 The district court also ruled that the security interest to the bank was not for the benefit of 
the supplier. 831 F.2d at 589. Both of these propositions will be refuted later. 
122 831 F.2d at 591. Cf Luring v. Miami Citizens Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. (In re Val Decker 
Packing Co.), 61 B.R. 831 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986). In Val Decker Packing, a bank had issued a 
letter of credit, but the security agreement specified that only debt evidenced by a promissory note 
could be brought in under the future advance clause. As a result, when the debtor finally did sign a 
note, the debt came under the security agreement, and a security interest finally attached. Unfortu-
nately, it attached during the preference period and constituted a voidable preference for the bank. 
The restrictive future advance clause therefore had the effect of a "deferred attachment" clause, with 
the usual disastrous consequence that such clauses have. 
12
• 831 F.2d at 591 (footnote omitted). 
124 Thus, the debtor paid $1,463 to issue the letter of credit. Id. at 589. 
12
• U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) (1978). Judge Williams' holding on the timing of the transfer might be 
compared with Judge Shirley Hufstedler's famous timing rule in DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 
(9th Cir. 1971 ). In DuBay, Hufstedler ruled that a security interest is deemed transferred, for voida-
ble preference purposes, when a financing statement is filed, even though an element of attach-
ment-the debtor has rights in collateral-is missing. Id. at 1287-88. In Compton, Williams also held 
that the transfer existed even in the absence of a different element of attachment--the creditor's gift of 
value. 
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tion 547(e)(3), which provides: "[f]or the purposes of this section, a trans-
fer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property trans-
ferred." Judge Williams did not describe the collateral claimed by the 
bank, but if the debtor acquired any of the collateral after the security 
agreement was signed in 1980, then dating the transfer back to the time of 
the security agreement transgressed section 547(e)(3). 
In any case, while the bank could view the transfer as having oc-
curred more than a year before the bankruptcy, the supplier could not, 
according to Williams, because the supplier was not a party to the bank's 
security agreement. 126 Therefore, the court reversed and held that the sup-
plier, having received the benefit of a voidable preference, was liable 
under section 550(a)(1). 
It is odd that a transfer considered to be a year old for the bank was 
consi~ered freshly made for the benefit of the supplier. The better view is 
that the transfer arose at precisely the same time for both the bank and 
the supplier. So far as both creditors were concerned, the security interest 
was a transfer on antecedent debt. 127 Meanwhile, the bank had a valid 
defense under section 547(c)(1)-a defense not available to the supplier. 
Once again, the nature of this defense will be taken up later.128 
1. Late Perfection 
The previous section considered two types of transfers on antecedent 
debt in tripartite cases. The third way a surety's security interest may also 
128 831 F.2d at 591. 
127 Two commentators suggest that, even though the security interest to the issuing bank in a 
case like Compton should not be vulnerable, a trustee should be able to obtain an injunction against 
the bank preventing distributions under the letter of credit whenever the letter of credit results in a 
preference for the benefit of an unsecured or undersecured creditor. Steven R. Gross & Peter L. 
Borowitz, A New Twist on Twist Cap: Invalidating a Preferential Letter of Credit in In re Air 
Conditioning, 103 BANKING L.J. 368 (1986). Such an injunction would not harm the bank since it 
would not have to pay out any funds, and the beneficiary of the letter of credit deserves no solicitude 
since the letter of credit constitutes the benefit of the bank's collateral. Nevertheless, one problem with 
this idea is that it permits the debtor's trustee to protect the debtor's in rem rights in the bank's 
would-be collateral, whereas the debtor's cause of action against the benefited creditor would have to 
be an in personam action for the value of the collateral. If the benefited creditor is herself bankrupt, 
then the Gross-Borowitz theory creates a preference for the original debtor's trustee, at the expense of 
the unsecured creditors of the beneficiary. It is not clear why the trustee of the bank's customer 
deserves a priority over the trustee of the beneficiary of the letter of credit. 
••• See infra notes 186-206 and accompanying text. Because the supplier had the benefit of a 
voidable preference, the bank might have been liable too, on a Deprizio theory, in spite of the contem-
poraneous exchange or Judge Williams' dubious relation back theory. J~dge Williams refused to 
follow what would later become the Deprizio theory, on grounds that are, with some revisions, quite 
'convincing. It is best to consider these grounds in the context of the § 547(c)(1) defense. 
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be a transfer on antecedent debt occurs when the surety neglects to perfect 
her security interest, thereby deferring the time of the transfer. This prin-
ciple, simple enough when abstractly pondered, becomes complicated in 
the case of suretyship for discretionary advances. 
By way of illustration, suppose the surety promises on January 1 to 
guarantee an advance that the assured creditor makes on January 1. On 
January 1, the debtor grants a security interest to the surety. The secured 
party perfects on January 12. Thanks to the deferral rule oL section 
547(e)(2)(B), the security interest is deemed transferred to the surety on 
January 12.129 It is potentially a voidable preference, if the other elements 
of section 547(b) have been met.130 
Suppose, however, that the advance is not made on January 1. In-
stead, the assured creditor has discretion to make advances, and the surety 
promises to be liable for any such advance, if it is ever made. Further-
more, the debtor and the surety sign a security agreement on January 1, 
but the surety forgets to perfect until January 12. Finally, the assured 
creditor advances funds on February 1, at a time when the security inter-
est is perfected. Is this a transfer on antecedent debt? 
There are two schools of thought. On the one hand, the surety had a 
contingent claim on January 1-based on its commitment to guarantee 
repayment of an advance the assured creditor is not bound to make. On 
the other hand, it had a contingent claim on February 1, when the ad-
vance was actually made. Which of these two dates count? The voidability 
of the security interest depends on the choice. 
The better choice is February 1. Prior to February 1, the extent of 
the obligation was zero. Even though the surety committed herself on Jan-
uary 1, no antecedent debt existed until funds were actually advanced on 
February 1.131 The security interest attached, and was perfected, on Feb-
ruary 1, suggesting that the security interest is not a voidable 
pref erence.132 
129 E.g., Taunt v. Fidelity Bank (In re Royal Golf Prods. Corp.), 908 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1990). 
130 It is possible that § 547(c)(1) might provide a defense, since the transaction was intended to 
be a contemporaneous exchange of values and, but for the perfection mistake, was substantially so. A 
great many courts, however, believe that § 547(c)(1) can never be used to correct perfection mistakes 
because that would render the grace period in § 547(e)(2)(A) superfluous. See Carlson, supra note 
11. 
131 This is an application of the rule that commitments to lend are not antecedent debts until the 
debtor actually owes the repayment. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. 
132 It may be noted that the new Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act makes an obligation effective 
when a "writing executed by the obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee." U.F.T.A. 
§ 6(5) (1985). This language implies that the suretyship is an obligation on January 1, long before 
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C. The Hypothetical Liquidation Test 
Suppose an outside creditor receives a security interest between 
ninety days and one year before the bankruptcy. An insider is benefited. 
The debtor is insolvent, 133 and the transfers were within the insider pref-
erence period of one year.134 How do these transfers meet the hypothetical 
liquidation test under section 547(b)(5), insofar as the benefited creditor is 
concerned? 
One commentator, Mark Toth, denies that they do: 
[I]f the inside guarantor managed to pay the outside creditor in full [ with 
debtor property], the inside guarantor would have no claim at all in bank-
ruptcy and would receive nothing. Under this analysis, payments made by 
an inside guarantor to an outside creditor are not avoidable because such 
payments do not enable the inside guarantor to receive more than if the 
payments had not been made. 1811 
The thrust of these remarks seems to be this: if the suspect transfers are 
returned to the bankrupt estate, as section 547(b)(5)(B) dictates, the 
surety has no allowable claim in the bankruptcy because the suretyship 
claim is still contingent.136 Therefore, the hypothetical liquidation divi-
dend called for in section 547(b)(5) is zero. This must be compared with 
what the surety received in real life: nothing whatsoever. Therefore, ac-
cording to Toth, the transfer cannot possibly meet the hypothetical liqui-
dation test.'' 
The controversial move in this interpretation is that "to receive 
more" in section 547(b)(5) means to receive more property. If so, then 
Toth is quite correct that transfers to assured creditors are not chargeable 
to insiders. One must concede, however, that the surety has obtained a 
great financial benefit by means of these transfers. If they are upheld, 
the assured creditor makes a discretionary advance. The definition, however, is limited to "the pur-
poses of this [Act]." Furthermore, the question at hand is whether the security interest of January 12 
is for or on account of antecedent debt. As this latter term is from federal law, the bankruptcy courts 
should adopt a federal definition and ignore any contrary suggestion from the U.F.T.A. 
133 The trustee would have to prove insolvency. The presumption of debtor insolvency covers 
only the 90 day period before bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 547([) (1988). 
134 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988). 
130 Mark E. Toth, Note, The Impossible State of Preference Law Under the Bankruptcy Code: 
Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. and the Problem of Insider-Guaranteed Debt, 1990 Wis. L. 
REV. 1155, 1168 (footnote omitted). 
138 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(l)(B) (1988). In other words, the debtor owes the surety no "antecedent 
debt," consistent with what was said earlier. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
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then the surety is relieved of a ser10us financial liability to the assured 
creditor. 
Alternatively, if "receive more" is stretched to mean "obtained a ben-
efit," then the commentator's point is wrong. The courts-though without 
analysis-routinely assume that "receive more" deserves the broad read-
ing.187 Section 547(b)(2) favors a broad reading by targeting benefits that 
are not themselves transfers.188 If section 547(b)(2) takes the trouble to 
strike down improper "benefits," then "receives more" in section 
547(b)(5) likewise must refer to improper benefits. 
Under this reading, "receives more" is entirely redundant with the 
existence of a benefit under section 547(b)(2). That is, if the trustee has 
proved section 547(b)(2) against a non-transferee, the trustee has likewise 
proved the elements of section 547(b)(S) as well.189 In other words, the 
mere existence of a benefit establishes that the hypothetical liquidation 
test can be met. 140 
It must be assumed, then, that "benefits" received by insiders are 
voidable within the meaning of section 547(b)(5). Nevertheless, ample 
valid collateral-granted either to the surety or to the assured credi-
tor-will confound the hypothetical liquidation test and save either party 
from liability. For example, if the assured creditor is fully secured, a pay-
ment is still arguably not for the benefit of the surety. The surety is sub-
rogated to any security interest of the oversecured party and therefore 
faces no loss in the debtor's bankruptcy. In addition, because the surety 
has subrogation rights and stands in the shoes of the secured creditor, the 
trustee cannot meet the hypothetical liquidation test against the surety. 
137 Any court that has ever followed Deprizio implicitly makes this assumption. 
••• This is, at least, the emerging view put forth in Deprizio. Some authorities would disagree 
and would assert that a benefit is itself a transfer separate from the initial transfi:r. This is known as 
the "two-transfer" theory, which is supposed to defeat the reasoning in Deprizio. See infra notes 302-
22 and accompanying text. 
139 Furthermore, "receives more" implies that a non-transferee defendant "receives" a benefit. 
The trope "receives more" therefore arguably assumes a "benefit" is a "transfer," because it is sus-
ceptible of receipt. This point, seemingly incoherent now, becomes important in our analysis of 
Deprizio later on. Whether a benefit is a "transfer" is essential in assessing whether Deprizio was 
rightly decided. 
140 It is considered a high crime and misdemeanor to render statutory language superfluous. 
E.g., United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 108 S. Ct. 626, 630 (1988) 
("Statutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor."). I have done no such thing here. Even if 
§ 547(b)(2) renders § 547(b)(S) superfluous in tripartite cases, it does not do so in bipartite cases, in 
which § 547(b)(S) plays a vital role indeed. Therefore, it is open for courts to recognize-indeed, it is 
impossible for them to deny-that the existence of a benefit under § 547(b)(2) satisfies the hypotheti-
cal liquidation test with regard to non-transferees. 
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1. The Surety As Owner of the Collateral 
It should be apparent that if the assured creditor and the surety are 
unsecured, but the surety has provided collateral to the assured creditor, 
the assured creditor's security' interest in the surety's assets can never be a 
voidable preference in the debtor's bankruptcy. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the fact that the debtor has not transferred property to another 
party.141 Nor can it be the case that the assured creditor is a secured 
creditor in the debtor's bankruptcy. Hence, if the assured creditor has a 
security interest only in assets of a surety, any transfer of debtor property 
to the assured creditor easily meets the hypothetical liquidation test of 
section 547(b)(5) and can be recovered by the debtor's trustee as a voida-
ble preference. 
In CEPA Consulting, Ltd. v. New York National Bank, Inc. (In re 
Wedtech Corp.),142 Judge Francis Conrad disagreed with the premise that 
an assured creditor with a security interest in the assets of a surety re-
.ceived more than it would have in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation. 
There, a lender advanced funds to the debtor, and insiders of the debtor 
pledged their personal property as security for the loan, making the insid-
ers nonrecourse sureties with contingent unsecured subrogation rights 
against the debtor. 143 Although the debtor paid the assured creditor in full 
during the preference period, .Judge Conrad, quite inexplicably, ruled that 
the trustee could not prevail under the hypothetical liquidation test be-
cause the assured creditor would recover fully in the bankruptcy. That 
full recovery was from non-debtor property was dismissed as a "flaccid 
argument."144 Judge Conrad pointed out that the Uniform Commercial 
Code defines "debtor" to include: 
141 E.g., Coral Petroleum v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (5th Cir. 1986). 
142 165 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
143 The suretyship arises when a third party offers collateral for a loan to another. Harrison v. 
Brent Towing Co. (In re H & S Transp. Co.), 939 F.2d 355, 360 (6th Cir. 1990); RE.STATEMENT OF 
SURETYSHIP § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 2 1993) ("The secondary obligor may, however, lend its prop-
erty to the principal obligor so that the principal obligor may grant the security interest."). Judge 
Francis Conrad, however, denied this premise: 
We note merely that the loan documentation in evidence affords no basis for any claim by 
the officers against Debtor in the event Debtor had defaulted and NYNB had liquidated 
the officers' certificates of deposit. Debtor did not agree to indemnify the officers. The 
officers did not provide a guaranty, which would give rise to a subrogation claim. Rather, 
they merely put up the collateral. 
Wedtech, 165 B.R. at 145 n.3. 
u• 165 B.R. at 144. 
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the person who owes payment ... whether or not he owns or has rights in 
the collateral . . . Where the debtor and the owner of the collateral are not 
the same person, the term "debtor" means the owner of the collateral . 
1415 
According to Judge Conrad, this provision proved that the assured credi-
tor was in fact an oversecured creditor, thereby negating section 547(b)(5) 
and saving the creditor from voidable_ preference liability. In other words, 
because the Uniform Commercial Code refers to both the principal obli-
gor and the nonrecourse surety as "debtors," Judge Conrad believed that 
the two persons were really one; that they bore the same name of 
"debtor" justified their substantive consolidation.146 
140 U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d) (1978). 
146 For two similar cases, see Schwartz v. Pitman-Moore, Inc. (In re Schwartz), 54 B.R. 321, 
325 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); Hargadon v. Cove State Bank (In re Jaggers), 48 B.R. 33 (Bankr. 
W.D. Tex. 1985). In Schwartz, the debtor-improbably but successfully-claimed that the subsidi-
ary's property was his own exempt property under Bankruptcy Code § 522. The debtor was then 
permitted to maintain a voidable preference action in his own name under § 522(g), even though 
§ 522(g) prohibits such personal use of voidable preference law when the debtor voluntarily conveyed 
the property. Missing from this opinion is a theory explaining why money from the subsidiary is 
property of the debtor, justifying the voidable preference recovery. One possible answer is that, in 
effect, the debtor awarded himself a dividend from his corporation, making the payment debtor prop-
erty. The debtor then directed the payment to the creditor in violation of the voidable preference 
statute. A similar theory will later be used to explain that, when a debtor arranges for a letter of 
credit just before bankruptcy in exchange for collateral, the bank has received no transfer, but the 
bank funds directed to the assured creditor are in reality debtor funds, thereby justifying an action 
against the assured creditor as the initial transferee of debtor property. See infra notes 167-85 and 
accompanying text. 
In Jaggers, a subsidiary wrote a check to a creditor on a bank account that contained both 
corporate funds and the debtor's personal funds. The entire check was declared to be debtor property 
on the basis: 
When a debtor uses the funds of a third party to pay an obligation of the debtor the Court 
must look to the source of the control over the disposition of the funds in order to deter-
mine whether a preference exists. If the debtor controls the disposition of the funds and 
designates the creditor to whom the monies will be paid independent of the third party 
whose funds are being used in partial payment of the debt, then the payments made by the 
debtor to the creditor constitute a preferential transfer. Hence, if the funds are available for 
payment to the creditors of the debtor generally the funds are an asset of the estate and 
payment thereof constitutes a diminution of the estate. 
48 B.R. at 36-37. This theory of debtor ownership must be sharply questioned. Admittedly, under 
standard tracing rules, the debtor should be presumed to use only his funds first to pay a debt. But 
thereafter corporate funds-non-debtor property-are being used. See Carlson, supra note 83 
(describing the tracing rules when the debtor writes check on commingled accounts in voidable prefer-
ence cases). As to corporate funds, mere fiduciary control of funds should not, as Judge Bert Thomp-
son suggested, be viewed as establishing debtor ownership, for the purposes of the voidable preference 
statute. Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990) (IRS was not liable for voidable prefer-
ence when payment came from trust held for the benefit of IRS). 
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Judge Conrad obviously overlooked the principle that two persons 
can have the same name without obliterating their separate personalities. 
As a result, he applied neither the hypothetical liquidation test nor the 
law of substantive consolidation properly. 147 Under the hypothetical liqui-
dation test in section 547(b)(5), the payments received must hypothetically 
be returned to the debtor, the court must calculate a hypothetical chapter 
7 liquidation dividend, and then we must compare that hypothetical divi-
dend to the payment actually received. That some third party has pledged 
collateral that the assured creditor could reach outside of bankruptcy is 
irrelevant. Even if the assured creditor recovers from the collateral of the 
surety, the surety steps into the assured creditor's shoes and makes the 
same unsecured claim against the debtor that the assured creditor would 
have made. The suretyship right merely affects the identity of the creditor 
making the unsecured claim in the debtor's bankruptcy, not the amount of 
the bankruptcy dividend to which that claim is entitled. 
The purpose of the hypothetical liquidation test is to punish creditors 
who deplete the bankrupt estate in violation of the duty to remain equal 
with like-ranked creditors. The assured creditor in Wedtech ·violated this 
duty by accepting payment within the preference period. The payment 
consisted of assets that should have been shared with other creditors. Since 
the other creditors had no access to the third party property pledged to the 
assured creditor, this collateral was irrelevant to the hypothetical liquida-
tion analysis.148 
Instead, the theory should be either that the debtor was conveying property of a third party, or 
that the debtor had awarded himself a dividend from the subsidiary and had forwarded this "debtor 
property" to the creditor. The former theory defeats the voidable preference action, but the latter 
would uphold it by explaining how these payments were "debtor property." 
These cases are like Wedtech, in that there are undisclosed or defective theories explaining why 
property of a subsidiary should be deemed property of the debtor, for voidable preference purposes. In 
Wedtech, security interests granted by third parties in non-debtor property before the preference pe-
riod made debtor payments within the preference period immune from attack. In Schwartz and Jag-
gers, the payments themselves seemed to be non-debtor property, pending some satisfactory explana-
tion as to why these payments belonged to the debtor at the time they were made. 
147 See Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 
F.2d 515, 520 (2d Cir. 1988) (prohibiting substantive consolidations when creditors are prejudiced in 
distributions). 
148 For a similar error of analysis, see Harry M. Fletchner, Preferences, Post-Petition Trans-
fers, and Transactions Involving a Debtor's Downstream Affiliate, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 22-23 
(1987). Fletchner is a critic of the so-called "earmarking doctrine," which allows one unsecured credi-
tor to refinance a pre-existing unsecured loan without rendering the paid creditor liable for having 
received a voidable preference. See infra note 182. In particular, Fletchner complains of solvent corpo-
rate subsidiaries that voluntarily refinance the debtor shareholder's unsecured loans; such refinancing 
lowers the value of the subsidiary's equity shares, thereby impoverishing the debtor's estate. 
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On the other hand, Judge Conrad's opinion is perfectly correct if the 
insiders did not merely lend their collateral as sureties to the debtor. If 
their collateral constituted an equity investment in the debtor, then the 
property pledged to the assured creditor really was debtor property, and 
the assured creditor was indeed an oversecured creditor in the debtor's 
bankruptcy. But this conception is clearly not what Conrad had in mind, 
given that his opinion assumes the ' surety continued to own the 
collateral.149 
A more subtle error along these lines occurs in K rafsur v. Scurlock 
Permian Corp. (In re El Paso Re.finery, L.P. v. Scurlock Permian 
Corp.). 150 In this case, a supplier with a purchase money security interest 
in the inventory supplied signed a "sharing" or subordination agreement 
with an unsecured creditor, whereby the secured party shared forty-five 
percent of all collateral with the secured party. The debtor surrendered 
cash proceeds to the secured party, of which the unsecured creditor had a 
forty-five percent interest. Judge Leif Clark ruled that, since forty-five 
percent of the proceeds had been assigned away, the supplier could keep 
fifty-five percent of the cash surrendered and must return forty-five per-
cent to the trustee as a voidable preference. 
In fact, the subordination agreement should have been viewed as a 
nonrecourse guaranty, with the secured claim as the surety's collateral.1111 
In this sense, it was like the Wedtech case, in that an assured creditor 
received property already belonging to the surety. The subordination 
agreement, designed to benefit a designated unsecured creditor, was there-
fore improperly used to disencumber cash proceeds . for the benefit of all 
the unsecured creditors of the debtor. 
One earmarking case that draws Professor Fletchner's displeasure is Coral Petroleum Inc. v. 
Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (5th Cir. 1986). Fletchner complains that, since the 
refinancing unsecured creditor supplied collateral to the unhappy unsecured creditor prior to the 90 
day preference period, the payment to the unhappy creditor just prior to bankruptcy would be pro-
tected from avoidance by the hypothetical liquidation test of § 547(b)(S). This, Fletchner claims, is a 
mode of decision that would successfully protect the oversecured creditor in a manner that was supe-
rior to the disfavored earmarking doctrine. Yet this is precisely the same analytical error committed by 
Judge Conrad in the Wedtech case. Application of the hypothetical liquidation test clearly condemns 
such a payment, when a surety has supplied the collateral. 
149 See Wedtech, 165 B.R. at 144. 
100 178 B.R. 426 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995). 
101 See David Gray Carlson, A Theory of Contractual Debt Subordnation and Lien Priority, 38 
VANDERBILT L. REV. 975,978 (1985). 
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D. Remedies 
Suppose a surety's security interest is voidable under section 547(b). 
According to section 550(a)(1), the trustee may avoid a security interest 
itself, or, "if the court so orders, the value of such property."162 Further-
more, the trustee can recover value from either "the initial transferee or 
the entity for whose benefit the transfer was made."163 Can the trustee let 
the surety keep her security interest and instead recover value of the void-
able security interest from the assured creditor?164 If so, the assured credi-
tor might be forced to pay the value of the security interest to the debtor. 
Typically, if the debtor pays the assured creditor, and if that pay-
ment had been recovered as a voidable preference, the suretyship agree-
ment, formerly extinguished by the debtor's payment, revives, and the as-
sured creditor can make the surety pay.166 It is less clear whether the 
suretyship obligation arises to indemnify the assured creditor when the 
assured creditor has to pay for the surety's security interest. For example, 
in Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.),166 Judge 
Jerre Williams required payment by the assured creditor for the value of 
the surety's security interest and then denied the assured creditor any in-
demnity from the surety.167 
There is one circumstance in which the assured creditor might be 
unfairly hurt-when the trustee allows the surety's interest to stand, even 
after the surety received a voidable preference and fulfilled the suretyship 
obligation by paying the assured creditor. Though the surety has guaran-
teed the original assured claim, it may not have promised to hold the as-
sured creditor harmless from voidable preference claims of the trustee. In 
such a case, the assured· creditor clearly cannot recover the value of the 
security interest from the surety, and the surety becomes a fully secured 
creditor in the debtor's bankruptcy, even though its security interest 
1
•• 11 U.S.C. § SS0(a)(l) (1988). 
163 Id. (emphasis added). 
164 One should bear in mind that the surety is often an insider and, in chapter 11, often the 
person in charge of bringing voidable preference actions in the first place. 
10• Schwarz v. Equitable Bank (In re Express Liquors), 65 B.R. 952 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986); 
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 115 (Tentative Draft No. 2 1993); cf. Anderson v. Trust Co. Bank 
(In re Southco., Inc.), 168 B.R. 93 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) (suretyship revived when trustee recovered 
postpetition transfers under § 549). 
168 831 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1987), modified, 835 F.2d 584 (1988) (per curiam). 
167 Id. at 591. Of course, it is possible-and advisable-for the suretyship agreement itself to 
contain a clause holding the assured lender harmless for any voidable preference recovery by the 
trustee. Baker, supra note 63, at 147. If such a clause exists, the assured creditor is relieved of some 
financial risk of the theory just described. 
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should have been a voidable preference. 
Now, according to the Restatement of Suretyship, the assured credi-
tor can expropriate any security interest granted to the surety. 158 Under 
this rule, the surety obtains the security interest that the trustee has delib-
erately allowed to survive. But this security interest, by definition, secures 
the suretyship claim against the debtor. It does not secure a right to an 
indemnity for a voidable preference judgment levied against the assured 
creditor. Restitutionary intuition strongly suggests that, if the assured 
creditor is made to pay for the surety's voidable preference, the surety 
should suffer-not the assured creditor. At confusing moments such as 
these, courts have been known to declare the surety's secured claim 
against the debtor to be encumbered by an equitable lien in favor of the 
assured creditor. 1119 
If, however, the Restatement of Suretyship is not followed, or if resti-
tutionary intuitions become lost, confused, or drowned in the plain mean-
ing of the Bankruptcy Code, the assured creditor must pay a money judg-
ment equal to the value of the surety's security interest, and cannot recoup 
this amount back from the surety. 
It is to be hoped that a bankruptcy court, in exercise of its discretion 
under section SS0(a)(1), will limit the trustee to avoidance of the security 
interest rather than allowing the trustee to pursue the assured creditor for 
the value of the standing security interest.160 Indeed, section SS0(a)(1) 
provides that the trustee may have the value of the preference only "if the 
court so orders."161 Courts could use this invitation to judicial supervision 
to prevent any abuses. Nevertheless, it must count as a weakness in the 
Bankruptcy Code that it depends on unregulated judicial discretion to re-
store decorum to its unruly governance of debtor-creditor relations. 
This good advice was ignored in Taunt v. Fidelity Bank of Michigan 
(In re Royal Golf Products Corp.),162 where an insider surety forgot to 
... RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP § 29 (Tentative Draft No. 2 1993). 
1
•• See David Gray Carlson, The Trustee's Strong Arm Power in Bankruptcy, 43 S. CAR. L. 
REV. 841, 935-45 (1992). 
1
•• Vern Countryman, The Trustee's Recovery in Preference Actions, 3 BANKR. DEV. J. 449, 
461 (1986) ("[o]nly if Section 550 is given a perverted interpretation," will a defendant be held liable 
for the value of a security interest, rather than simply avoiding the security interest itself). 
181 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988). The Bankruptcy Act had vested this discretion in the trustee, 
not the courts; and, at least after 1938, required that "value" could be had in lieu of the thing 
transferred only if the debtor converted the original transfer to her own use. See generally Country-
man, supra note 160, at 449-55, 467 (describing the history of trustee recoveries prior to the enact-
ment of the Bankruptcy Code). 
••• 79 B.R. 695, 697 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987), ajfd, 908 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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perfect his security interest in assets of the debtor. 163 Because of this .fail-
ure to perfect, the assured creditor received benefit just before the bank-
ruptcy. petition.164 Before the bankruptcy petition, the insider paid the 
debtor's obligation in full. Judge Nathaniel Jones ruled that the assured 
creditor was liable for the value of the security interest issued to the 
insider .165 
Judge Jones' holding, although consistent with the literal words of 
section 550(a)(1), was most unfair from the higher perspective of natural 
law. If the trustee can recover the value of the voidable preference from 
the assured creditor, she cannot recover a second time from the surety, as 
section 550(d) prevents double recoveries for the same preference.166 This 
implies that the insider becomes a secured party in the debtor's bank-
ruptcy as a result of the payment made to the assured creditor, hy virtue 
of its unperf ected security interest. Meanwhile, the assured creditor had to 
pay the value of the insider's security interest without necessarily being 
able to collect again from the surety, who after all had already paid up on 
its suretyship obligation. 
II. DEFENSES TO THE PRIMA F ACIE CASE 
A. Defenses Assertable by Beneficiaries 
A difficult issue in tripartite cases is the extent to which non-trans-
feree beneficiaries liable under section 547(b) may assert defenses under 
section 547(c). Most of these defenses, by their terms, defend only trans-
fers-not the benefit radiating from transfers.167 
183 In this case, the lender had no security from the debtor, but the insider had arranged for a 
letter of credit, secured by the insider's stock portfolio. When the debtor defaulted, the insider re-
quested the right to pay the lender directly, so that the stock portfolio would not be disturbed. Id. at 
697. The insider paid and hoped to recoup from the debtor under their security agreement. The 
collateral consisted of inventory plus a patent. The surety's financing statement perfected a security 
interest in the inventory, but not the patent. Earlier obligations, however, had fully encumbered the 
inventory so that, when the surety paid the assured creditor, the advance was against the patent only. 
184 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(C) (1988). · 
'"" Royal Golf, 908 F.2d at 93. Actually, he characterized the judgment as avoiding the payment 
by the insider to the extent of the value of the security interest. Properly speaking, however, the 
payment was not being recovered. Rather, it was the value of the security interest issued to the debtor 
which the debtor sought. Royal Golf, 79 B.R. at 699 ("[l]n the present case, it must be held that 
Royal Golf controlled the disposition of the [insider's] funds to the extent of the security interest given 
to [the insider] to secure the loan."). 
188 11 U.S.C. § SS0(d) (1988), as amended by Act, supra note 8, § 202, 108 Stat. 4106, 4126. 
187 An exception to this rule is found in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988), which refers to transfers 
"for the benefit" of a creditor. These beneficiaries will have a defense under § 547(c)(4) if they give 
new value to or on behalf of the debtor. 
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In this regard, it is necessary to jump ahead to disclose that a logical 
predicate of Deprizio was that "benefits" under section 547(b)(2) were not 
"transfers." Every case following Deprizio affirmed this proposition, and 
every case that disparaged Deprizio's reasoning did so on the premise that 
benefits themselves are trans£ ers. This is the so-called "two transfer" the-
ory, upon which Deprizio was supposed to have risen or fallen. Whether 
the "two transfer" theory has intrinsic merit will be assessed later.168 
For the moment, it may be noted that the validity of the "two trans-
fer" theory has important effects with regard to the defenses in section 
547(c). If a benefit is a transfer, then the beneficiary's section 547(c) de-
fense must distinguish the benefit from the transfer that gave rise to the 
benefit.169 For example, suppose a senior secured party obtains payment 
in the ordinary course of business and utilizes this as a defense under 
section 547(c)(2).170 If the junior secured party's "benefit" is a transfer 
unto itself, then the junior secured party cannot assert the section 
547(c)(2) defense for the benefit, because section 547(c)(2) defends only 
"payments"-not the ·supposedly separate transfer of which the benefit•of 
the payment consists. But if the benefit is not a separate transfer, then the 
beneficiary may invoke section 547(c)(2) to show that the one and only 
underlying transfer was in the ordinary course and hence not voidable.171 
In short, if the "two transfer" theory is denied, then beneficiaries have 
standing to assert defenses that refer to the initial transfer. If upheld, the 
"two transfer" theory destroys many of the defenses the beneficiaries 
would like to assert. 
One of the principal cases following the "two transfer" theory is Kel-
logg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.),172 in which the 
surety; a bank, issued a letter of credit to an unsecured supplier on antece-
dent debt. In exchange, the bank received a security interest in the 
debtor's assets. In our earlier discussion of that case, we saw that the bank 
188 Newly amended § SSO(c) says nothing about the merits of the "two transfer" theory either, 
so the validity of the doctrine is still open to question. 
189 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988), as amended by Act, supra note 8, § 304(f), 108 Stat. at 4133-34. 
170 According to § 547(c)(2): 
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(2) to the extent that such transfer was- (A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor 
in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; (B) 
made in the ordinary course of business of financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; 
and (C) made according to ordinary business terms .... 
Id. § 547(c)(2). 
171 James J. White & Daniel Israel, Preference Conundrums, 98 CoM. L.J. 1, 19 (1993). 
172 831 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1987), modified, 835 F.2d 584 (1988) (per curiam). 
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escaped liability on illegitimate grounds. 173 Properly analyzed, the bank 
had primafacie liability under section 547(b), but it also qualified for the 
defense under section 547(c)(1). According to section 547(c)(1), the trustee 
may not avoid the transfer: 
to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit 
such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value 
given to the debtor; and 
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange .... 17' 
That is, the bank and the debtor intended to exchange a security interest 
on the debtor's assets for the new value the bank would supply. There-
fore, by use of section 547(c)(1), it is possible to confirm the result that 
Judge Williams reached, but on much different grounds. 
Now, whether one follows Judge Williams' defective theory, based 
on massacring the state law of attachment, or the more sound theory that 
relies on the section 547(c)(1) defense, it would appear to the casual ob-
server that the bank was the initial transferee of another's voidable prefer-
ence. As such, it might have succumbed to Deprizio-style liability. But 
Judge Jerre Williams held otherwise. According to Williams, the benefit 
to the assured creditor was itself a transfer, separate and apart from the 
security interest the bank received. Because this was so, the bank was not 
the "initial transferee" of the supplier's voidable preference but was in-
stead the initial transferee of an entirely different transfer. 176 
This holding in favor of two transfers is clearly correct- on the facts 
of the case before Judge Williams. Furthermore, this holding is entirely 
consistent with Deprizio because it does not rely on the general proposi-
tion that "benefits" under section 547(b)(2) are "transfers." 
To see why, it is necessary to examine the bank's section 547(c)(1) 
defense a little more closely. Under section 547(c)(1), the bank intended 
173 Judge Jerre Williams had proclaimed that the bank's security interest dated back to the time 
of the security agreement, even though the bank had discretion to extend or refuse credit. Such a 
conclusion misconceives the law of loan commitments under Article 9 of the U.C.C. Instead, the 
security interest to the bank was created only when the bank decided to issue the letter of credit. As a 
result, the security interest was for or on account of antecedent debt-the amount owed to the sup-
plier. Because the supplier's antecedent debt counted for both the supplier and the bank, the bank-
ruptcy trustee could make out the prima facie case against both creditors-the bank and the supplier. 
See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text. 
174 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988). 
110 831 F.2d at 591-95. 
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for the creation of its security interest to be contemporanecms with the 
bank's tender of new value-the proceeds of the letter of credit. But sec-
tion 547(c)(1) requires that the new value be given "to the debtor." How 
can it be said that the bank paid new value when the bank forwarded the 
funds directly to the assured creditor? This objection can be answered by 
observing that paying another creditor at the behest of the debtor is the 
same as giving the new value directly to the debtor, who might then have 
forwarded it to the assured creditor. The Bankruptcy Code supports this 
characterization, defining "transfer" as, "every mode, direct or indirect .. 
. of disposing of or parting with property .... " 176 "Indirect transfer" 
can only be interpreted to mean that the bank's extension of credit to the 
supplier was indirect property of the debtor. Therefore, the bank in 
Compton was fully entitled to invoke the section 547(c)(1) defense (to the 
extent of new value actually given).177 This theory saves the bank when 
the suretyship contract and the security interest are contemporaneous.178 
The question arises, though, why the supplier in Compton was not 
also entitled to the section 547(c)(1) defense. Suppose we say that the sup-
plier received a "benefit" from the security interest. The supplier's benefit 
was contemporaneous with the new value that the bank admittedly sup-
176 11 U.S.C. § 101 (54) (Supp. V 1993). 
177 Compton, 831 F.2d at 586. It will be noted that § 547(c)(t)(A) requires a gift of new value 
(by anyone) to the debtor directly. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1)(A) (1988). In contrast, § 547(c)(4) flips 
these requirements by indicating that only the creditor who is the voidable preference defendant can 
give the new value, but the new value need not be given directly to the debtor. Rather, it suffices that 
the new value was given to a third party "for the benefit of the debtor." Id. § 547(c)(4). Nevertheless, 
it is possible to say that the supplier gave new value to the debtor, with the debtor then directing that 
this new value be given to one of the debtor's unsecured creditors. 
This implies, of course, that two transfers of debtor property occurred. First, the debtor trans-
ferred a security interest to the issuing bank. Second, the issuing bank gave an equivalent amount of 
value back to the debtor who designated the bank as its agent to transfer this new value to the 
unsecured creditor. This is precisely what Judge Williams held in order to explain why the bank did 
not have Deprizio liability for being the recipient of the security interest which enabled the unsecured 
supplier to be paid. 
178 It does so without falsely treating the surety's contingent claim as an antecedent debt ~hich 
the debtor "owes." Earlier, I suggested that, since the subrogation claim of the surety is entirely 
contingent before the surety pays the assured creditor, the debtor does not "owe" the surety anything. 
See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the debtor "owes" the assured credhor on 
an antecedent debt and is making transfers to the surety. The transfer to the surety on account of an 
antecedent debt owed to the assured creditor established the prima facie liability of both the assured 
creditor (as the entity benefited) and the bank (as transferee on an antecedent debt). This allowed us 
to assert the general proposition in bipartite cases that mere commitments to lend are not antecedent 
debts until funds are actually advanced. The exclusion of commitments to lend from the concept of 
antecedent debt in § 547(b)(2) is vitally important for secured transactions under Article 9. See gener-
ally Carlson, supra note 11. 
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plied. The section _547(c)(1) defense does not require the supplier to pro-
vide the new value. 179 A third party may supply the new value, so long as 
it was intended by the debtor and the creditor benefited by the transfer. 
Why should the supplier be deprived of the same defense that the bank 
utilized? 
The answer is that the supplier can indeed assert the defense, but 
only with regard to the benefit obtained from the security interest. Even if 
the supplier had the benefit of the bank's security interest, it received an 
entirely different transfer as well-the proceeds of the letter of credit. Re-
call that the bank's own section 547(c)(1) defense required us to believe 
that new value was given "to the debtor," who then (by act of the bank) 
gave the debtor's property to the supplier. 180 This means that separate 
and apart from the bank's security interest, the supplier is being sued for 
an entirely different transfer of debtor property-the receipt of dollars 
supplied by the bank. As to this separate transfer, the supplier could have 
no defense. No new value was supplied in exchange for this cash. Thus, 
the security interest of the bank enjoys the section 547(c)(1) defense, 
which may be asserted by initial transferee and beneficiary alike. But, in 
fact, there were two transfers in Compton. Only the supplier qualified as 
the initial transferee of the second transfer-the cash proceeds of the letter 
of credit. This second transfer engenders no defense under section 
547(c)(1). Because the bank was not the beneficiary (indeed it was the 
source of the funds), 181 the bank can have no Deprizio liability for what 
179 Here again is the text of § 547(c)(1): 
(c)The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer- (1) to the extent that such 
transfe,.r was- (A) intended by the debtor and the creditor . . . for whose benefit such 
transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; 
and (B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange; .... 
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988). 
180 In this regard, note that the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "transfer" includes the concept 
of the "indirect" transfer, thereby supporting the argument in the text. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (Supp. V 
1993). . 
181 The bank will have issued the letter of credit in exchange for a fee. Is this a "benefit" 
radiating from the supplier's transfer? The answer must be yes. In addition, it must be a benefit 
received on antecedent debt, because, as was said earlier, a surety's benefit can be on an antecedent 
debt owed to another. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15. The "nexus" requirement, how-
ever, prevents this benefit from drawing the bank into the maelstrom of the supplier's preference 
liability. According to the nexus requirement, the supplier's claim against the debtor must enjoy a 
unity with the bank's claim, such that payment or collateralization of one claim implies payment or 
collateralization of the other. See supra text accompanying notes 45-63. Here, the debtor's payment to 
the suppliers did not "pay" the bank. The opposite is true. The payment created the debtor's liability 
to the bank for which the bank received a separate security interest. 
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the supplier received.182 
It may be emphasized that Judge Williams' "two transfer" theory 
from Compton does not put him in conflict with the Deprizio holding.183 
182 By way of refinement, suppose the letter of credit promised the supplier $100, but the bank's 
security interest in the debtor's assets was worth only $10. This results in the bank becoming an 
undersecured creditor. On the theory just presented, the supplier is liable for the proceeds of the letter 
of credit ($100) which we have deemed to be property of the debtor. 
The supplier should be liable only for $10-the amount the security interest diminished the 
debtor's estate. Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 835 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 
1988) (per curiam) (trustee has a remedy against the assured creditor for what the debtor transferred 
to the surety); Mandrosa v. Peoples Banking Co. (In re Hartley), 825 F.2d 1067 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(same). Yet the "two transfer" theory suggests that the remedy should be based upon the property 
that the bank, on behalf of the debtor, transfers to the assured creditor. How can we say that the 
remedy should be for $10 when the bank conveyed $100 to the assured creditor? 
One way to achieve this result, consistent with the "two transfer" theory of Judge Williams, is 
by means of the "earmarking doctrine." According to this doctrine, the proceeds of an unsecured loan 
obtained for the purpose of refinancing some other unsecured claim are not to be deemed property of 
the debtor, even if the debtor receives the initial advance and later forwards the proceeds to the 
intended beneficiary. E.g., Hansen v. MacDonald Meat Co. (In re Kemp Pac. Fisheries, Inc.), 16 
F.3d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Rather, these loan proceeds are considered property ·of 
the second lender. In short, the earmarking doctrine is the mirror opposite of the doctrine claiming 
that the loan proceeds are indeed property of the estate when the debtor grants a security interest in 
exchange. Mandross v. Peoples Banking Co. (In re Hartley), 825 F.2d 1067 (6th Cir. 1987) (apply-
ing the earmarking doctrine only to the unsecured deficit claim and holding the recipient of borrowed 
funds for the value of the security interest granted to the refinancing lender). 
Putting the "two transfer" theory together with the earmarking doctrine, of the $100 supplied by 
the bank under the letter of credit, $10 are property of the debtor, which is transferred to the supplier. 
The remaining $90 are property of the bank only, under the earmarking doctrine. Thus, in American 
Bank v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air Conditioning, Inc., of Stuart), 845 F.2d 293 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 993 (1988), the debtor had pledged a certificate of deposit as collateral for a letter of 
credit on antecedent debt. Judge Robert S. Vance did not permit avoidance of the security interest 
against the ·bank. Rather Judge Vance wanted the trustee to recover from the beneficiary of the letter 
of credit. The recovery, however, was described as "payment made pursuant to the letter of credit," 
and also as proceeds of the certificate of deposit. Id. at 294-95. These two remarks are reconciled by 
what has just been suggested. The proceeds of the letter of credit were received (by the debtor) in 
exchange for the security interest. These proceeds-property of the debtor-were then transferred to 
the assured creditor on antecedent debt and were recoverable accordingly. 
In criticizing the earmarking doctrine, Professor Harry Fletchner points out that "the oft-re-
peated assertion that earmarking prevents the transferred property from becoming property of the 
estate represents a misguided attempt to create a statutory basis for the judge-made earmarking doc-
trine , and should be rejected." Fletchner, supra note 149. This is no doubt a valid criticism. Perhaps 
the earmarking doctrine - and any chance for refinancing unsecured claims-should be viewed as 
contrary to the statutory language of § 547. But it still remains the case that, at least insofar as the 
earmarking doctrine is concerned, secured loan proceeds directed to a third party are in fact property 
of the estate, which the debtor separately conveys to the beneficiary of the letter of credit. This conces-
sion proves that Judge Williams' "two transfer" theory was essentially correct as applied to the facts 
of the Compton case. 
183 This is not how Judge Williams viewed the matter. In his opinion, he asserted that benefits 
are always separate transfers. Compton, 831 F.2d at 591-93. This broad language indeed conflicts 
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In Deprizio, Judge Easterbrook held that there was only one transfer of 
debtor property, and one benefit emanating from that transfer. 184 But, in 
Deprizio, the facts were different; a debtor paid a creditor and the insider 
surety was benefited. Only one transfer occurred in Deprizio. Since no 
new value was forwarded to the debtor, there was no occasion to find that 
two transfers of the debtor's property occurred. It is possible, then, to af-
firm the reasoning in Compton and still agree that, generally, benefits are 
not transf ers.185 
If benefits are not transfers, it becomes easy to reconcile the liability 
of beneficiaries under section 547(b), and their access to -defenses under 
section 547(c), which generally immunize only transfers, not benefits from 
transfers. Whenever the benefit is not itself an indirect transfer of debtor 
property, the beneficiary has standing to show that because the transfer is 
not voidable, neither is the benefit. Liability for the benefit and for the 
transfer will, therefore, rise and fall together. 
B. New Value Contemporaneously Exchanged 
If the assured creditor is unsecured but the surety is fully secured, 
and if the assured creditor receives transfers directly from the debtor 
within the preference period, the trustee can make out the full prima facie 
case against the assured creditor. The assured creditor, however, may as-
sert the defense set forth in section 547(c)(1). As we have seen, section 
547(c)(1) requires that new value be given to the debtor, but it does not 
specify who must do the giving.186 Therefore, if the assured creditor re-
ceives the voidable preference and the surety gives back the new value, the 
assured creditor may assert the def ense.187 
with Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Deprizio. 
1
•• Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1196 (7th Cir. 1989). 
180 Thus, in T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re T.B. Westex Foods, 
Inc.), 950 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir. 1992), Judge William Garwood found that, in Compton, there really 
were two transfers, while in Westex (involving a collection from a bankrupt garnishee by a garnishor), 
there was but one transfer, for which the garnishor had Deprizio liability. T.B. Westex, 950 F.2d at 
1194. Garwood also found that, under the facts of Deprizio, there are two transfers. Id. Perhaps he 
felt the need to do so in order to conform his opinion with the earlier decision in Compton. If so, such 
deference was unnecessary. It is fully possible to reconcile Compton with Deprizio. 
188 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988). 
187 In contrast, § 547(c)(4) requires the creditor to give the new value "to or for the benefit of 
the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988). On suretyship and new value generally, see Thomas J. 
Palazzolo, Note, New Value and Preference Avoidance in Bankruptcy, 69 WASH. U.L.Q. 875, 888-
94 (1991). 
In Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc. v. Connecticut Nat'! Bank (In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.), 
117 B.R. 21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990), an insider guaranteed undersecured creditors, who also offered 
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When the surety is fully secured and the assured creditor receives 
transfers from the debtor, the debtor receives new value. Every dollar paid 
to the assured creditor reduces the surety's security interest, thereby en-
riching the debtor.188 For example, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuel Oil Supply 
& Terminaling, Inc. (In re Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling, Inc.),189 
two banks issued letters of credit to the debtor's supplier in exchange for a 
security interest in collateral ample enough to keep the banks fully se-
cured. The supplier sent gasoline to the debtor, thereby becoming an un-
secured creditor of the debtor. Instead of calling in the letter of credit, the 
creditor accepted payment dire<::tly from the debtor. The creditor received 
a voidable preference under section 547(6), but it had a full defense under 
section 547(c)(1).190 Every dollar the debtor paid released a dollar of col-
lateral earlier pledged to the sureties. 
Courts occasionally miss the section 547(c)(1) defense in cases where 
the surety is fully secured and the assured creditor is unsecured. 191 Thus, 
in Security First National Bank v. Brunson (In re Coutee),192 a law firm 
guaranteed an unsecured loan to a client. The law firm was a fully se-
cured creditor for the amount loaned and also for its contingency fee. As 
collateral, the law firm could claim the proceeds of a personal injury judg-
ment in favor of the client. The client won a large judgment, the loser 
paid the client's law firm, the law firm paid the lender, and the law firm 
returned the surplus to the client. The plaintiff soon filed for bankruptcy, 
unsecured revolving credit. The debtor drew down unsecured credit to pay interest on the secured 
claim. Judge Lavien ruled that a § 547(c)(1) defense canceled the voidable preference liability of the 
undersecured parties. Id. at 30. That is, the revolving credit was substantially contemporaneous with 
the payment of interest. The reason this defense was appropriate was because it showed that, at the 
time the insider received a benefit, the debtor received n~w value from the assured creditors. Id. 
Accordingly, the new value supplied by another was used to defend the insider's own § 547(b) liabil-
ity. Because the insider had no § 547(b) liability, the undersecured creditors could have no Deprizio 
liability. 
Later, Judge Lavien seems to have changed his mind and ruled that the undersecured parties 
were liable after all. From this unreported changement de coeur, the undersecured parties appealed. 
In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc. (In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.), 980 F.2d 
792 (1st Cir. 1992), Judge Conrad Cyr found that no benefit to insiders existed, thereby defeating any 
prima facie case and obviating any need to consider the status of any defense under § 547(c). 
188 In contrast, the mere disappearance of an unsecured subrogation claim cannot count as new 
value, since the disappearance in no way enriches the other general creditors of the debtor. LaRose v. 
Crosby & Son Towing, Inc. (In re Dick Henley, Inc.), 38 B.R. 210, 213 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1984). 
189 837 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988). 
190 Id. 
191 Erman v. Armco, Inc. (In re Formed Tubes, Inc.), 41 B.R. 819 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) 
(assured creditor held liable even though surety fully secured). 
192 984 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). 
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and the bankruptcy trustee sued the lender to recover the payment as a 
voidable preference. 
The lender first argued that it was not the initial transferee-the law 
firm was, as the payment came from the proceeds of the judgment. If this 
argument had worked, the lender would have been a transferee of a trans-
feree, entitled to the defense described by section SSO(b).193 The court 
held, however, that the law firm was just a transparent conduit.194 The 
court explained, "[A] party that receives a transfer directly from the 
debtor will not be considered the initial transferee unless that party gains 
actual dominion or control over the funds."196 "And 'dominion' meant the 
freedom 'to invest the whole [amount] in lottery tickets.' " 196 Since the law 
firm had no such freedom to play the lottery, the law firm was not the 
initial transferee-the bank was. 
All this was quite beside the point. The lender had a section 
547(c)(1) defense, because every dollar it received reduced the surety's se-
curity interest against the debtor's property.197 This constituted new value 
extended (by the surety) contemporaneously with the payment to the 
lender. 
But more fundamentally, the Fifth Circuit incorrectly decided the 
case because the trustee could not properly plead a prima facie case 
against the bank. In Brunson, as payment the bank received the surety's 
cash collateral.198 It is a prime feature of the hypothetical liquidation test 
that the surrender of cash collateral can never be preferential, so long as 
the security interest on the cash was itself not voidable.199 Therefore, no 
transfer to the bank of cash proceeds of a valid security interest could 
1
•• According to 11 U.S.C. § SSO(b) (1988): 
(b) The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section from- (1) the initial 
transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; (2) any 
immediate or mediate good faith transferee under subsection (a) of this section. 
Id. The lender argued that it was a transferee of a transferee under § SSO(a)(2) and hence entitled to 
the defense in § SSO(b). 
1
~• Brunson, 984 F.2d at 144. 
1
•• Id. 
196 Id. at 141 (citing Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Amer. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 894 (7th 
Cir. 1988)). Actually, few fiduciaries have the right to use trust funds to play the lottery. Judge 
Easterbrook's rhetoric should not be taken to mean that those with a fiduciary duty to invest funds 
wisely are never initial transferees under § SSO(a)(l). Those schooled in law and economics are sim-
ply enamored with the lottery as a metaphor for economic risk taking. This is odd because the lottery 
is economically irrational to play-strictly a sucker bet. 
197 But see Kleckner v. Russell (In re Kleckner), 81 B.R. 464, 467 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) 
(under Illinois law, attorney's liens unperfected until court acknowledges its existence). 
1
•• Brunson, 984 F.2d at 140. 
1
•• See Carlson, supra note 11. 
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possibly meet the hypothetical liquidation test of section 547(b)(5).200 
A deceptively difficult case where the court missed a section 547(c)(1) 
defense is Kepler v. Aetna Finance Co. (In re Ausman Jewelers, Inc.),261 
where a debtor sold jewelry to customers on open account. The debtor 
sold the account to a secured party for cash. Later, two customers re-
turned the jewelry, for undisclosed reasons, and the debtor agreed to re-
fund the price. The .customers owed the secured party, however, not the 
debtor. The debtor therefore promised to pay the account owed to the 
secured party. Later, the debtor forwarded unencumbered dollars to the 
secured party and then filed for bankrupt~y. The bankruptcy payment 
trustee claimed that the payment to the secured party was a voidable pref-
erence, of which the secured party was the initial transferee. 
Judge Robert Martin agreed that the secured. party had received a 
voidable preference. Oddly, he did not hold that th~ secured party was a 
creditor of the debtor.202 Rather, the secured party was a creditor of an 
account debtor. Therefore, Judge Martin ruled that the payment of the 
account was for the benefit of the customers. The secured party, however, 
was the initial transferee of the customers' voidable preference and, under 
section 550(a)(1), it had Deprizio liability for it. 
In fact, the returned jewelry was collateral. Therefore, it is possible 
that a section 547(c)(1) defense existed. It is impossible to judge from 
Judge Martin's opinion what shape this defense might take. We need to 
know why the customers returned the jewelry. 
For example, let us suppose that the jewelry was being returned be-
cause of latent defects. In such a case, the customer could revoke accept-
ance, and no sales contract will have been formed. 263 If no sales contract 
existed·, the customer owed the debtor nothing, and the debtor had no ac-
count to sell to the secured party. If not, it is possible that the secured 
20° Crucial to the preceding analysis is the release of the surety's security interest. Mere reduc-
tion of an unsecured suretyship 'Claim (because the assured creditor was paid) could not by itself be 
considered "new value" because suretyship simply affects the identity of the creditor claiming against 
the bankrupt estate. Suretyship never aids the debtor's balance sheet. See Nordberg v. Arab Banking 
Corp. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 904 F.2d 588, 596 (11th Cir. 1990); Simon v. Engineered 
Protection Sys. (In re Hatfield Elec. Co.), 91 B.R. 782, 785 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). 
201 177 B.R. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1995). 
202 Id. at 285 n.3. 
20
• U .C.C. § 2-608(1) provides: 
The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a ... unit whose non-conformity substan-
tially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it ... 
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced 
either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances. 
u.c.c. § 2-608(i) (1978). 
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party was entitled to a refund from the debtor, because it paid for an 
account that did not exist. Such refunds or chargebacks are often expressly 
provided for in security agreements. If a right to a refund existed, then 
contrary to Judge Martin's opinion, the secured party was a creditor of 
the debtor. Given a right to a refund, the returned jewelry would have 
been collateral for the secured party. According to Uniform Commercial 
Code section 9-306(5): 
If a sale of goods results in an account ... which is transferred by the 
seller to a secured party, and if the goods are returned to or are repossessed 
by the seller or the secured party, the foll.owing rules determine priorities: 
(a) If the goods were collateral at the time of sale, for an indebtedness 
of the seller which is still unpaid, the original security interest attaches 
again to the goods and continues as a perfected security interest if it was 
perfected at the time when the goods were sold . . . 
(c) An unpaid transferee of the account has a security interest in the 
goods against the transferor. Such security interest is subordinate to a secur-
ity interest asserted under paragraph (a). 
(d) A security interest of an unpaid transferee asserted under para-
graph ... (c) must be perfected for protection against creditors of the trans-
feror and purchasers of the returned or repossessed goods. 204 
We do not know from Judge Martin's opinion whether the secured party 
was also an inventory financier or merely the buyer of accounts. If the 
setured party financed inventory, as well as bought accounts, then section 
9-306(5)(a) applies, and provides the secured party with a perfected se-
curity interest in the jewels. If the amount of the refund is less than the 
value of the jewels-unlikely, where the jewels were defective-then the 
payment is voidable. All payments to undersecured creditors are voidable 
under Bankruptcy Code section 547(b)-until the payment exceeds the 
unsecured deficit. After that point, the payment releases the secured 
party's security interest in the returned jewels, and to this extent the se-
cured party might have a section 547(c)(1) defense.2011 
Suppose the secured party did not finance inventory, but rather only 
bought the accounts in question. In this case, section 9-306(5)(c) applies. 
The application of subsection (c) poses some problems for the secured 
party's position. If some other undersecured inventory financier existed, 
that other secured party would have priority to the returned jewelry, in 
••• u.c.c. § 9-306(5) (1978). 
••• See Carlson, supra note 11. 
\ 
I 
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which case the buyer of the account may have had a security interest in 
the return that was too deeply subordinated to do much good. Or, if the 
inventory financier did not exist or was oversecured, the secured party 
could claim the returned jewels as proceeds of a perfected security interest 
in the accounts under section 9-306(5)(c), but, unless the financing state-
ment pertaining to the accounts referred to a proceeds security interest in 
returned goods, the secured party's perfection would lapse ten days after 
the return.206 Since the return was in December 1991 (perhaps after 
Christmas), and since the debtor paid the secured party in March, perfec-
tion may have lapsed. Lapse of perfection is a difficult voidable preference 
issue. The usual reaction to it is that lapsed perfection renders the security 
interest voidable under section 547(b).207 If so, the release of a voidable 
unperf ected security interest cannot constitute new value under section 
547(c)(1). 
These are the facts when the customers returned defective goods after 
revoking acceptance. If the goods conformed to the contract, then the cus-
tomers were merely selling the goods back to the debtor. As the secured 
party was not a party to this resale, the customer still owes the secured 
party on the account. Meanwhile, section 9-306(5) still applies, so that 
the jewels are collateral of the secured party. In effect, the customers and 
the debtor have agreed that the secured party is a third party beneficiary 
of the debtor's obligation to pay. This makes the secured party a creditor 
of the debtor, contrary to what Judge Martin ruled, and the jewelry is 
collateral for this obligation to pay. Such a principle establishes the possi-
bility of a section 547(c)(1) defense, or perhaps even a defeat of the prima 
facie voidable preference, if the value of the jewelry exceeds the debtor's 
obligation to pay the secured party. 
For these reasons, it is unlikely that section 547(c)(1) defenses were 
dismissed. 
C. New Value Given Back 
LaRose v. Crosby & Son Towing, Inc. (In re Dick Henley, Inc.). 208 
is a case in which a court wrongly applied section 547(c)(1). There, a 
contractor paid a subcontractor shortly before bankruptcy. The subcon-
tractor held a statutory lien on a third party's real property for services 
and materials bestowed on that property. That made the third party a 
• 06 U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) (1978). 
••• See Carlson, supra note 11. 
••• 38 B.R. 210 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1984). 
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nonrecourse surety to the contractor. As surety, the real estate owner had 
a right over against the debtor, but this right was entirely unsecured. 
Judge Wesley Steen ruled that every dollar paid to the subcontractor re-
leased a statutory lien the debtor enjoyed against the surety and that this 
constituted a defense under section 547(c)(1) to the contractor's voidable 
preference liability.209 
The fault in Judge Steen's opinion lies in the fact that the debtor 
never received any new value. Only the surety did.210 Meanwhile, the 
payments depleted the debtor's estate to the prejudice of the debtor's un-
secured creditors. Therefore, the payments should have been ruled voida-
ble preferences.211 
Far from establishing the subcontractor's section 547(c)(1) defense, 
the reduction of the statutory liens against the third party's property had 
the opposite effect. It proved that the third party itself had received the 
benefit of transfers to the subcontractor, and therefore the third party had 
its own voidable preference liability. 
If, however, the same subcontractor were to provide additional ser-
vices to the debtor, the third party would have had a defense under section 
547(c)(4) because the third party would have given the debtor new value. 
Specifically, the new value is the further encumbrance of the real estate. 
The new value would allow the debtor to generate a bigger account re-
ceivable (from the same third party), thereby enriching the debtor's estate. 
This was the holding in Harrison v. Brent Towing Co. (In re H & S 
Transportation Co.),212 where fuel suppliers of a debtor obtained mari-
time liens on a towboat every time the boat used fuel. The towboat, how-
ever, was not debtor property. Rather, the owner hired the debtor to run 
the towboat, meaning that the owner had become a nonrecourse surety for 
the supplier's unsecured claim against the debtor. The maritime lien could 
not, of course, mean that the supplier was oversecured in the debtor's 
bankruptcy. The surety was unsecured in that bankruptcy. Therefore, 
••• Id. at 212-14. 
210 Judge Steen's answer to this argument was that § 547(a)(2)'s definition of new value in-
cluded "release by a transferee of property previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction 
that is neither void nor voidable .... " 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (1988). The release of the lien caused 
release of the subrogation claim and hence the release was (indirectly) to the debtor. 38 B.R. at 215. 
211 Judge Thomas Reavley expressly ruled that in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuel Oil Supply & 
Terminaling, Inc. (In re Fuel Oil Supply and Terminaling, Inc.), 837 F.2d 201, 230 (5th Cir. 1988). 
Accord Cocolat, Inc. v. Fisher Dev., Inc. (In re Cocolat, Inc.), 176 B.R. 540, 545 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
1995); Simon v. Engineered Protection Sys., Inc. (In re Hatfield Elec. Co.), 91 B.R. 782 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 1988). 
212 939 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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payments by the debtor for fuel within the ninety day preference period 
were for the benefit of the towboat owner and hence prima Jacie voidable 
preferences. Every such payment served to disencumber collateral owned 
by the surety. On this theory, the trustee tried to recover the value of 
payments to the assured creditor from the surety directly. 
The supplier, however, had advanced new unsecured credit to the 
debtor after having been paid, creating yet new liens on the surety's tow-
boat. According to Judge Richard Suhrheinrich, this gave rise to a defense 
under section 547(c)(4).213 That is, the debtor received oil from the sup-
pliers, and the towboat sustained a lien for the supplies. The oil was the 
new value, and it was produced by the surety's alienation of the towboat 
in favor of the supplier. This new value defended the earlier preferences 
that had benefited the nonrecourse surety. 
In H & S, the debtor received new value in the form of oil shipments 
in exchange for the debtor's unsecured obligation to pay. The trustee 
chose to pursue the surety as the beneficiary of these transfers, but the 
surety could assert the new oil as a defense because the surety's collateral 
to the supplier was likewise new value given "for the benefit of the 
debtor." Suppose now that the trustee tries to pursue-the assured creditor 
for receiving payments on antecedent debt. Given the fact that the new 
value-additional oil-has already been used as a defense by the supplier, 
can the assured creditor use that same new value defense a second time to 
defend against this new voidable preference theory? 
Oddly, the answer is yes. Nothing in section 547(c)(4) prevents the 
same new value defense over and over again. As applied to H & S, this 
seems appropriate. Why should the supplier who actually supplied the oil 
be deprived of this defense just because the surety has already used the 
same oil to defend against the trustee's voidable preference claim ?214 In 
other situations, though, the repetitive use of a single dose of new value to 
defend against multiple voidable preference suits is deeply disturbing. In 
theory, where a creditor has received eight units of preference on eight 
different occasions and then gives back one unit of new value, that creditor 
could use the one unit of new value as a defense in each of the eight 
voidable preference actions. This defect is convenient in tripartite cases 
such as H & S, but quite upsetting in ordinary bipartite cases which are, 
213 Id. Judge Suhrheinrich theorized that § 547(c) defenses could be used in general by Deprizio 
defendants who' have no liability under § 547(b), and whose liability springs only from § 550(a)(1) 
as the initial transferee of someone else's voidable preference. Id. 
214 The reason that the § 547(c)(4) defense should be put to double use is that the debt owed to 
the supplier and guaranteed by the nonrecourse surety were one and the same debt. 
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happily, beyond the scope of this Article.215 
Meanwhile, section 547(c)(4) has a curious limitation. According to 
that provision, the trustee cannot avoid a transfer "to or for.the benefit of 
a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfers, such creditor gave new 
value .... "216 This emphasized language would seem to require that the 
very creditor who is the defendant in a voidable preference case must be 
the one who gives back the new value to or for the benefit of the debtor. 
In a tripartite case, this requirement can be vexatious. Suppose an 
initial transferee is being sued because the transfer benefited some insider 
who is not being sued. Later, that insider gives back new value to the 
debtor. Because of the trope "such creditor," it would appear that the 
initial transferee cannot assert the new value given by the insider. Thus, 
even though the beneficiary has totally reimbursed the debtor's estate, the 
bankruptcy trustee can obtain a windfall by pursuing the initial 
transferee. 
This limitation is not without its logic. Properly speaking, section 
547(c)(4) is in the nature of a setoff. Only the creditor being sued for a 
voidable preference should be entitled to set off the extension of new 
value. Just as the mutuality requirement in setoff law217 prohibits a credi-
tor from asserting the claim of some stranger as a setoff, so section 
547(c)(4) prohibits the use of some stranger's new value by way of set-
off.218 To be compared is the defense in section 547(c)(1), where a voida-
ble preference defendant can cite the new value exchanged by some stran-
ger, so long as the exchange wa.s intended as part of a single 
transaction.219 Section 547(c)(4), being based on setoff, operates on a clif-
f erent principle. 
D. The Surety as Account Debtor 
When an existing unsecured creditor receives a subsequently created 
suretyship right, which is in turn contemporaneously secured by the 
debtor's collateral, the surety's· security interest is a transfer on antecedent 
debt, but the surety has the section 547(c)(1) defense. So long as the "two 
transfer" theory is applied, as it should be, the assured creditor has no 
210 On this feature of § 547(c)(4), see Carlson, supra note 11. 
21
• 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988) (emphasis added). 
217 Id. § 553(a) (1988). 
21
• Id. § 547(c)(4). 
21
• Id. § 547(c)(l). 
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such defense. 220 
These principles become unusually complex when the assured credi-
tor claims a security interest in the debtor's receivables, and when a surety 
is an "account debtor."221 Whether the trustee can recover a voidable 
preference from either the surety or the assured creditor is a matter of 
prodigious complexity and caprice. These matters might be litigated under 
section 547(c)(1), but aspects of the trustee's prima facie case are impli-
cated as well. 
The ability of the trustee to recover a voidable preference from the 
assured creditor is the function of the age of three different variables as of 
the time of the bankruptcy petition: (a) the suretyship obligation, (b) the 
receivable that the surety owes to the debtor, and (c) the security interest 
the assured creditor claims against that receivable. Of course, item (c) can 
never be older than item (b), since a security interest can never antedate 
the debtor's rights in the collateral.222 Also, the age of the security interest 
in the receivable depends on its perfection within ten days of attach-
ment, 223 so that if we say that the security interest is of a certain age, we 
imply that the creditor perfected within that grace period. 
In the discussion that follows, we will assume the assured creditor is 
undersecured. If oversecured, then no transfer by the debtor to either the 
assured creditor or the surety could be a voidable preference because such 
a transfer never flunks the hypothetical liquidation test of section 
547(b)(S). In addition, the reader must constantly monitor whether the 
assured creditor is receiving the debtor's unencumbered dollar, an encum-
bered dollar (paid by the surety over to the secured party as assignee), or 
a dollar in which the debtor has no interest (paid by the surety in satisfac-
tion of the suretyship obligation). 
1. The Suretyship, the Receivable, and the Security Interest Are All 
Over Ninety Days Old 
If all of the analytical variables fall outside the ninety day preference 
period, then the assured creditor may be paid at any time without voida-
ble preference liability. The analysis for reaching this conclusion, how-
••• See infra notes 167-85 and accompanying text. 
221 U.C.C. § 9-l0S(l)(a) (1994) (" 'Account debtor' means the person who is obligated on an 
account, chattel, paper or general intangible."). 
••• 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1988). 
••• Id. § 547(e)(2)(A), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 8, § 203, 108 Stat. 
at 4122. · 
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ever, is rather complicated. 
Suppose the debtor pays the assured creditor with unencumbered 
dollars. The transfer is a prima facie voidable preference, but this is pre-
cisely where the assured creditor has a section 547(c)(1) defense. Every 
such dollar the assured creditor receives reduces the surety's right to set 
off its contingent subrogation claim against the debtor's claim against the 
surety. This reduction in the setoff opportunity enriches the debtor dollar 
for dollar, thereby establishing the assured creditor's section 547(c)(1) 
defense.224 . 
No defense exists, though, so long as the debtor is paying down what 
can be called the "insufficiency."2211 To the extent that the subrogation 
claim exceeds the surety's obligation as account debtor, payment to the 
assured creditor does not return value to the bankrupt estate."For exam-
ple, if the debtor owes the assured creditor $100 and the surety owes the 
debtor $80, a $20 insufficiency exists. The first $20 that the debtor pays 
the assured creditor does not reduce the surety's setoff rights. Rather, it 
eliminates the surety's insufficiency. This initial payment depletes the 
bankrupt estate and is therefore preferential, but all additional payments 
reduces the setoff opportunity of the surety pro tanto. As a result of a 
second $20 being paid over, the debtor's estate shrinks by $20, but the 
debtor's claim against the surety-formerly worth zero because of the set 
off right-is now worth $20. The debtor's gain offsets the debtor's loss, 
and so the assured creditor (via the surety) has given back new value 
contemporaneously with its receipt of the $20 payment. 
Thus, where a surety is undersecured, payments to the assured credi-
tor are voidable preferences. Once the unsecured deficit claim has disap-
peared, every dollar the debtor p?ys to the assured creditor reduces the 
surety's setoff rights, thereby enrid1ing the debtor. From this point, the 
assured creditor can assert the section 547(c)(1) defense because new value 
is being returned to the debtor. 
The section 547(c)(1) defense exists only when the debtor pays the 
assured creditor with unencumbered dollars.226 If the dollars are supplied 
••• The assured creditor is therefore in the position of the supplier of oil in Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling, Inc. (In re Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling, Inc.), 837 F.2d 224 
(5th Cir. 1988), discussed supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
••• 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2) (1988) (insufficiency is defined as the "amount, if any, by which a 
claim against the debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the holder of such claim"). 
Section 553(b)(2)'s definition is, properly speaking, applicable only to § 553(b), which is not yet 
implicated in the discussion. Section 553(b) attempts to prevent a creditor from improving her position 
through setoff within 90 days of bankruptcy . 
.. a 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(l) (1988). 
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by the surety, the section 547(c)(1) defense is no longer relevant, and the 
analysis must follow one of two divergent paths, although each path leads 
to the same result. The two paths exist because, in the context at hand, 
the surety owes the assured creditor twice over. First, the surety owes the 
assured creditor under the suretyship agreement. Second, the surety owes 
the assured creditor as assignee of her obligation on the receivable. It is 
necessary, then, to determine which debt the surety is paying when she 
transfers dollars to the assured creditor. 
When a payor owes a creditor two different debts, the payor is enti-
tled to declare what a given payment means.227 For example, the surety 
might declare that she is paying the suretyship obligation-not the receiv-
able owed to the debtor. In such a case, the payment by the surety can 
never be a voidable preference in the debtor's bankruptcy because the pay-
ment is not a transfer of debtor property.228 
Once the surety pays her suretyship obligation, the surety has estab-
227 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 388-89 (3d ed. 1972) 
(Walter H.E. Yaeger ed. 1972). 
•
2
• See National Bank of Newport v. National Herkimer County Bank, 225 U.S. 178 (1912). In 
that case, the debtor had a claim against its affiliate. It was also liable on a promissory note held by a 
bank. Shortly before bankruptcy, the affiliate purchased the debtor's note held by the bank and used it 
to set off its obligation to the debtor. Then, as now, assignments of unsecured claims during the 
preference period obtained to create a setoff were disallowed. See Bankruptcy Act § 68(b); 11 U.S.C. 
§ 553(a)(2) (1988). The affiliate, however, was insolvent and had no assets. The bankruptcy trustee 
therefore tried to recover from the bank on a preference theory. Apparently, the trustee alleged that 
the money paid by the affiliate to the bank was in fact the debtor's property-proceeds of the receiva-
ble the affiliate owed the debtor. If so, then the bank received debtor property on antecedent debt. 
The lower court had ruled that the bank could not be liable for the preference because it was 
never the transferee of debtor property. Mason v. National Herkimer County Bank, 172 F. 529, 531 
(2d Cir. 1909), affd, 225 U.S. 178 (1912). In affirming, Justice Charles Evans Hughes was appar-
ently keen to deny that only transferees could be defendants in voidable preference actions. 225 U.S. 
at 184. National Bank of Newport therefore constitutes the birth of the tripartite preference case, and 
its principles were eventually made explicit in statutory language. The reason that the bank had not 
received a preference, however, was that "[i]t was not shown that the bank had anything to do" with 
the initial transferee's collateral. Id. at 187; By this Justice Hughes presumably meant that the affili-
ate's payment to the bank was not cash proceeds of the debtor's account receivable. Id. at 186. Rather, 
the dollars paid were not the debtor's property but the assignee's own property. As such, the assignee 
was like the surety who declares that a payment is on the suretyship obligation, but not a payment of 
the receivable. 
Justice Hughes also thought that the setoff meant that the debtor had made no transfer of prop-
erty and had simply suffered the extinguishment of one of its receivables. 225 U.S. at 185 ("The fact 
then is not ... that 'the bankrupt parted with property ... and the bank received it,' but rather that 
the bankrupt parted with nothing, and the bank received then money of the [affiliate] and redelivered 
to the [affiliate] the paper .... "). This view that setoffs are not transfers is probably overruled by 
§ 550(a), which allows a trustee to recover illegal setoffs under § 553(b) from either the "initial 
transferee" or the person benefited. See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text. 
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lished a vested suretyship claim against the debtor. This suretyship claim 
can be used to set off the surety's obligation on the receivable owed to the 
debtor. If this occurs, the trustee has no voidable preference recovery 
against the surety, for the simple reason that the setoffs cannot be voidable 
preferences. Section 553(a) provides, in relevant part, that: 
this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing 
by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the 
case under this . title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case . . .. 2H 
This language means that the surety's setoff can never be deemed a voida-
ble preference, at least so far as the surety is concerned. 230 . 
219 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1988). 
""° Section 553(a) validates setoffs generally, but several exceptions are also set forth. Three of 
these exceptions entail events occurring within 90 days of bankruptcy. t 1 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2)-(3), (b) 
(1988). Since we are stipulating that the surety's obligation to the debtor is over 90 days old by the 
time of bankruptcy, none of these exceptions is relevant. 
In addition, § 553(a) requires that, for a setoff right to exist, the two countervailing debts must 
be "mutual." Id. § 553(a). This may pose a problem for the surety who pays the suretyship obliga-
tion instead of paying the receivable. Thereafter, the surety must try to set off the subrogation claim 
against its obligation to pay a receivable that the debtor assigned to the secured party. Where the 
surety pays the suretyship obligation in full, the assured creditor's security interest entirely disap-
pears. This disencumbers the receivable and makes it fully mutual for setoff purposes. Where the 
surety pays less than the full amount of the suretyship obligation, or where the receivable secures debt 
the surety never guaranteed, the surety may set off the subrogation claim against the encumbered 
account, but only if the surety's obligation to pay the receivable arose after the suretyship obligation. 
This follows from U.C.C. § 9-318(1)(b), which provides: 
[t]he rights of an assignee are subject to (b) any ... defense or claim of the account debtor 
against the assignor which accrues before the account debtor receives notification Qf the 
assignment. 
U.C.C. § 9-318 (1)(b) (1978). Where the temporal order is reversed, the assured creditor can claim 
that the setoff is invalid as against her right to collect as assignee. 
A contrary case is Kent-Reese Enters., Inc. v. Hempy, 378 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1967), where the 
receivable was older than the suretyship agreement and both were older than the preference period. 
The. assured creditor claimed no. security interest in the receivable. 
Just before bankruptcy, the surety paid off the assured creditor and then declared a setoff to 
extinguish the surety's qbligation to the debtor. The trustee sued on the receivable, as if the setoff 
were invalid. Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Marvin Jones ruled in favor of the trustee, hold-
ing that the trustee should recover from the surety because the assured creditor had taken no security 
interest in the debtor's receivables. Id. at 912-13. 
This is a non sequitur. Why should the secured party's failure to take a security interest in the 
receivable prevent the surety's right to setoff? Had the assured creditor held a security interest in the 
receivable, the sctoff would have been improper because the debts would not have been mutual. See 11 
U.S.C. § 533(a) (1988). The debtor would have had a claim against the surety, and the surety would 
have owed the countervailing claim to the secured party as assignee. Contrary to Judge Jones' opin-
ion, the absence of the security interest was the sine qua non of the setoff-not a reason to invalidate 
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Under state law, however, setoff is subject to the rule of "use it or 
lose it." Thus, if the surety pays the receivable before its contingent sure-
tyship claim becomes fixed, no mutual debt exists when it comes time to 
exercise the setoff. 
The surety did not take this advice in Citizens' National Bank v. 
Lineberger (In re Kirby-Warren Co.),231 yet an overly generous court 
came to the aid of the surety and the assured creditor. In this case, a 
surety who owed a receivable to a debtor had also co-signed the debtor's 
notes. In an eleventh-hour workout, the surety, an insider, borrowed 
money from the assured creditor, used the money to pay down the receiva-
ble, and caused the debtor to pay the same money back to the assured 
creditor. The bankruptcy trustee sued the assured creditor for voidable 
preference and should have recovered. The assured creditor had received 
unencumbered property of the debtor and had no security interest in re-
ceivables. The surety had forfeited the setoff right by paying the receiva-
ble instead of declaring the setoff. Yet the assured creditor still prevailed 
against the bankruptcy trustee. In essence, Judge John J. Parker allowed 
the parties to recharacterize the transaction after the fact for their own 
benefit. Judge Parker effectively treated the surety's payment to the 
debtor as a payment to the assured creditor (not a payment on the receiva-
ble) followed by a setoff of the receivable.232 
The above discussion assumes that the surety chose to pay the surety-
ship obligation and not the receivable. When this occurred, the assured 
creditor was entirely immune from the trustee's voidable preference theo-
ries-proving, incidentally, that the assured creditor need not rely on any 
security interest encumbering receivables in order to prevail. But another 
assumption is also possible: if the security agreement between the debtor 
and the assured creditor is in default, or if the security agreement provides 
for direct payment to the assured creditor, the surety may choose instead 
to pay the receivable. Payment of the receivable to the assured creditor 
extinguishes the guaranteed debt, thereby relieving the surety pro tanto of 
any suretyship obligation to an unpaid assured creditor. 
it. 
••• 45 F.2d 522 ( 4th Cir. 1930). 
••• In dissent, Judge Elliott Northcott protested that the assured creditor's president was the 
brother-in-law of the surety, that the entire arrangement was crooked, and that no such help to the 
parties was deserved. Id. at 531-32 (Northcott, J., dissenting). 
Judge Parker had a bad year in 1930. Besides the Kirby-Warren case, Parker was also narrowly 
rejected by the Senate after President Hoover ,nominated him to the Supreme Court. See John C. 
McCoid II, Moore v. Bay: An Exercise in Choice of Law, 1990 ANN. SURVEY BANKR. LAW 157, 187 
n.70 It is not known whether the reasoning in Kirby-Warren contributed to Judge Parker's demise. 
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If the surety's payment to the assured creditor implies payment of the 
receivable, the trustee can have no voidable preference recoveries. Such a 
payment of the receivable to the assured creditor means that the assured 
creditor has received possession of her own cash proceeds. The surrender 
of cash proceeds to a secured party with a valid security interest is never 
preferential because the surrender never runs afoul of the hypothetical 
liquidation test. Therefore, thanks to section 547(b)(5), the trustee cannot 
recover when the surety pays the proceeds of the receivable directly to the 
assured creditor.233 
2. The Receivable or the Suretyship Arose During the Preference Pe-
riod on Antecedent Debt 
The conclusion that the assured creditor might escape voidable pref-
erence liability when the surety is also an account debtor depends on the 
assumption that the surety has a valid setoff. A valid setoff means that, 
when an assured creditor receives unencumbered dollars from the debtor, 
the assured creditor can assert the disappearance of the surety's setoff op-
portunity as a section 547(c)(1) defense. Section 553(a) validates setoffs 
generally, but it also sets forth exceptions: 
(2) such claim was transferred, by an entity other than the debtor, to 
such creditor ... 
(B)(i) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and (ii) 
while the debtor was insolvent; or 
(3) the debt owed to the debtor by such creditor was incurred by such 
creditor ... 
(A) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; (B) while the 
debtor was insolvent; and (C) for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff 
against the debtor.234 
Section 553(a)(2) will not affect the surety's setoff right even when the 
receivable arises within the ninety day preference period. This subsection 
requires the surety to obtain a countervailing claim against the debtor 
through transfer or assignment. The creation of the receivable arises 
through transfers from the debtor which section 553(a)(2) excludes by its 
terms. Rather, the suretyship creates a contingent claim in the surety, 
without any transfers of rights from the assured creditor. For this reason, 
••• Kapela v. Newman, 649 F.2d 887, 891 (1st Cir. 1981). 
284 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1988). 
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the suretyship agreement created in the ninety day period before bank-
ruptcy can never violate section 553(a)(2).2311 
Section 553(a)(3), however, may provide an impediment to the 
surety's valid right of setoff. If the surety borrows from the debtor within 
ninety days of the debtor's filing for the purpose of establishing the setoff, 
the setoff will be disallowed.238 Or, where the receivable is old and the 
suretyship is new, the setoff will not be allowed when the suretyship was 
for the purpose of obtaining a setoff. In either case, the surety /account 
debtor will continue to owe the receivable to the debtor, and the trustee 
may recover the receivable as if no setoff occurred.237 On the other hand, 
if the surety signs a suretyship agreement and then borrows for some hon-
est purpose, or if the suretyship was not undertaken for the purpose of 
obtaining the setoff, then the surety can exploit a setoff opportunity be-
cause no part of section 553(a) is offended. If the setoff is legal, then the 
assured creditor has a section 547(c)(1) defense. 
Earlier we saw that, between senior and junior secured parties, setoff 
rights arising during the preference period for the benefit of the senior 
secured party potentially benefit the undersecured junior party.238 These 
observations, valid in context, cannot lead to the conclusion that the as-
sured creditor is liable for the setoff opportunity the surety has received 
within the preference period. The surety's late-arising setoff rights proba-
bly do not "benefit" the assured creditor within the meaning of section 
••• It is true that subrogation resembles transfer. But subrogation exists alongside and in addi-
tion to the self-generated rights of the surety. That is, the self-generated right of the surety is her 
contingent claim against the debtor for indemnity. Subrogation is the assignment of the assured credi-
tor's fixed claim. Both rights exist side by side. Hostmann v. First Interstate Bank (In re XTI Xonix 
Technologies, Inc.), 156 B.R. 821, 828-29 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993) (more or less concurring with this 
proposition). This distinction is honored by Bankruptcy Code § 509, which provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, an entity that is liable with 
the deb!or on, or that has secured, a claim of a creditor against the debtor, and that pays 
such claim, is subrogated to the rights of such creditor to the extent of such payment. (b) 
Such entity is not subrogated to the rights of such creditor to the extent that- (1) a claim of 
such entity for reimbursement or contribution on account of such payment of such credi-
tor's claim is- (A) allowed under section 502 of this title; (B) disallowed other than under 
section 502(e) of this title; or (C) subordinated under section 510 of this title; or (2) as 
between the debtor and such entity, such entity received the consideration for the claim 
held by such creditor. 
11 U.S.C. § 509(a)-(b) (1988). The upshot of this provision is that a surety can claim against the 
debtor in her own right or through subrogation, but not both. Subrogation involves a transfer of rights 
from the assured creditor to the surety, but a surety also has a claim against the debtor in her own 
right, without regard to any transfer. 
••• 11 U.S.C § 553(a)(3) (1988). 
••• Id. 
••• See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text. 
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547(b)(1). The reason they do not is that, at best, the setoff opportunity is 
like a security interest issued to the surety after the suretyship obligation 
arose. Such security interests may not benefit the assured creditor because 
the assured creditor already had the right to collect from the surety m:1der 
the suretyship agreement.239 That the surety obtains a security interest for 
its subrogation claim is of no concern to the assured creditor. 
We also saw earlier that the principle from the new Restatement of 
Suretyship, which subrogates the assured creditor to the surety's security 
interests, interfered with the conclusion of "no benefit."240 The Restate-
ment, however, can have no effect here. There is no way for the assured 
creditor to benefit from the surety's setoff opportunity. The setoff oppor-
tunity can only be exercised after the suretyship obligation has become 
vested, which happens only when the assured creditor has been paid. 
Therefore, by the time the setoff opportunity can be used, the assured 
creditor has already been paid and therefore can never benefit from the 
setoff opportunity.241 
The trustee needs to destroy the surety's setoff in order to destroy the 
assured creditor's section 547(c)(1) defense. Section 553(b) is another pro-
vision to which a trustee might look for such vengeance . because it at-
tempts to strike down improvement of the surety's position during the 
ninety days prior to bankruptcy. As we are assuming the suretyship obli-
gation predates the receivable, it is very likely that the surety has indeed 
improved her position. But section 553(b) has a key limitation in that it 
requires that the surety actually manifest an intent to set off prior to the 
bankruptcy petition. If no setoff is manifested, section 553(b) does not 
apply.2"2 
Because of this limitation, it is very unlikely that section 553(b) will 
help the trustee establish a voidable preference theory against the assured 
creditor. If the debtor has paid the assured creditor with unencumbered 
dollars, the setoff opportunity disappears, as does any chance for the 
surety to manifest the setoff. With no manifested setoff, section 553(b) 
cannot apply to reduce the setoff right. 
To summarize, if the surety has a valid setoff, the trustee likely will 
have trouble recovering any voidable preference when the surety's obliga-
••• See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text. 
••• See supra note 33-34 and accompanying text . 
• ., Of course, any event occurring after the assured creditor has been paid by the surety cannot 
benefit the assured creditor, so that the assured creditor could have no liability under § 547(b). 
••• Heckathorn Constr. Co. v. Bass Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (In re Bass Mechanical Con-
tractors, Inc.}, 88 B.R. 201, 203 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988). 
282 BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 11 
tion to the debtor arises shortly before bankruptcy. The security interest, 
however, is surely a voidable preference. It will be of no extra help to the 
secured party.243 But the assured creditor will nevertheless have a valid 
section 547(c)(1) defense if the surety has a valid setoff. As always, if the 
surety pays the assured creditor directly on the suretyship obligation, the 
trustee has no voidable preference case against the assured creditor be-
cause the assured creditor has received no transfers of debtor property. 
There is one possible slip-up of which sureties should be aware. If 
the surety accidentally pays the receivable before paying the suretyship 
obligation, the setoff right may be lost, and the surety will be an un-
secured creditor in the debtor's bankruptcy. Even here we saw at least one 
court willing to aid the surety by recharacterizing the payment of the re-
ceivable as in fact a payment of the suretyship obligation.244 But sureties 
should not expect such generosity from the courts again, especially when 
they are insiders of the debtor. 
E. Receivables and Inventory 
When the assured creditor claims a security interest in inventory or 
receivables, the surety will usually enjoy the same defense the assured 
creditor has under section 547(c)(S).2411 So long as the secured claim is 
guaranteed, any transfer of inventory, receivables, or proceeds to the as-
sured creditor is for the benefit of the surety. But this benefit is not a 
voidable preference when section 547(c)(S) applies. According to the 
opening words of section 547(c)(S): 
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer- (S) that cre-
ates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds 
of either, .... 246 
To this defense is appended a very long "except" clause, which is 
designed to prevent a secured party (or her surety) from improving her 
position over the preference period: · 
••• If the surety's setoff fails under § 553(a)(3), the secured party would like a valid security 
interest in the late-arising receivable. She may have a defense under § 547(c)(5), depending on the 
facts. On this defense, see infra notes 245-7 5. 
••• Citizens' Nat'! Bank v. Lineberger (In re Kirby-Warren Co.), 45 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1930); 
see supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
••• Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 87 4 F.2d 1186, 1200 (7th Cir. 1989); Still v. Congress 
Fin. Corp. (Southern) (In re Southwest Equipment Rental, Inc.), 137 B.R. 263, 268 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 1992). 
••• 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1988). 
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. . . except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to the 
transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and 
to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount 
by which the debt secured by such security interest exceeded the value of all 
security interests for such debt on the later of-
(A)(i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this 
section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (ii) 
with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section ap-
plies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or 
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security 
agreement creating such security interest; . . . . 247 
According to this complicated exception, if the difference between the debt 
and the collateral decreases over the relevant preference period, the de-
fense created by the opening words of section 547(c)(S) is reduced by the 
amount of that decrease. 248 
As section 547(c)(5)(A)(ii) indicates, the one year reach-back period 
of section 547(b)(4)(B) may apply if insiders are involved.249 But, surpris-
ingly, if an insider has guaranteed repayment to a party with a security 
interest in inventory or receivables, the one year reach-back period is not 
necessarily applicable. According to section 547(c)(S)(A)(ii), the one year 
test is conducted "with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) 
of this section applies .... " 2110 Subsection (b)(4)(B) specifically refers to a 
period "between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of 
the petition, if such creditor at the time of the transfer was an insider."2111 
Therefore, the one year test must apply to security interests created be-
tween ninety days and one year before bankruptcy. Thus, it is an error to 
assume that the one year period universally applies in the section 
547(c)(5) calculation, just because an insider is implicated.2112 Rather, the 
••• Id. 
••• For exhaustive analysis of this proposition, see Irving A. Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Inter-
ests as Voidable Preferences, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 357 (1982); Carlson, supra note 11. 
••• 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(S)(A)(ii) (1988). 
••• Id. 
""' Id. § 547(b)(4)(B). 
••• Richard F. Duncan, Preferential Transfers, The Floating Lien, and Section 547(cX5) of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 36 ARK. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1982). In Still v. Congress Fin. Corp., 
137 B.R. 263 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992), Judge Ralph Kelley saw that the one year period might 
apply, but he missed the point that the test applies only to certain of the security interests that bene-
fited insiders. Instead, he applied the one year test to all the security interests, even if they arose 
during the 90 day period. Id. at 269. Application of the one year test in this way violates the literal 
terms of § 547(c)(S)(A)(ii). 
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one year period applies only when one of the voidable preferences was 
transferred before the ninety day period began. In other words, only when 
some of the items of inventory or collateral are very old will the one year 
test apply, and even then, it applies very specifically to the older inventory 
or account items. 
Because the ninety day test applies to all relevant security interests 
created within the ninety day period, while the one year test applies only 
to transfers made during the ninety day to one year period, the proper 
calculation of improvement in position contains some surprises. By way of 
example, suppose that the assured creditor has an after-acquired property 
security interest on all inventory of the debtor, and an insider of the 
debtor has guaranteed this claim. Suppose also that the inventory consists 
of widgets worth a dollar apiece. Widgets turn over frequently and there-
fore have a short shelf life. The assured creditor has a $100 claim, and, on 
the date of the bankruptcy petition, there are precisely 100 widgets. 
Ninety days before bankruptcy, the debt was $100 and there were only 
eighty widgets. One year before bankruptcy, the debt was $100 and there 
were only thirty widgets. 
Suppose that all 100 widgets were acquired a few days or weeks 
before bankruptcy. In that case, the only test used to determine improve-
ment of position is that described in section 547(c)(S)(A)(i), even though 
insiders are involved. Because all the transfers are those "to which subsec-
tion (b)(4)(A) ... applies," we are required to compare the insufficiency 
in the security that exists on the ninetieth day before the date of the bank-
ruptcy ($100 debt - $80 in widgets = $20) with the insufficiency in the 
security that exists on the date of the bankruptcy ($100 in debt - $100 in 
widgets = 0). The assured creditor has therefore improved her position 
by $20. As a result, the assured creditor has a valid security interest in 
$80 of the widgets and is liable for having received $20 worth of voidable 
preferences. Of course, as an insider, the surety is liable for the voidable 
portion of the security interests, which constitutes $20 in "benefits" within 
the meaning of section 547(b)(1). But by no means does the "insider" 
status of the surety, standing alone, invoke the one year test. 
Suppose now that ninety-nine of the widgets were acquired a few 
days before bankruptcy, with one other widget having been on the shelf 
for 100 days. In this case, section 547(c)(S)(A)(i) applies to the security 
interests on ninety-nine of the widgets, while section 547(c)(S)(A)(ii) ap-
plies to the security interest on the one aged widget, because that one 
1995] Tripartite Voidable Preferences 285 
transfer is "a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) ... applies."2113 Ac-
cordingly, with regard to the ninety-nine widgets, we calculate "any 
amount by which the debt secured by such security interest [$100] ex-
ceeded the value of all security interests for such debt [$80]" on the nine-
tieth day.264 The insufficiency with regard to the ninety-nine widgets is 
$20. Next, we calculate the insufficiency on the bankruptcy date. On that 
day, we are to find the "aggregate of all such transfers" to the assured 
creditor.21111 "Such transfers" means the transfers that are voidable under 
section 547(b). There are $100 worth of such transfers. 2116 The insuffi-
ciency at bankruptcy is $100 - $100 = 0. So far, of the ninety-nine wid-
gets, the trustee disencumbers $20 worth, and the secured party retains 
$79 worth of widgets. 
Now we must account for the one widget to which the one year pe-
riod in section 547(c)(5)(A)(ii) applies. According to this new test we 
must find the insufficiency on the day one year prior to bankruptcy. On 
this day, the debt was $100 and there were thirty widgets. On bankruptcy 
day, there was zero insufficiency. Therefore, the trustee is able to disen-
cumber up to seventy widgets. There is only one widget to which this 
portion of the test applies. Accordingly, the trustee may disencumber it. 
The final result is that the assured creditor has a security interest on only 
eighty ,widgets. The assured creditor is liable for the voidable security in-
terest on twenty widgets. The insider, however, is worse off. It "bene-
fited" from the $20 improvement in position during the preference period, 
and, in addition, from the one transfer that occurred in the insider period. 
Therefore, the insider's total liability is $21. Notice that this result is dif-
ferent from the one we might reach if the ninety day test or the one year 
test were used against all the widgets together. If we applied the ninety 
day test to all of the insider's "benefit," the insider would have had a 
liability of $20. If we applied only the one year test, the insider's liability 
would have been $70. 
Under this improvement-in-position test, the position of the assured 
creditor and the insider grows worse as the inventory grows older. By way 
of illustration, suppose that ninety-nine of the widgets are over ninety 
days old, and only one was recently acquired. Because at least ninety-nine 
of these widgets existed on the ninetieth day before bankruptcy, the insuf-
••• 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(S)(A)(ii) (1988) . 
... Id. § 547(c)(5)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
••• Id. § 547(c)(5). 
""" "Such transfers" consist of 99 widgets, which were transferred to the secured party within 
the 90 day period, and an additional widget, for which the secured party is liable under Deprizio. 
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ficiency on that day cannot be less than $100 - $99 = $1. Let us assume 
this is true. The insufficiency on the date of bankruptcy is still zero. 
Therefore, the trustee disencumbers the one and only widget that is sub-
ject to the ninety day test, and, so far, the secured party retains ninety-
nine widgets in collateral and loses one. Meanwhile, as to the ninety-nine 
widgets the secured party is allowed to keep, these ''benefited" the insider 
surety, and therefore the insider can be made liable for them, depending 
upon the section 547(c)(5) calculation. As to that calculation, the insuffi-
ciency one year before bankruptcy was $70. The insufficiency on the date 
of bankruptcy is still zero. Therefore, the assured creditor and the surety 
have improved their position by $70. The trustee can use this $70 to im-
pose liability on the insider. This $70 voidable preference can no longer 
be charged to the assured creditor now that Deprizio is repealed.2117 But 
the insider can be made to pay for the "benefit" obtained from the $70 in 
security interests transferred during the insider period. Thus-at least in 
our example, where improvement in position occurred in the insider pe-
riod-the older the inventory, the greater the liability of the insider 
surety. Before, the assured creditor had $79 of collateral. Now the insider 
has only $29 worth. Once again, this result is different from the result 
reached by simply using either the ninety day or the one year test. If the 
one year test had been used, the trustee could only disencumber $70 of 
inventory in total, not $71. It is not apparent why the insider's liability 
should increase the longer the inventory sits on the shelf. But this seems to 
be the import of the improvement-in-position test when insiders are 
involved. 
In applying these tests, it should be emphasized that section 547(c)(S) 
makes only the transferee's improvement in position relevant. Any im-
provement in position of a non-transferee is irrelevant. This point was 
fully recognized in Still v. Congress Finance Corp. (Southern) (In re 
Southwest Equipment Rental, Inc.),268 where a receivables lender being 
held liable under a Deprizio theory was able to assert a section 547(c)(5) 
defense. Judge Ralph Kelley decided to apply the one year test found in 
section 547(c)(S)(A)(ii) to check for the secured party's improvement of 
position.269 On its own, this was erroneous. The one year test should only 
have been applied with regard to receivables that were over ninety days 
••• 11 U.S.C. § SS0(c) (1988), as amended by Act, supra note 8, § 202, 108 Stat. at 4126.; see 
supra text and accompanying notes 7-9. 
••• 137 B.R. 263, 269 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992). 
209 Id. 
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old on the date of the bankruptcy. All other security interests should have 
been tested under the ninety day test of section 547(c)(5)(A)(i), even 
though an insider was involved. 260 Judge Kelley was correct in allowing 
the secured party to see whether its position had been improved over the 
one year period.261 Section 547(c)(5) does not require us to test whether 
the insider had improved the insider's position. The two tests will not be 
the same, as the following example will show. 
Suppose again that the assured creditor has a $100 claim against the 
debtor and has an after-acquired property security interest in widgets 
worth $1 a piece. Ninety-one days before bankruptcy, the debtor obtains 
$80 in widgets. These widgets still exist in the debtor's estate, and so the 
one year test applies to them. Suppose further that, one year before bank-
ruptcy, the debtor owned no widgets at all, so that the acquisition of $80 
in widgets is an $80 naked improvement of position. 
These security interests may have benefited the insider, if the insider 
was undersecured. If so, the trustee has a prima f acie case against the 
insider, unless section 547(c)(5) provides a defense. On the facts hereto-
fore supplied, the insider has pure improvement of position. But now sup-
pose that the insider has borrowed $50 from the debtor more than one 
year before. This $50 account payable constitutes a security interest in the 
debtor's bankruptcy because it constitutes a setoff opportunity against the 
surety's still-contingent subrogation claim.262 
As section 547(c)(5) measures global improvement in position-not 
just the improvement that stems from the receivables263-the one year test 
shows that the insider started off with an insufficiency of $50-the $100 
claim minus the $50 setoff opportunity. The insider thereafter improved 
her position by ending up fully secured in the bankruptcy. Therefore, a 
$50 improvement of position under the one year test has occurred. 
According to Judge Kelley's reasoning, the assured creditor's im-
provement of position is tested. Since all $80 constitutes an improvement 
in position over the one year period, the secured party is worse off under 
Judge Kelley's formulation than under a perspective that examines the 
insider's improvement of position. Nevertheless, this formulation is pre-
cisely what section 547(c)(5) seems to require. Fortunately, section 
547(c)(1) comes to the rescue again. If the secured party receives an addi-
060 See supra notes 247-56 and accompanying text. 
••
1 137 B.R. at 269. 
••• 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). 
••• See Carlson, supra note 11. 
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tional account or item of inventory, then the secured party will not have to 
resort to the surety. Every dollar of forbearance the surety enjoys directly 
enriches the debtor, because the surety will likewise forbear asserting the 
setoff right or other security interest the surety may validly own. This 
value to the debtor establishes the defense under section 547(c)(1). 
These principles are difficult enough that they elude the courts from 
time to time. Thus, in Wilson v. First National Bank (In re MissiQnary 
Baptist Foundation of America, Inc.),264 Judge Irving Goldberg indicated 
that the ninety day preference period should apply.2611 But a close exami-
nation of the facts in Wilson reveals that a debtor and several affiliates 
had signed a security agreement under which any of their receivables were 
collateral for advances to the debtor. That is, the subsidiaries were insider 
guarantors of the debtor. Thus, perhaps the one year period of section 
547(c)(S)(A)(ii) should have been applied to the older receivables, making 
each of the various subsidiaries potentially liable to the bankruptcy trustee 
of each of the other subsidiaries. Furthermore, the secured party, should 
have had Deprizio liability for any of these security interests. 
Missionary Baptist Foundation had a further complication. After the 
security agreement was signed, the debtor acquired a new subsidiary that 
owned receivables. The new subsidiary, however, never signed the secur-
ity agreement. Therefore, the court implicitly relied upon some additional 
undisclosed agreement or restitutionary principle to establish that the new 
subsidiary was obliged to pay for advances made initially to the debtor.266 
Nevertheless, the secured party obtained proceeds from the new subsidi-
ary's receivables and used them to pay down the claim against the debtor. 
To the extent the new subsidiary acquiesced to the bank's collection of its 
receivables, it was volunteering to pay the debt of its corporate parent. 
Each voluntary payment probably established a new subrogation claim 
against the debtor, but in advance of such volunteerism, the secured party 
never could have compelled the subsidiary to pay. 
Payment of another's debts by an insolvent debtor might constitute a 
fraudulent transfer if no reasonably equivalent value is received in re-
284 796 F.2d 7 52 (5th Cir. 1986). 
••• Id. at 760 ("The bankruptcy court made no specific findings of fact on this issue. Instead, the 
court simply stated that 'the evidence does not support the trustee's position that the bank improved its 
position within 90 days of bankruptcy.'"). 
••• E.g., 'smith v. Creative Fin. Management, Inc. (In re Virginia-Carolina Fin. Corp.), 954 
F.2d 193, 196-98 ( 4th Cir. 1992) (subsidiary did not sign security agreement but was deemed the 
debtor because it actually received the loan proceeds); Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L 
Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990) (same). 
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turn.267 Now if the new subsidiary had not signed the security agreement, 
it is possible that the subsidiary had very little debt at all. If not, it is 
possible that the new subsidiary was solvent, and payments made on be-
half of its parent might not be fraudulent conveyances.268 Alternatively, if 
the secured party advanced funds to the debtor for use by the new subsidi-
ary, the new subsidiary might have a restitutionary duty to repay the 
funds it received. If so, the new subsidiary might have been insolvent at 
the time it made payments, but these payments would have been on ac-
count of antecedent debt. As such, the payments were transfers for a rea-
sonably equivalent value and therefore not fraudulent transfers, within the 
meaning of section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.269 To be sure, they 
might be voidable preferences, but only in the new subsidiary's bank-
ruptcy .270 The debtor's bankruptcy trustee had no right to recover these 
funds. Whatever the avoidance theory, it belongs to the subsidiary's bank-
ruptcy trustee, not the principal obligor's bankruptcy. 
Judge Goldberg answered this question differently. Apparently rec-
ognizing that the security interest in the new subsidiary's receivables was 
defective,271 he stated that the secured party has "at best, an unperfected 
security interest."272 This unperfected security interest in turn implied 
that the secured party somehow gave value because the giving of value is 
one of the elements of attachment under the Uniform Commercial 
Code.278 
In any event, citing the strong arm power of section 544(a), Goldberg 
allowed the trustee of the debtor (not the new affiliate) to "avoid as pref-
erential payments made on an account that was not covered by a properly 
••• 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988). 
••• Id:' That a solvent subsidiary may pay a shareholder's debts free from either voidable prefer-
ence or fraudulent transfer liability draws a sharp criticism from Professor Harry Fletchner, who 
observes that such payment reduces the value of the equity shares the debtor owns, thereby prejudic-
ing the debtor's unsecured creditors. For this reason, he suggests that the judge-made "earmarking" 
doctrine be eschewed when the financing unsecured creditor is also the subsidiary of the debtor. 
Fletchner, supra note 149. 
••• 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2) (1988) (defining value to mean "satisfaction or securing of a present 
or antecedent debt . . . "). 
070 Obtaining cash proceeds is never preferential, so long as the original security interest was not 
itself voidable. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. No such principle could help the se-
cured party in the new affiliate's bankruptcy because the new affiliate's receivables were not encum-
bered by any security interest (because the affiliate never signed the security agreement). Any cash 
received from the affiliate would have been strictly unencumbered dollars. 
271 796 F .2d at 7 63 n.16 ( chastising secured party for not attending to the difference between 
attachment and perfection of a security interest). 
••• Id. 
••• U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) (1978). 
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perfected security interest."274 Such a theory cannot suffice, however, even 
if we agree that the secured party had an unperfected security interest in 
the accounts of the affiliate in question. How a hypothetical judicial lien 
creditor against the debtor should have a hypothetical judicial lien against 
the property of a nondebtor is left unexplained. 
Perhaps Judge Goldberg viewed the debtor and its subsidiaries as 
substantively consolidated in the bankruptcy of the debtor. That is, the 
property of the subsidiaries became property of the debtor. But if that is 
so, the question arises why the debtor's financing statement should not be 
sufficient to perfect a security interest in the new subsidiary's receivables. 
Yet Judge Goldberg insisted that the financing statement was not compe-
tent to do this. 
All of this is very confusing and contradictory, but the real reason to 
emphasize the Missionary Baptist case here is that the secured party was 
obtaining security interests that benefited insider sureties. Accordingly, 
any security interest created between one year and ninety days · before 
bankruptcy was subject to the one year test in section 547(c)(5). And, per 
Deprizio, the secured party would have been liable for any such transfer 
not protected under the one year test. The ninety day test is appropriate 
only for those security interests that were less than ninety days old at the 
time of the debtor's bankruptcy. None of this was dreamed of in Judge 
Goldberg's philosophy of this case, which he treated as consolidated,2711 
Id. 
274 796 F.2d at 763. Judge Goldberg concluded: 
We therefore remand this issue for a factual determinatioii as to the amounts from the 
[new subsidiary's] accounts that were applied to the Debtor's loan balance during the pref-
erence period; after such a determination has been made the district court is to enter judg-
ment in favor of the Trustee in that amount. 
••• For a similar de facto consolidation of corporate subsidiaries, see Waslow v. MNC Comm. 
Corp. (In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1991), affd mem., 37 F.3d 1487 (3d 
Cir. 1994). In this case, it does not even appear that the corporate subsidiaries ever signed the security 
agreement. As a result, no security interest could have attached to those assets. U.C.C. § 9-203(1 )(a). 
Yet Judge Raymond L. Broderick assumed that the assets of the subsidiary were collateral for the 
loan to the debtor. 161 B.R. at 125-26. To complicate matters, the subsidiaries had been sold by the 
time of the bankruptcy. See American Cigar Co. v. MNC Comm. Corp. (In re M. Paolella & Sons, 
Inc.), 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1181, at 17-18, 87-88, n.26, 101-02, 105 n.33 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.), affd in 
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 161 B.R. 167 (E.D. Pa. 1991), affd mem., 37 F.3d 1487 (3d 
Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the encumbered assets of these newly unrelated entities were counted in the 
§ 547(c)(5) calculation with regard to the debtor. Furthermore, the 90 day test was applied; no 
thought was given to the one year test on, the theory that the subsidiaries were insider guarantors of 
the debtor's obligation. 
The rationale for the de facto consolidation was that the secured party treated the property of 
nondebtors as if it were debtor property. 161 B.R. at 125-26. But this cannot be a ground for ignoring 
the rules for attachment. Acting as if your neighbor's property is your own does not establish your 
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which undercuts his conclusion that the financing statement of the debtor 
was incompetent to perfect the security interest in the new subsidiary's 
receivables. 
1. Fraudulent Transfer Theory 
Suppose that, because of section 547(c)(S), an insider escapes prefer-
ence liability under both the ninety day and the one year versions of the 
two-point test, even though some improvement in position can be found in 
between the points in the test. Some commentators have suggested that 
such insiders have received fraudulent transfers.276 If so, then the same 
fraudulent transfers may be recovered from the assured creditor as initial 
transferee under sectiqn SS0(a)(1). 
Fraudulent transfer law is partly found in section 548(a)(1), which 
provides: 
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, 
or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or 
within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor 
voluntarily or involuntarily (1) made such transfer or incurred such obliga-
tion with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the 
debtor was or became, on or after the date that such trans£ er was made or 
such obligation was incurred, indebted; .... 277 
ownership if the neighbor objects. Similarly, the affiliates must have consented to the security interest 
before the secured party could look to their property as collateral. 
278 Peter L. Borowitz, Waiving SubI_ogation Rights and Conjuring Up Demons in Response to 
Deprizio, 45 Bus. LAW. 2151, 2156 (1990); Note, Trustees Do It Better: Analyzing Section 547(cX5) 
of the Bankruptcy Code, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1296 (1992) [hereinafter Harvard Note); Andrew 
J. Nussbaum, Comment, Insider Preferences and the Problem of Self-Dealing Under the Bankruptcy 
Code, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 603, 621-24 (1990) [hereinafter Chicago Note). 
••• 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1988). Section 548(a)(2) refers to transfers or obligations for rea-
sonable equivalent value. Since a secured creditor always claims at least an antecedent debt, and since 
antecedent debt is defined as value, § 548 cannot be used to hold insiders or initial transferees liable 
for security interests or other transfers. 
Section 544(b) also invokes state fraudulent transfer law if the trustee can locate a real creditor 
with avoidance power. The subrogation power has always required a flesh-and-blood creditor who 
actually has the avoidance rights the trustee would like to assert. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S .. 4 (1931); 
David Gray Carlson, The Trustee's Strong Arm Powers under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 S. CAR. L. 
REV. 841, 849-51 (1992). But, as state law usually replicates the ideas in§ 548(a)(1), we will treat 
that provision as generally representative of state fraudulent conveyance law. 
Until recently, state law did not condemn insider preferences separate and apart from condemna-
tion of preferences generally. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law 
and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEx. L. REV. 471, 556-57 (1994) (national survey of state voidable 
preference laws, showing 22 states have general preference statu'tes, 20 have voidable preference stat-
utes that apply to bank insolvencies, and 48 have statutes that apply to insurance insolvencies). The 
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A close reading of section 548(a)(1) reveals that only transfers of debtor 
property or obligations incurred by the debtor may be avoided. The indi-
rect "benefit" from such transfers or obligations is not actionable under 
section 548(a)(1)-though under section SSO(a)(l), the "value" of trans-
fers may be recovered from "the entity for whose benefit such transfer was 
made."278 But, in order to bring the provisions of section SSO(a)(l) into 
play, the trustee must show that a transfer of debtor property or obliga-
tion of the debtor can be avoided under section 548(a).279 
A transfer on antecedent debt to the assured creditor, however, is not 
likely to be a fraudulent transfer. These are transfers for a reasonably 
equivalent value, because satisfying or securing antecedent debt is specifi-
cally included in section 548(d)(1)'s definition of that term. It is usually 
agreed that transfers on antecedent debt, even if preferential, are not 
fraudulent with regard to other creditors.280 
If a third party takes a transfer as part of a scheme to finance a 
voidable preference to another, the transfer to the third party may itself be 
a fraudulent conveyance. This was established in Dean v. Davis,281 where 
a debtor borrowed money from a bank using forged notes as collateral. In 
response to the bank's threat to prosecute, the debtor borrowed money 
from his brother-in-law in exchange for a mortgage on the debtor's farm. 
recently drafted and widely enacted Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (U.F.T.A.) now does so, but in 
a way that avoids Deprizio problems. According to U.F.T.A. § 5(b): 
A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim· arose before the 
transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor 
was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor 
was insolvent. 
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(b), 76 U.L.A. 639 (1985). Like the Bankruptcy Code, the 
preference period for insiders is one year, id. § 9(c), but the insider must have reasonable cause to 
believe the debtor was insolvent. 
Nothing in the U.F.T.A. makes the "person benefited" liable for preferences received by others. 
Nor is an initial transferee liable for receiving some other person's voidable preference. Therefore, the 
UFT A cannot be the source of a fraudulent transfer theory in the Deprizio context. 
278 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988). Note that § 548(a) allows for the avoidance of "obligations," 
but § 550(a)(1) allows for the recovery of "transfers" (or their value). 
278 Id. 
280 Hartman v. First Ameri~an Bank (In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Group, Inc.), 956 F.2d 479, 
485 (4th Cir. 1992); but see supra note 277 (discussing the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act). 
The author of the Chicago Note, supra note 276, at 628, tries to fudge this, arguing that the 
benefit a surety receives when the assured creditor is paid by the debtor is "like" a corporate dividend, 
which can be a fraudulent transfer. But the difference is palpable. The corporate dividend is a trans-
fer of debtor property. The surety's financial relief at the disappearance of the suretyship obligation 
owed to the assured creditor does not constitute a transfer of debtor property. This is just the "two 
transfer" theory rejected in Deprizio. See infra notes 302-22 and accompanying text. 
281 242 U.S. 438 (1917). 
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When the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the trustee sued the brother-in-law 
on voidable preference and fraudulent conveyance theories. Justice Bran-
deis ruled that the bank received the benefit of a voidable preference,282 
but this was an action against the brother-in-law, not the bank. The 
brother-in-law had given value contemporaneously with the mortgage and 
therefore was not liable under a voidable preference theory. Yet, the 
brother-in-law was liable for having participated in a fraudulent convey-
ance. As Justice Brandeis explained, "A transfer, the intent (or obviously 
necessary effect) of which is to deprive creditors of the benefits sought to 
be secured by the Bankruptcy Act 'hinders, delays or defrauds creditors' 
•••• " 283 A transfer made in the expectation that the debtor might extri-
cate himself from an economic emergency might not be a fraudulent con-
veyance, Brandeis opined.284 Thus, it is possible to refinance unsecured 
debt with secured debt, provided such an expectation of extrication ex-
ists,2811 "[b]ut where the advance is made to enable the debtor to make a 
preferential payment with bankruptcy in contemplation, the transaction 
presents an element upon which fraud may be predicated."286 
Davis, then, stands for the proposition that a secured party who 
knowingly and contemporaneously exchanges value in order to finance a 
voidable preference is the recipient of a fraudulent transfer and can be the 
subject of an avoidance action. On the other hand, if the secured party 
knowingly finances a payment to a creditor that is not a voidable prefer-
ence, the security interest cannot be a fraudulent transfer. Furthermore, in 
Davis, the surety did receive a security interest from the debtor. This 
transfer of debtor property made plausible the fraudulent transfer claim. 
In the typical Deprizio situation, no such analogous transfer will have 
occurred. 287 
••• Id. at 444. 
••• Id. 
284 Id. 
••• This possibility is further protected from voidable preference law by the judge-made 
"earmarking" doctrine, discussed supra note 182. 
••• 242 U.S. at 144. 
••• Nevertheless, the author of the Chicago Note suggests that Deprizio should have been a 
fraudulent transfer action. If an assured creditor was paid 91 days before bankruptcy, the insider 
surety should be held under § 548(a)(l), not under § 547(b). Chicago Note, supra note 276, at 622. 
But this certainly does not square with Davis, where the transferee's sin was financing a voidable 
preference. In Deprizio, the underlying transaction was not independently a voidable preference. 
Nor does this author explain how the insider surety has obtained transfers or obligations from 
the debtor. Rather, he implies that pure financial advantage is a "transfer" within the meaning of 
§ 548(a)(l ). While the insider surety clearly "benefits" from the payment of the assured creditor, it is 
impossible to show that the debtor transferred property or undertook an obligation in a fraudulent 
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In the case of inventory financing, a secured party might improve her 
position over the preference period but nevertheless be protected under 
section 547(c)(S). This might occur if the secured party makes an under-
secured advance during the preference period and later the improvement 
in position renders the advance fully secured.288 Or it may also occur •if 
the secured party simply allows interest to accrue over the preference pe-
riod. 289 One author suggests that the legal improvement in position might 
nevertheless be a fraudulent transfer if the secured party has an insider 
guaranty.290 This suggestion violates the spirit of Davis, which requires 
that a transferee of debtor property finance a transaction that is, on its 
own, a voidable preference. 
Davis does not support the theory that a legally approved "feeding" 
of the lien would constitute a fraudulent transfer. In Davis, any direct 
transfer to the bank would have been a voidable preference. Here, the 
transfers to the assured party are by definition not voidable preferences. 
For this reason, the fraudulent transfer theory will ensnare neither the 
insider surety nor the undersecured party where section 547(c)(S) fully 
protects the transfers to the undersecured party. 
In spite of everything that has just been said, there is some judicial 
authority suggesting that both the assured creditor and the insider are 
indeed liable for fraudulent conveyances with regard to transfers that are 
not voidable preferences. In Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of America,291 
Judge William Campbell held that the assured creditor was guilty of a 
fraudulent conveyance when it received payment from the debtor non-
preferentially. His reasoning was that the payment of antecedent debt was 
in bad faith and was therefore not a transfer for value within the meaning 
of section 67(d)(1)(e), which provided: 
Consideration given for the property or obligation of a debtor is "fair" (1) 
way. A creditor simply obtained a transfer on antecedent debt more than 90 days before bank-
ruptcy-something the Bankruptcy Code deems legal. Therefore, a fraudulent transfer theory cannot 
be used in the Deprizio context. 
The author of the Chicago Note presents a negligent analysis of Davis, to say the least. He reads 
this case as proving that, where the unsecured creditors do not benefit from a transaction, the transac-
tion is a fraudulent transfer. Chicago Note, supra note 276, at 619. Under such a reading, any trans-
fer to any creditor could be challenged, so long as the creditors did not like it and the statute of 
limitations on fraudulent transfer actions has not yet run. In truth, the mortgage in Davis was voida-
ble precisely because the mortgage was implicated in a voidable preference to another creditor. 
••• See generally Carlson, supra note 11. 
••• See id. 
••• Harvard Note, supra note 276. 
••
1 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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when, in good faith, in exchange and as a fair equivalent therefor property 
is transferred or an antecedent debt is satisfied . . . . 292 
Today, section 548(d)(1) does not define "reasonably equivalent value" 
according to any good faith component, so that it is very unlikely that a 
modern court would hold that unavoidable transfers to creditors could be 
transfers for no value. 
Still, the above definition is repeated under the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act.293 In states where the old Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act is still in effect, and where the trustee can find a creditor with 
avoi~.ance rights, section 544(b) applies to make the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act effective in a modern bankruptcy. If so, Bullard might 
stand for the proposition that the initial transferee of the unavoidable 
transfers on antecedent debt may be liable for receipt of a fraudulent con-
veyance. Under these circumstances, both the assured creditor, as initial 
transferee, and the insider who has waived subrogation rights, as the 
"person benefited" within the meaning of section 550(a)(1), might be lia-
ble for transfers on antecedent debt without the aid of voidable preference 
theory. Bullard, however, does assume that paying one's creditors is "bad 
faith," something that is hard to argue when voidable preference law 
smiles benevolently on the practice. 
III. DEPRIZIO 
For most creditors, transfers on antecedent debt are voidable prefer-
ences if they occur within ninety days of bankruptcy. For insiders, the 
period is extended to one year.294 
Prior to the 1994 amendments, section 550(a)(1) subjected ordinary 
creditors to the insider's one year period because they are initial transfer-
ees of preferences that "benefited" the insider. This is the famous holding 
in Levit v. Ingersoll-Rand Financial Corp.,2H universally called 
"Deprizio" after the debtor, V.N. Deprizio Construction Corporation. 
••• Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(l)(e) (1976) (repealed 1979) (emphasis added). 
293 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(a), 76 U.L.A. 639 (1985). 
••• 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988). 
••• 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). Although Deprizio was the first decision at the court of 
appeals level to ratify the plain meaning of § 550(a)(l ), other decisions presaged it by some years. 
Other courts opposed it on the ground that Congress could not have intended such a result, or because 
such a result is inequitable. See id. at 1186 n.2 (collecting cases). The leverage of assured creditors to 
obtain preferences because of insider guarantees was first developed in Thomas E. Pitts, Jr., Insider 
Guaranties and the Law of Preferences, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343 (1981). 
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Deprizio 1s based on a reading of section SSO(a). According to that 
provision: 
to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section : .. 547 ... the trustee 
may recover ... from - (1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the 
entity for whose benefit such transfer was made .... 286 
It can be seen easily enough that, once section 547 proclaims a transfer 
voidable, section SSO(a)(1) makes the initial transferee liable whether the 
initial transferee independently transgresses the elements of section 547(b) 
or not. 
Congress has now substantially repealed the Deprizio doctrine. Ac-
cording to newly amended section SSO(c): 
If a transfer made between 90 days and one year before the filing of the 
petition-
(1) is avoided under section 547(b) of this title; and 
(2) was made for the benefit of a creditor that at the time of such 
transfer was an insider; the trustee may not recover under subsection (a) 
from a transferee that is not an insider. 287 
A few things may be noted about this new provision. First, it applies only 
to transfers more than ninety days old at the time of the bankruptcy. 
Deprizio still must be considered good law when the transfer is within the 
ninety day preference period. Thus, if the initial transferee is an over-
secured creditor .and some junior undersecured party is benefited, the 
oversecured party has Deprizio liability for transfers within ninety days of 
bankruptcy. 288 
288 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988). 
287 Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 8, § 202, 108 Stat. at 4126 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 550 
by adding new subsection (c)). 
288 See supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text. One situation in which Deprizio liability 
might spring up unexpectedly is when a debtor pays interest to senior debenture holders, where the 
debenture holders can claim that they are saved under § 547(b)(5), because the insolvent estate was 
large enough to guarantee senior debt 100 cents on the dollar in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation. 
This result occurs because the senior claimants are entitled to all the dividends that would otherwise 
go to the junior claimants. The premise of subordination is that junior dividends are uniquely diverted 
to the designated senior classes, not to all unsecured creditors. This is sometimes called "double divi-
dends," in subordination parlance. David Gray Carlson, A Theory of Contractual Debt Subordina-
tion and Lien Priority, 38 VAND. L. REV. 975, 982 (1985). 
Suppose a senior debenture holder can show that the hypothetical liquidation test of § 547(b)(5) 
protects otherwise voidable payments to the seniors. Such a payment, if within 90 days of bankruptcy, 
can still be recovered because every such payment to the seniors disencumbers the junior dividends, 
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Second, the 1994 amendment repeals Deprizio when an insider re-
ceives the benefit of a transfer to some other creditor. It does not repeal 
Deprizio when the insider is the initial transferee and the outside creditor 
receives the benefit. Thus, if a surety receives a security more than ninety 
days before bankruptcy, and if the security interest benefits an outside 
creditor, the bankruptcy trustee may still use the Deprizio theory to visit 
liability upon the outside creditor, even though the transfer was over 
ninety days old by the time of the transfer. We have already seen that 
Taunt v. Fidelity Bank (In re Royal Golf Products Corp.)299 was a case 
in which the surety's security interest benefited the assured creditor. In 
Royal Golf Products, the security interest was deemed to have been trans-
ferred just before bankruptcy because the surety's security interest was 
unperf ected. But if the security interest had been on antecedent debt 
within the insider period, the assured creditor could have been held liable, 
even though the transfer was older than ninety days by the time of bank-
ruptcy. The assured creditor was the "entity for whose benefit such trans-
fer was made" within the meaning of section 550(a)(1) and therefore lia-
ble along with the insider. 
Third, under new section SSO(c), ex-insiders are apparently made 
exempt from voidable preference liability. For example, suppose a share-
holder of the debtor has obtained a security interest from the debtor for an 
antecedent debt eight months before the bankruptcy, at a time when the 
debtor is insolvent. A week before bankruptcy, the shareholder sells her 
shares for next to nothing-the firm having no net worth-and so is an 
ex-insider. It appears as if such an ex-insider is fully protected under 
section SSO(c). In comparison, section 547(b)(4)(B) is careful to condemn 
transfers "between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing 
of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider 
•••• "
300 Section SSO(c) will obviously overrule the suggestion that m-
siderhood is measured at the time of the transfer.301 
thereby benefiting the junior creditors. Since the senior creditors are the initial transferees of pay-
ments that impermissibly benefit the juniors, the seniors will have Deprizio liability, even though the 
senior creditors can claim that the hypothetical liquidation test protects them. 
Of course, the senior creditors may still be able to claim the "ordinary course" defense under 
§ 547(c)(2). If it is applicable, the defense may be asserted by the senior and junior creditors alike, 
thereby choking off Deprizio liability. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
••• 908 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text. 
• 00 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988) (emphasis added). 
•
01 Prior to this amendment, a controversy existed as to whether a creditor who was an insider at 
the time an obligation was arranged (but not at the time the obligation was paid or secured) might be 
subject to the one year period. Some courts stretched § 547(b)(4)(B) to condemn, for example pay-
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For at least three reasons, reports on the death of Deprizio are 
slightly, though not greatly, exaggerated. 
A. "Two Transfers" 
There is no use denying that Deprizio, in its day, was a compelling 
interpretation of section 550(a)(1).302 Some courts resisted the implication 
by asserting that Congress did not intend the consequences of section 
550(a)(1 )'s literal meaning, 303 or that, for equitable reasons, the statute 
ment of a "golden parachute"- created when an insider resigned but paid later when the creditor 
was no longer an insider. Other courts insisted that insiderhood be tested as of the exact time of the 
challenged transfer. Melissa M. Cowan, Determining Insider Status Under Bankruptcy Code Section 
547(bX4XB): When I "Resign" May Not Be Enough to Terminate Insider Status, 41 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1541 (1994) (recognizing that § 547(b) imposes Deprizio liability without the aid of§ 550). 
Presumably, neither line of cases is valid, in light of the 1994 amendments. 
••• One such attempted denial occurs in Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'! Assoc. (In re. 
Midwestern Cos.), 102 B.R. 169, 172 (W.D. Mo. 1989), where Judge Dean Whipple thought that 
the Deprizio reading of§ 550(a)(t) flatly contradicted § 547(b)(4)(B) and therefore must be wrong. 
Accord Performance Communications, Inc. v. First Nat'! Bank (In re Performance Communications, 
Inc.), 126 B.R. 473, 476-77 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991). But it is all too easy to show that the two 
provisions are not contradictory. Section 547(b)(4)(B) may limit recovery of transfers made to insiders 
more than 90 days before bankruptcy, but § 550(a)(t) does not. It does not even require that the 
initial transferee be guilty under § 547(b). 
••• Bakst v. Schilling (In re Cove Patio Corp.), 19 B.R. 84), 844 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). 
There is at least one piece of legislative history in favor of the plain meaning. As Judge Charles 
Baker writes in Mixon v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc. (In re Big Three Transp., Inc.), 41 B.R. 16 
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983): . 
In the precursor to Section 550 proposed by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of 
the United States, the primary target of the trustee's recovery was likewise the initial trans-
feree. In explaining this section, the Commission stated that it "covers all initial transferees 
of- recoverable property, not just those preferred." 
Id. at 21 n.1 (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 178 (1973)) (emphasis added). Thus, 
Judge Baker was persuaded to anticipate the ·Deprizio decision and held that the assured creditor is 
liable for the surety's voidable preference. Id. at 21. 
A controversial passage of the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 179 (1973) states: 
This section is derived from §§ 21g, 60b, 67a(3), 67d(6), and 70d(t) and (5) of the present 
Act. Those sections partially spell out the relative rights of the trustee and initial and 
subsequent transferees. The treatment of initial and subsequent transferees varies in each 
of the sections; some variation is justifiable as to initial transferees, but it is not as to 
subsequent transferees. Variances required as to the treatment of initial transferees are 
handled in the avoidance sections. 
Id. (emphasis added). Others have interpreted this passage to mean that Congress intended initial 
transferees to be liable only if they themselves were guilty of preference under § 547. David I. 
Katzen, DePrizio and Bankruptcy Code Section 550: Extended Preference Exposure Via Insider 
Guarantees, and Other Perils of Initial Transferee Liability, 45 Bus. LAW. 511, 529 (1990). Other-
wise, a defense in § 547(c) could not possibly be relevant to pure Deprizio liability under 
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should not be followed literally.304 Some argued that section 550(a)(1) 
granted discretion to a bankruptcy court to hold the "initial transferee" 
harmless and to direct suit solely against the insider as the "entity for 
whose benefit such transfer was made."30~ Section SSO(a) does award dis-
cretion to judges over whether to order the return of the actual property 
trans£ erred or its value. But this discretion as to what might be recovered 
does not serve to suggest discretion as to who should be liable. In the end, 
the "plain meaning" of the Bankruptcy Code consistently prevailed at the 
court of appeals level. 306 
The prevailing theory for avoiding the Deprizio result is the so-called 
"two transfer" theory. According to this theory: 
[E]ach payment the Debtor made to its creditors which had the indirect 
effect of benefitting insiders constituted not one but two distinct- trans-
fers-one directly to the creditor receiving the payment and one indirectly 
to the insiders. Therefore, while the "transfers" to the insiders were poten-
tially avoidable during the expanded preference period, the transfers to the 
non-insider creditors were subject only to the ordinary ninety-day prefer-
ence period. 307 
§ SS0(a)(t). 
One commentator complained that this use of the legislative history was illegitimate. He wrote 
that the Commission report "merely emphasizes that section was applicable to fraudulent and other 
avoidable transfers, not just preferences." Isaac Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference Laws: Interpret-
ing Code Sections 547(cX2), 550(aX1), and 546(aX1), 41 Bus. LAW. 175, 194 n.87 (1985). 
3•• See Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'! Assoc. (In re Midwestern Cos.), 102 B.R. 169, 
170-72 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Schmitt v. Equibank (In re Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 1983) (the assured creditor "should not be penalized for its prudence in seeking a guarantor 
of the debt .... "); Seeley v. Church Bldgs. & Interiors, Inc. (In re Church Bldgs. & Interiors, Inc.), 
14 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) ("Furthermore, this court ... reaches the same equita-
ble result."). In terms of the "inequity" in holding an initial transferee who does not herself transgress 
the elements of § 547(b), it has been pointed out that § 547(b) itself has abandoned scienter and 
other indicia of moral turpitude, so that § SS0(a)(t )'s similar disinterest in morality should not come 
as any surprise. Chicago Note, supra note 276, at 612. 
300 11 U.S.C. § SS0(a)(t) (1988). For an attempt to provide meaning for "to the extent," see 
Bethaney J. Vazzana, Trustee Recovery of Indirect Benefits Under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 403, 418-19 (1989). 
300 See Galloway v. First Alabama Bank (In re Wesley Indus., Inc.), 30 F.3d 1438, 1441 (11th 
Cir. 1994); Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Meridith Hoffman Partners), 12 F.3d 1549, 
1556-57 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2677 (1994); Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. 
of Suffola, Inc. v. United States Nat'! Bank (In re Suffola, Inc.), 2 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 1993); 
Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490, 1494-95 (6th Cir. 1990). 
But see T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.), 950 
F.2d 1187, 1194 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the premises of Deprizio). 
307 Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. DePrizio Constr. Co.), 86 B.R. 545, 550 
(N.D. Ill. 1988), affd, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corrugated 
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The "two transfer" theory is based on the idea that the assured creditor 
and the insider each received separate transfers. In the words of Judge 
William Garwood, "Under this theory, only the second transfer is an 
avoidable preference under section 547(b) because the first transfer, once 
separated from the second, does not itself benefit the insider guarantor."308 
As this theory is still relevant to the benefited creditor's standing to assert 
defenses of the initial transferee, a full examination of it is still 
worthwhile. 
According to Judge Frank Easterbrook, the "two transfer" theory 
was "an heuristic device to explain how recoveries could be had from in-
direct beneficiaries under the 1898 Act. ... "309 Under section 6O(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Act, the trustee could only recover from a "transferee," even 
while section 6O(a) condemned transfers for the benefit of non-transfer-
ees.310 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had made clear, in dictum, that 
preferences might be recovered from a person who was not actually the 
initial transferee of a preference. In National Bank v. National Herkimer 
County Bank,811 Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote: 
To constitute a preference, it is not necessary that the transfer be made 
directly to the creditor. It may be made to another for his benefit. If the 
bankrupt has made a transfer of his property, the effect of which is to en-
able one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than 
another creditor of the same class, circuity of arrangement will not avail to 
save it .... It is not the mere form or method of the transaction that the act 
condemns, but the appropriation by the insolvent debtor of a portion of his 
property to the payment of a creditor's claim, so that thereby the estate is 
depleted and the creditor obtains an advantage over other creditors.3 lll 
The "two transfer" theory arose to describe this dictum. According to 
Judge J erre Williams, who endorsed the theory: 
To combat such circuity, the courts have broken down certain transfers into 
Box Corp. (In re Mercon Indus., Inc.), 37 B.R. 549, 552 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (single transfer of 
funds effected two transfers). 
••• T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.), 950 
F.2d 1187, 1193 (5th Cir. 1992). 
••• Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1196 n.6 (7th Cir. 1989). 
•
10 Bankruptcy' Act § 60(b). 
m 225 U.S. 178 (1912). 
312 Id. at 184. Nevertheless, Justice Hughes also ruled that the beneficiary of a transfer was 
immune from voidable preference liability because "[i]t was not shown that the bank had anything to 
do" with the initial transferee's collateral. Id. at 187. 
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two transfers, one direct and one indirect. The direct transfer to the third 
party may be valid and not subject to a preference attack. The indirect 
transfer, arising from the same action by the debtor, however, may consti-
tute a voidable preference as to the creditor who indirectly benefited form 
the direct transfer to the third party. 313 
The "two transfer" theory was necessary to explain why beneficiaries 
could be sued under section 60(b) of the old Bankruptcy Act. This is no 
longer true. Section 550(a)(1) extends liability to "the entity for whose 
benefit such transfer was made."314 Besides being outmoded, the "two 
trans£ er" theory fits poorly in the context of Deprizio because the insider 
surety has received no transfer of debtor property.316 Rather, the insider's 
313 Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586, 591-92 (5th Cir. 
1987), modified, 835 F.2d 584 (1988) (per curiam). Judge Jerre Williams used the "two transfer" 
theory to explain why the bankruptcy trustee could not recover collateral from a bank that issued a 
letter of credit to an unsecured creditor. Id. at 596. The bank would otherwise have been liable under 
Deprizio as the initial transferee. Earlier, we approved of this reasoning but reconciled it entirely with 
the dicta in Deprizio. 
Contrary to what was said here, a later opinion from the Fifth Circuit appeared to interpret 
Compton as opposing the result in Deprizio. In T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. 
(In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.), 950 F.2d 1187, 1188 (5th Cir. 1992), a debtor lost a general intangi-
ble through garnishment by a judgment creditor. The garnishee refused to pay, and so the judgment 
creditor garnished again, seizing the bank accounts of the garnishee. Id. This latter garnishment of the 
garnishee was within a year of bankruptcy, but not within 90 days. Id. 
Judge Garwood ruled that the garnishment constituted a "benefit" to the judgment debtor, an 
insider. Id. at 1192. This part of the case is discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 92-102. 
He also ruled that the judgment creditor was the initial transferee of the insider's voidable preference 
and therefore liable on a Deprizio theory. Id. at 1193-94. In so ruling, he purported to distinguish the 
"two transfer" theory adopted in Compton. He read Compton as opposing Deprizio by its two-trans-
fer theory (something I have disputed). Garwood affirmed that Deprizio was wrongly decided because 
of the "two transfer" theory, but, in Westex, there was only one obligation owing to the judgment 
debtor, which the judgment creditor had ~anaged to garnish, to the benefit of the judgment debtor. As 
Garwood explained, "Only one transfer occurs because the obligation that is discharged by way of the 
transfer is indivisible." Id. at 1194. While Judge Garwood is correct that the facts before him consti-
tuted only one transfer, two transfers genuinely existed in Compton. Therefore, it was not necessary 
to opine that Compton stood in opposition to Deprizio. 
· • 814 11 U.S.C. § SS0(a)(l) (1988). 
810 Judge Easterbrook did not so much deny that a "benefit" might be a transfer. Rather, he 
insisted that a "transfer" must be analyzed from the debtor's perspective, not from the multiple credi-
tors' perspective. Even if the creditors received two transfers, the debtor made only one - and it 
benefited insiders: 
The two-transfer approach equates "transfer" with "benefit received". Both Lender and 
Guarantor gain from payment, and each receives a "transfer" to the extent of the gain. 
The Code, however, equates "transfer" with payments made. Section 101 (SO) ... says that 
a transfer is a disposition of property. Sections 547 and 550 both speak of a transfer being 
avoided; avoidability is an attribute of the transfer rather than of the creditor. While the 
lenders want to define transfer from the recipients' perspectives, the Code consistently de-
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suretyship obligation to the assured creditor has disappeared. This disap-
pearance of an obligation to a third party is not readily made into "prop-
erty of the debtor."316 In addition, as one commentator has pointed out: 
[T]wo transfers is probably incorrect because it ignores that Congress spe-
cifically provided for initial transferees to be liable even though another 
party may have been the beneficiary of the transfer. If the benefit to the 
guarantor is viewed as a separate transfer, Congress should never have used 
the term "initial transferee."817 
The renunciation of the "two transfer" theory in the Deprizio context is 
useful to make clear that any initial transferee who is liable because an-
other creditor was preferentially benefited has full access to the defenses 
in section 547(c). But this point also depends upon the proposition that a 
Deprizio defendant is liable under section 547(b)-not just under section 
SSO(a)(1)--as the initial transferee of an avoidable transfer. So long as 
Deprizio is thought to emanate only from section 550(a)(1), the assertion 
of section 547(c) defenses by Deprizio defendants is illogical. The defenses 
of section 547(c) can only prevent liability under section 547(b), not sec-
tion SSO(a)(1).318 Initial transferees do not have a good faith purchaser 
fines it from the debtor's. A single payment therefore is one "transfer," no matter how 
many persons gain thereby. 
874 F.2d at 1195-96. Accord Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Meredith Hoffman Part-
ners), 12 F.3d 1549, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993); Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Suffola, Ini:. v. 
United States Nat'! Bank (In re Suffola, Inc.), 2 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Ray v. City 
Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490, 1493 (6th Cir. 1990) ("The approach 
incorrectly equates 'transfer' with 'benefit received.' "). 
316 1n·Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1989), 
it was possible to see that the benefited creditor received debtor property. There, a bank had issued a 
standby letter of credit to a supplier on antecedent debt. In exchange, the debtor granted the bank a 
security interest. Under the proper analysis of that case, the bank obtained the security interest on the 
antecedent debt of the supplier. Accordingly, the bank was liable under § 547(b). But, as to this 
security interest, both the bank and supplier (for whose "benefit" the security interest was granted) 
had a defense under § 547(c)(1). The story did not end here, though. In exchange for the security 
interest, the bank extended its credit to the debtor. The debtor ordered the credit-its credit-11e 
transferred to the supplier. This indeed was a "second transfer.'' As to this second transfer of debtor 
property, the supplier was liable to the debtor's bankruptcy trustee because the supplier had no de-
fense with regard to this second transfer. So analyzed, Compton and Depriz:io are in complete accord. 
See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. 
317 Isaac Nutovic, supra note 303, at 193 n.82. See also Block v. Texas Commerce BanR Nat'! 
Assoc. (In re Midwestern Cos.), 102 B.R. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (rejecting Deprizio on other 
grounds). 
316 Performance Communications, Inc. v. First Nat'! Bank (In re Performance Communications, 
Inc.), 126 B.R. 473,476 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (refusing to follow Deprizio); 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN 
ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 6-10, at 535 (1992); Baker, supra note 63, at 130-32. 
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defense in section SS0(a), but transferees of transferees do, under section 
SS0(b)(t). Initial transferees must therefore rely on the defenses found in 
section 547(c), or they have no defense at all. 319 
Deprizio, decided under section SS0(a), could have been decided from 
the words of section 547(b) alone.320 Section 547(b) proclaims as "void" 
transfers received by the initial transferee if some other creditor benefited 
preferentially. Thus, even though the transfer is not preferential if the 
beneficiary is ignored, the initial transferee is holding property of the es-
tate that must be returned. 321 On the theory just presented, beneficiaries 
••• One commentator opposes extending § 550(b)(1) defenses to "creditors" liable under 
§ 547(b) because that would invade the turf of the § 547(c) defenses. Henk J. Brands, Note, The 
Interplay Between §s 547(b) and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 530 (1989). If, 
however, an initial transferee is not a creditor liable under the prima facie rules of § 547(b), then 
according to this commentator, extending the § 550(b)(1) defense to such transferees cannot under-
mine the § 547(c) defenses. Id. at 548. Therefore, courts should go ahead and treat the assured 
creditor as a transferee of a transferee, even though she is only the initial transferee. Jd. 
Although not consistent with a literal interpretation of § 550(a)(2), this approach would allow 
courts to permit the assured creditor to escape whenever the assured creditor is in good faith. The 
author concludes by noting that his idea "makes unnecessary an elaborate factual inquiry to determine 
the equity of recovery in a specific case. Thus it provides a more certain standard than the vague 
equitable standard, and it is easier to apply." Id. at 549. 
These last remarks are mysterious in that the equitable theory simply refuses to make the as-
sured creditor liable. This equitable theory is the one that is factually easy. Adjudicating the good 
faith of the assured creditor, however, is likely to be factually messy. In any case, this approach 
depends on the willingness of a court to deem that the initial transferee is really a transferee of a 
transferee, contrary to the "plain meaning" of these words. Thomas D. Buckley, Insider Guaranties, 
Their Effect on the Bankruptcy Preference "Reach Back" Period and Possible Use in Getting an 
"Ordinary Course" Exception From Avoidance, 22 U. ToL. L. REV. 247, 283 (1991). Just because 
ignoring the plain meaning does no violence to § 547(c), does not prove that the plain meaning of 
§ 550(b) ought to be ignored. 
In any case, the suggestion depends upon the notion that the Deprizio defendant is "innocent" 
under § 547(b). I am just about to suggest, however, that the standard Deprizio defendant was fully 
liable under § 547(b), without any reference to § 550(a). See infra notes 320-22 and accompanying 
text. 
••• Melissa M. Cowan, Determining Insider Status Under Bankruptcy Code Section 
547(bX4XB): When I "Resign" May Not Be Enough to Terminate Insider Status, 41 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1541, 1546 n.14 (1994) (recognizing that§ 547(b) imposes Deprizio liability without the aid of 
§ 550). 
821 In support of this proposition, it can be noted that, when a bankruptcy case is dismissed, 
according to § 349 of the Bankruptcy Code, "any transfer avoided under section . . . 54 7" is resur-
rected. It does not say that transfers voided under § 550(a) are resurrected. This proves that § 547(b) 
is capable of avoiding transfers all by itself. Similarly, § 551 provides that "[a]ny transfer avoided 
under section ... 547 .. .is preserved for the benefit of the estate .... " 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1988). 
This likewise implies that § 550(a) is superfluous to the Deprizio theory. 
In despatching Deprizio, the House Judiciary Committee scuttled S.540 and substituted its own 
bill, including the above amendment to§ 550. The Senate version, however, would have been ineffec-
tive in repealing Deprizio, if it is accepted that § 547(b) in isolation compels the Deprizio result. 
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of the initial transfer have access to any defense under section 547(c) that 
the initial transferee could have asserted. If the beneficiary has a valid 
defense, then the initial transferee is equally off the hook because, now, 
no one is liable for a voidable preference. The premises of Deprizio fail, 
and the initial transferee cannot be held liable under either section 547(b) 
or section SSO(a). Therefore, section 547(c) defenses are fully adequate to 
prevent Deprizio liability because Deprizio liability arises from the lan-
guage of section 547(b).322 
According to the Senate's version of the amendment: 
The trustee may recover under subsection (a) a transfer avoided under section 547(b) from 
a first transferee or an immediate or mediate transferee only to the extent that 
(1) all the elements of section 54 7 (b) are satisfied as to the first transferee; and 
(2) the exceptions in section 547(c) do not protect the first transferee. 
S.540, § 214 (1994). This amendment assumes that the Deprizio result arises solely from§ 550(a)(1) 
and not from the text of § 547(b) itself. If, however, Deprizio is justified out of the language of 
§ 547(b), then the proposed legislation just quoted would not have sufficed to kill Deprizio off. This 
is because the Deprizian first transferee has satisfied "all the elements of§ 547(b)," and therefore the 
bankruptcy trustee could recover from the initial transferee, the same as before. 
If § SS0(a)(1) was unnecessary to Deprizio's theory, are we then saying that § SS0(a)(1) is 
superfluous? No. Section SS0(a) contributes to voidable preference jurisprudence (as well as to fraud-
ulent transfer jurisprudence) by making clear that non-transferees can be held liable. The fact that 
initial transferees could be held liable was always well understood under the old Bankruptcy Act. 
According to § 60(b): 
Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving it or to be 
benefited thereby ... has, at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to 
believe that the debtor is insolvent. Where the preference is voidable, the trustee may re-
cover the property or, if it has been converted, its value from any person who has received 
or converted such property . . . 
Bankruptcy Act § 60(b) (emphasis added). According to this statute, the trustee could only recover 
from a "transferee." Yet § 60(a) condemned transfers for the benefit of non-transferees. This anom-
aly is precisely what gives rise to the "two transfers" fiction-to explain how a trustee might recover 
from a non-transferee. 
What § SS0(a) adds-and why it is not superfluous if § 547(b) directly avoids transfers-is a 
more direct statement that beneficiaries of transfers are liable for the benefit caused by the initial 
transfer. Section SS0(a) therefore replaces the "two transfers" fiction. 
If § 60(b) permitted the trustee to pursue the initial transferee for a preference that is voidable 
only because of the benefit bestowed on an insider, why is it that Deprizio did not arise under the old 
Bankruptcy Act? The answer is simple. Under old § 60(b), insiders were subject to the same prefer-
ence period (four months) as any other creditor. Therefore, the Deprizio phenomenon could not arise. 
That is, either the assured creditor and surety were both liable, or they were both innocent. For 
example, a transfer made six months before bankruptcy could not be recovered from either the assured 
creditor or the surety. Only when Congress elected to extend the preference period for insiders and 
shorten it for all other creditors did the circumstances arise for Deprizio liability. 
322 In support of this view, some legislative history suggests that a defense in § 54 7 ( c) might be 
used by an initial transferee to defend against liability under § SS0(a)(1 ). Senator Edward Di Concini 
and Congressman Don Edwards both read the following identical statement into the record: 
The liability of a transferee under section SS0(a) applies only "to the extent that a transfer 
is avoided." This means that liability is not imposed on a transferee to the extent that a 
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The renunciation of the "two transfer" theory is essential to provide 
access to the section 547(c) defenses. If the benefit is one transfer, and the 
initial transfer is another, it is impossible to explain why the initial trans-
feree should be able to assert the defense of the beneficiary or vice versa. 
Only if the transfer and the benefit enjoy a unity can both the initial 
transferee and beneficiary assert each other's defenses. 
B. Oversecured Creditors 
Deprizio did not usually pose a threat to oversecured creditors. If the 
debtor paid an oversecured creditor, the hypothetical liquidation test 
would have shielded the insider.323 
There are some exceptions to this analysis. First, suppose the trustee 
could make out a case of equitable subordination against an insider 
transferee is protected under a provision such as section 548(c) which grants a good faith 
transferee for value of a transfer that is avoided only as a fraudulent transfer, a lien on the 
property transferred to the extent of value given. 
124 CONG. REC. 32400 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edwards); 124 CoNG. REC. 34000 (1978) (state-
ment of Rep. DiConcini). If a defense from § 548(c) works to protect an initial transferee under 
§ 550(a)(1), then so would a defense under § 547(c). Lowrey v. First Nat'! Bank (In re Robinson 
Bros. Drilling, Inc,), 97 B.R. 77, 82 (D. Okla. 1988) (dictum), affd, 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(per curiam); Miller v. Steinberg (In re Marilyn Steinberg Enters., Inc.), 141 B.R. 587, 597-98 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992). Deprizio, however, arises not from§ 550(a)(1), but from§ 547(b). For this 
reason, any defense a beneficiary may assert under § 547(c) is capable of choking off Deprizio liabil-
ity because § 550(a)(1) liability requires a finding that § 547(b) has been violated. 
••• Miller v. Rausch-Alan (In re Gamest, Inc.), 129 B.R. 179, 182 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991). 
For a case involving an oversecured party, see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rodgers (In re 
Laguna Beach Motors, Inc.), 148 B.R. 317 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1992). In Laguna Beach Motors, the 
owner of an automobile, as to which a secured party had a perfected security interest, surrendered 
possession to a car dealer. The owner kept the title documents and only granted the dealer an option 
to buy the automobile in case it could make a profitable resale. The dealer sold the car btit did not 
pay the owner immediately. Later, after several demands, the dealer paid the owner. Most of the 
purchase price was sent directly to the secured party. The dealer then filed for bankruptcy. 
The dealer's trustee argued that the payment to the secured party was "for the benefit" of the car 
owner, and as initial transferee of the payment, the secured party was liable under § 550(a)( 1) for 
the owner's voidable preference. Although Judge John Ryan ruled for the trustee, Judge Robert Clive 
Jones reversed on appeal because application of Deprizio would have been "inequitable." Id. at 321. 
A better rationale for deciding the case is based on the fact that, fo California, ownership of the 
car is never transferred until the owner endorses the certificate of ownership or mails notice of the 
transfer .to the California Department of Motor Vehicles. CAL. VEH. CODE § 5600 (West 1987). The 
owner of the car only received cash when he surrendered documents and so had never received pay-
ment on antecedent debt. If the owner and the secured party gave up documents simultaneously with 
receiving cash, then no party received a voidable preference. Although the payment to the owner was 
pursuant to an earlier executory contract, the "debt" was not created when the dealer and the owner 
entered into the option agreement. At this time, the dealer had no present obligation to pay. Only 
when the dealer accepted the certificate of title did the dealer become obligated to pay. As this oc-
curred contemporaneously with payment, no transfer on antecedent debt was implicated. 
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surety, but not against the oversecured creditor. Equitable subordination 
is capable of depriving the insider of any security interest inherited 
through subrogation.324 Therefore, the insider may flunk the hypothetical 
liquidation test, even though the oversecured party does not. Yet, because 
the oversecured party is the initial transferee of the insider's preference, it 
has liability after all. 325 
A second situation threatens an oversecured party. Suppose a subse-
quent junior undersecured party appears. The debtor now pays the senior 
oversecured party just before bankruptcy. The payment benefits the junior 
secured party by freeing up collateral that otherwise would have been nec-
essary to collateralize the senior claim. As the senior secured party is the 
initial transferee of the voidable preference-and as the transfer was not 
within the insider period or even for the benefit of an insider-the senior 
secured party continues to have Deprizio liability for the payment. 326 This 
liability makes anti-pledge covenants in the senior security agreement even 
more desirable than they were previously, since junior secured parties can 
trigger a Deprizio theory against the senior oversecured party. 327 
If the senior secured party is made to return a payment because the 
3•• 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(2) (1988). 
3
•• Thomas E. Pitts, Jr., Insider Guaranties and the Law of Preferences, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
343, 357-58 (1981). 
828 Id. at 356-57. This situation actually arose in Deprizio, where a senior oversecured party 
enjoyed no guaranty at all and was sued for being the initial transferee of a voidable preference that 
benefited the insiders (by further securing the junior secured party, who did l)ave a guaranty). The 
matter was remanded to the bankruptcy court by Judge Easterbrook, but he did speculate as follows: 
Lender #1 extends credit and takes security. It is so over-secured that Lender #2 is willing 
to make a second loan and take a junior security interest. This second loan (but not the 
first) is backed up by an insider's guarantee. Every payment to Lender #1 increases the 
amount of security available for Lender #2, which produces a benefit to Guarantor by 
reducing his exposure. The trustee seeks to recover all payments to Lender #1 during the 
year before the filing, even though Lender #1 did not negotiate for an insider's guarantee . 
. . (W]e have substantial doubt that the payments to Lender #1 are avoidable transfers. By 
assumption Lender #1 is over-secured, so its position has not been improved relative to a 
Chapter 7 liquidation. The benefit in such a case is negligible at best, so the case for 
recapture is weak. Because neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court considered 
this question in detail, we do not resolve it, but the Trustee has an uphill battle. 
874 F.2d at 1200 (citations omitted). These remarks do not seem consistent, however, with the spirit 
of the rest of the opinion. If there were only one oversecured party, payments to that secured party 
would not "benefit" the insiders; indeed, the payments would not have met the hypothetical liquida-
tion test of § 547(b)(5). But the benefit to the insiders when a guaranteed junior undersecured party 
exists is obvious. The payment to the senior oversecured party means that the junior undersecured 
party will now receive more collateral, benefiting the insiders, who now have less exposure. Since the 
senior secured party is the initial transferee of the insiders' voidable preference, the senior ~ecured 
party should clearly be liable. 
827 Baker, supra note 63, at 147. 
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payment benefited a junior secured party and ·an insider surety,328 the 
senior secured claim revives. Therefore, recovery from a senior secured 
party may not increase the bankrupt estate, but at least it allows for the 
debtor to obtain some cash in exchange for a security interest in non-
liquid collateral---"-a kind of involuntary postpetition loan-and with no 
need to adequately protect the junior secured parties.829 Or it may be the 
case that the collateral no longer exists by the time of the debtor's bank-
ruptcy. The collateral, freed up when the senior secured party is paid, 
may have been pledged elsewhere, or sold. 880 In such a case, recovery 
from the senior secured party enriches the bankruptcy estate. 
Professor Thomas Buckley tries to argue against Deprizio liability of 
the senior secured party by denying that transfers to the senior secured 
party benefit the junior secured party. According to Buckley, a transfer to 
the senior secured party is simultaneously a transfer directly to the junior 
secured party, indicating that there are two transfers.881 If so, then the 
junior secured party is not indirectly benefited by the transfers to the sen-
ior secured party but rather is a direct transferee of collateral otherwise 
dedicated to the senior claim.882 The consequence of such an approach is 
that two unrelated transfers have taken place, and therefore the senior 
secured party cannot be the initial transferee of the junior secured party's 
voidable preference. So conceived, no Deprizio liability can be laid on the 
828 
· Peter Borowitz states that the secured party will not have to return the payment. Instead, the 
trustee will let the senior secured party retain the payment, avoid the security interest to the extent of 
the payment, and preserve that senior security interest for the benefit of the estate under § 551 so that 
it may be asserted againsf the junior secured party. Peter L. Borowitz, Waiving Subrogation Rights 
and Conjuring Up Demons in Response to Deprizio, 45 Bus. LAW. 2151, 2166 (1990). This sugges-
tion does not comport very well with § 550(a)(1), whi~ gives the court discretion to order the return 
of the property conveyed or its value. As the remainirtg security interest is neither the property trans-
ferred (i.e., unencumbered cash) nor the value of the property transferred, it is hard to see how the 
court can order the avoidance of a perfectly valid security interest when the trustee wants cash. 
819 In a voluntary postpetition loan where a senior security interest is granted the lender, the 
junior secured parties are entitled to adequate protection of their subordinated security interests. 11 
U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)(B) (1988). Where a junior secured party suffers an instant demotion because the 
trustee has made payments to the senior oversecured party, the juniqr secured party should not be able 
to claim that this consequence of avoidance gives rise to a right to adequate protection. 
880 Buckley, supra note 319, at 283. If the original secured party has perfected by filing, the 
financing statement may continue to stay on file. Under the U.C.C.'s "first to perfect or file" rule, the 
secured party would continue to be senior when its secured claim revives. Professor Buckley wonders 
whether the secured party can resist the debtor's demand that a termination statement be submitted 
under U.C.C. § 9-404, on the ground that the secured party is "committed" to lend by virtue of being 
potentially liable for a voidable preference-a concern for debtors who are not even likely to be bank-
rupt. Id. at 283 n.114. 
aa, Id. 
888 Id. at 284-85. 
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doorstep of the senior secured party. 
What Buckley does not do, however, is explain why payments or 
other transfers to the .,senior secured party constitute a new transfer of 
collateral to the junior secured party. The creation of a security interest is 
defined as the agglutination of the three elements of attachment,333 plus 
perfection, as regulated by section 547(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The 
junior secured party received a transfer when the junior security interest 
was created and perfected. But how does it receive another, separate se-
curity interest when the senior secured party is endowed with either cash 
( extinguishing all or part of the senior claim) or further collateral? If a 
security interest is a power to sell the debtor interest in the collateral at 
the time the security interest attached, 334 then the junior secured party 
had all of this power when the junior security interest was created. The 
senior security interest continues to have this senior power of sale-a 
power that can terminate the junior security interest. That the senior 
claim now has additional collateral not otherwise available to the junior 
secured party, or that the senior claim has shrunk through payment, does 
not affect the seniority of the power of sale, nor does it affect the status of 
the junior power of sale. When property changes value, there has been no 
necessary transfer of property. The only thing affected is the value of this 
junior power of sale. Therefore, it is hard to conceive of the junior secured 
party receiving a direct transfer from the debtor because the senior se-
cured party was paid or further secured. Professor Buckley's suggestion 
must therefore be rejected as a mere revival of the "two transfer" theory. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Tripartite preference cases arise because the trustee may recover a 
transfer (or its value) either from the creditor receiving the transfer or 
from a creditor enjoying the benefit of a transfer to someone else. Over-
shadowing these cases is the louring presence of the Deprizio case, which 
holds that innocent "initial transferees" must returil( a transfer if some 
other insider creditor enjoyed the benefit. This holding, based on the clear 
meaning of section 550(a)(1), effectively extended the preference period 
from ninety days to a year whenever a creditor takes a guaranty from an 
insider of the debtor. This holding has now largely been overthrown by 
Congress in new section SS0(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Even if Deprizio is largely repealed, many problems will remain in 
••• U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1978). 
884 Id. § 9-504(4). 
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the analysis of tripartite voidable preference cases. As we have seen, the 
definition of "benefit" is quite controversial. The precise definition of 
"antecedent debt," given the contingent nature of .subrogation claims by 
sureties, also raises difficult issues. The limit on the trustee's ability to 
recover the value of a security interest (instead of simply avoiding the 
set:urity interest) has largely been left to the discretion of courts,. which 
have yet to work out a very coherent policy on governing this choice. And 
finally, defenses based upon new value supplied by a person other than 
the defendant in the voidable preference case have proven very difficult to 
fathom. This article has attempted to contribute to the learning on all of 
these subjects. Even though Deprizio has not survived the wrath of Con-
gress, these issues will continue to pose the most difficult issues in the 
generally difficult arena of voidable preference law. 
